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This dissertation tests the legal model of judicial behavior and uses party
capability, or litigant resource, theory to explain litigant success in the Court of
Appeals for environmental cases and help understand the role litigant type and
resources play. Environmental law has received little attention in judicial politics, and
I examine which judicial behavior model explains case outcomes. The legal model
argues case characteristics best explain judicial outcomes, whereas litigant resource
theory posits judicial a litigant’s resources, or lack thereof, explain outcomes.

Galanter’s (1974) party capability theory focuses on advantages repeat
players, the “haves,” possess and how these advantages enable them to more often
prevail over one-shot, “have not” litigants. This theory is tested using a typology of
litigant types including individuals, businesses, state and local governments, and
other groups, such as nonprofit organizations. Songer and Sheehan (1992) and
Wheeler (1987) find that litigant resources have an effect on success before the Court
of Appeals. This has not yet been analyzed exclusively with environmental cases, so I
show how resources and statutory provisions matter in this arena.

I examine five of the most litigated environmental statutes: the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act. Data for this
analysis includes cases in Westlaw and Lexis Nexis from 1994–2008 in which these
statutes were the primary ones under dispute.

Litigant resources theory most persuasively explained litigant success and
support Galanter’s argument that repeat players and litigants with the most resources
will be successful. The legal model is supported by evidence that specific provisions
of the environmental statutes directly influence case outcomes and this varies by
statute. There is still much research to be done in this understudied area at the
intersection of judicial and environmental politics, but this dissertation improves the
literature considerably by explaining what determines case outcomes in the Court of
Appeals for these statutes and how the environmental statutes are interpreted by the
court system.
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CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE VALUE OF LITIGANT RESOURCES AT
THE COURT OF APPEALS
Introduction
Beginning in the 1970s, the environmental movement swept across the United States,
and in the process, Congress enacted a series of groundbreaking statutes focused on
environmental protection. With the last major revision of these statutes in 1990 for
the Clean Air Act, interpretations of these environmental policies are largely the
domain of the judiciary and responsibility of judges who may or may not have
substantive expertise. This invites the questions of which statutes and cases are
litigated, how these statutes are interpreted, which types of parties win the cases, and
what the legal interpretations mean for environmental policy at-large. In order to start
addressing these questions, an examination of judicial behavior is necessary.
We know judges at each level in the court hierarchy behave differently with
both endogenous and exogenous factors including ideology, case issue, and circuit
location influencing case outcomes and a litigant’s chance at prevailing. When
specific issue areas are examined, the varying influence of these factors continues.
For example, limited work has been done to understand how judges behave in
environmental cases for particular statutes or a sample of circuits, but we do not know
to what extent the most prevalent judicial models explain outcomes in this area on a
larger scale. We also do not have a solid understanding of how the existing body of
knowledge on judicial hierarchy, litigant resources, amicus briefs, interest groups and
1

demographic characteristics of the judges influence judicial behavior in
environmental cases at the appellate level.
The main focus of this dissertation is to understand the relationship between
judicial behavior and litigant resources at the Court of Appeals using five substantive
environmental laws: the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the
Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
These laws were chosen because they are some of the longest established
environmental statutes, cover most of the biggest environmental problems in the
United States, and there was sufficient data at the Court of Appeals level for a
quantitative analysis.
Perhaps notable absences from this research are the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), and the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The ESA was
not chosen for two reasons; first, it is not primarily enforced by the Environmental
Protection Agency as the other statutes are and secondly, there were not enough cases
for a quantitative analysis meeting the coding decisions during the time period under
study. CERCLA was not included because of the complicated liability regime it
imposes and the challenge in classifying upperdogs/underdogs, which as described in
Chapter 2, is a core component of this research. Finally, NEPA was not included
because it is more of a procedural statute and puts forth standards used by all of the
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actors and other statutes. These are all areas with potential for analysis and will be
discussed under future research plans in Chapter 7.
In order to test the statutes chosen, I will examine on what grounds litigants
prevail and the impacts of both endogenous and exogenous factors on environmental
decisions at the appellate courts. How does the legal model explain judicial behavior
in these pollution-centered statutes, which comprise a significant portion of
environmental law? Applying this literature to litigant resources, what are the
implications of judicial behavior for environmental law? Having a sufficient amount
of resources to achieve success in the courts is a problem that constantly confronts
environmental advocates and organizations, making it important to understand both
how resources and judicial behavior can influence their success.
The unique contribution of this research to judicial literature is the application
of theories to an issue area receiving little attention from court scholars and a
contemporary application of Songer and Sheehan’s (1992) party capability theory to
success at the Court of Appeals which they argue is an ideal level to study litigant
resources within the federal hierarchy. Environmental law is not an area studied to the
extent of other areas such as search and seizure cases, gender discrimination, or civil
rights, and we do not know to what extent the judicial literature persuasively explains
judicial decisions.
For the environmental literature, this research will help understand the context
in which environmental litigation is pursued from the perspective of litigant resources
and from the court’s standpoint on how these environmental cases are decided. I look
3

at who wins the cases and how they do so, which may enable future litigants to be
more strategic in which cases they choose to pursue and which provisions will likely
be most successful. This is particularly important for litigants with fewer resources
who need to allocate them in the most efficient manner.
Bridging these two fields will provide a richer understanding of both judicial
behavior and litigant resources using a large sample of environmental cases at the
Court of Appeals. In order to understand each field’s contribution to this dissertation,
I will first discuss the important theories and research.

Literature Review: Theories of Judicial Behavior
Judicial scholars have developed several models to explain judicial behavior
including the legal, attitudinal, and strategic interaction models. The legal model
claims that decisions of a court are substantially influenced by facts of the case in
light of the plain meaning of the statutes, the Constitution, precedent, and the framers’
intent as determined by the judge(s). Segal and Spaeth (2002) criticize this model
before presenting their alternative view of attitudinal decision-making. They argue
that with the legal model it can be a challenge to determine “plain meaning.” The
English language is not precise, legislatures often are unable to define critical terms,
statutes may conflict, and identical words may have different meanings depending on
the context. Additionally, they note a number of ways judges at all court levels can
deviate from adhering to precedent, including distinguishing a case because the facts
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before them are substantially different, limiting/extending a precedent in principle,
and the most clear rejection of overruling a precedent (p. 81).
After critiquing what they perceive as weaknesses of the legal model, Segal
and Spaeth offer their own view of judicial decision-making, the attitudinal model.
Rather than make decisions based on the pure law, they argue judges selectively
choose cases that coincide with their legal preferences, giving the appearance they are
adhering to the legal model when they are actually choosing cases to support their
ideological preferences. Whether or not a judge is liberal or conservative is the
driving force behind a judge’s decision at the Supreme Court, not the law.
Subsequent scholars such as Hansford and Spriggs (2006) have modified this
finding of the attitudinal model, discovering that while ideology remains an important
explanatory variable, there are other critical influences. As part of the law and the
cornerstone of the legal model, precedents remain important in the attitudinal model,
but in a different way. In a study of Supreme Court decisions from 1946–1999,
Hansford and Spriggs (2006) find that precedents can be a constraint on decisions, but
that they also present opportunities for judges to support their preferred outcomes.
Hansford and Spriggs note that in the Supreme Court cases they examined, judges
still took precedent into account, but as the ideological distance from the precedent
grew, the probability of the precedent being treated positively declined. This finding
was also tested at the circuit level. Here, Hansford and Spriggs found that appellate
judges pay more attention to their court’s own precedents that were positively treated
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by the Supreme Court and were more likely to both follow these cases and cite them
in opinions.
To address perceived gaps left by the legal and attitudinal models, particularly
at the opinion-writing stage, scholars such as Murphy (1964), Epstein and Knight
(1998), Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck (2000), and Hammond, Bonneau, and
Sheehan (2006) advocate a model called strategic interaction or strategic behavior. In
this model, a justice may not advance their ideological preferences to the extent
he/she would prefer in favor of a supporting a more limited opinion. Epstein and
Knight describe it as follows,
[J]ustices may be primarily seekers of legal policy, but they are not
unconstrained actors who make decisions based solely on their own
ideological attitudes. Rather, justices are strategic actors who realize their
ability to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of
other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional
context in which they act (1998, 10).
Focusing on Supreme Court opinions, Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
(2000) argue judges make strategic calculations when assigning and drafting
opinions. Forming a coalition of at least five justices to produce a majority opinion
involves what the authors term the “collegial game” (Maltzman, Spriggs, and
Wahlbeck 2000, 8). The collegial game has three phases: first draft of the majority
opinion, responses to the initial draft from other justices in the majority, and finally
circulation of other draft opinions in response to the feedback. The legal model would
explain the outcome during this process as a result of the case facts and law, and the
attitudinal model would explain the outcome in terms of a judge’s ideological
preferences. The strategic model draws from both of these theories and looks at
6

judges as strategic actors with ideological preferences who have to operate within a
system of institutional constraints. These constraints include both formal rules and
informal norms that restrict choices available. In a collegial game based on
interdependency, the strategic model looks at how judges craft opinions within these
constraints while furthering their ideological preferences.
Applying strategic behavior to the Court of Appeals, Hettinger, Lindquist, and
Martinek (2004, 2006) look at ideological disagreement among appellate judges and
how institutional differences between the Supreme Court and appellate courts may
influence horizontal dissensus within a circuit or vertical dissensus between the
circuit and higher court. Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek (2006) view the
attitudinal model as a starting point and then introduce additional characteristics of
judges, cases, and the circuits to explain behavior at the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Factors such as position on the court (chief justice, freshman, district judge sitting by
designation), circuit norms (dissensus, workload), and case characteristics (salience,
complexity, quality of legal argument) are applied to a justice’s decision on whether
they should write a separate opinion. Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek (2006)
ultimately conclude that the attitudinal model alone cannot explain decision-making
at the circuit level but that it remains a useful model to start from.
While Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek (2006) do not find support for
strategic behavior in models testing behavior between the Circuit and Supreme Court,
the model testing reversal of District Court decisions finds that factors such as circuit
and case characteristics, or whether the Chief Justice authored the opinion, do play a
7

role in whether these decisions are reversed. Overall, the research affirms the
importance of ideology in dissensus, but invites questions on how strategic theory
explains dissensus within a circuit or among the levels of the court system.
These scholars have demonstrated that there are a number of ways to look at
strategic behavior including ideological distance from other branches of government,
or within the same branch, or in a hierarchical sense between a panel and circuit or
the Supreme Court. This dissertation focuses on rulings at the appellate level in the
majority opinion and does not examine dissents or reversals. To test the potential
influence of ideological distance as a strategic factor in the majority opinion, though,
a variable is included to test whether ideological distance between the panel and
circuit is significant. The theoretical focus remains on litigant resources and the legal
model, however.
Both the legal and attitudinal models, with a clearer focus on judicial
decisions than strategic behavior, have also been applied to the lower courts and we
have learned more about how they pertain and their limitations. The lower courts are
different in several important ways including a mandatory docket and the possibility
of being overruled by higher courts. At the Court of Appeals, the influence of
ideology and partisanship remain, and much of the attitudinal model can be applied.
For instance, Songer and Davis (1990) conduct a longitudinal evaluation of First
Amendment, civil rights, and criminal appeal areas and find that Democrat-appointed
judges more often issue liberal decisions than judges appointed by Republicans.
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Focusing on obscenity cases, Songer and Haire (1992) also discover that partisanship
is influential in predicting how a judge will rule.
While the attitudinal model is useful at the circuit level, there are other factors
that also become important in explaining judicial behavior including circuit location
and panel effects. Focusing on environmental cases, Wenner and Dutter (1988) find
that some circuits are more favorable to environmental demands, and litigant types
such as the government are more successful than others depending on the circuit.
Revesz (1997) examines the effects of panel composition and how a judge’s
individual ideology can influence the case outcome for the D.C. Circuit. Using
environmental cases, Revesz (1997) finds that ideology of other judges on an
appellate panel are a better predictor of a vote than a judge’s own ideology,
supporting the claim that the ideological identity on a panel matters for judicial
behavior.
An additional important aspect of judicial behavior is compliance by lower
courts and the extent to which courts choose to comply and the extent to which they
are monitored. Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) use the principal-agent model to
study compliance by the Court of Appeals with Supreme Court search and seizure
cases. They find that the circuits are responsive to the court in this issue area, but that
they also find opportunities to shirk in situations where there is not a clear fact pattern
or precedent. Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) also find that litigants can play an
active role in monitoring by the Supreme Court, but that when the circuits appear to
have been faithful agents, litigants are less likely to play this “fire alarm” role.
9

Monitoring in this case was measured by whether litigants were more likely to appeal
cases that relied on the preferences of lower court judges rather than those that relied
on the Supreme Court’s preferences.
Haire, Lindquist, and Songer (2003) take a similar approach to studying court
hierarchy and compliance, but instead look at civil rights decisions of circuit and trial
courts. They find that the Supreme Court influences the circuit courts and that the
district courts take both Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedents into account
when issuing opinions. Interestingly, they also show that the appellate court tries to
advance its own preferences whenever possible and reverses cases to advance these
preferences and those of the Supreme Court. This research is a good example of the
attitudinal model’s claim regarding the supremacy of ideology, but also illustrates
other constraints faced by a court within the judicial hierarchy. Attitudes remain an
important influence, but as one moves down the court hierarchy, institutional factors
such as the fear of reversal also become more meaningful.
It is also important to understand how demographic factors such as gender and
race may influence judicial decision-making. Songer, Davis, and Haire (1994) find
that women are more likely to vote liberally when deciding employment
discrimination cases, but not when ruling on obscenity or search and seizure cases.
Boyd, Epstein, and Walker (2010) looked at whether male and female judges decided
cases differently and if the presence of a woman on a panel influenced the final
opinion. In a study of thirteen areas of law, they find gender effects only in cases
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dealing with sex discrimination. Their research suggests female judges decide cases
differently depending on the issue area.
Lastly, it is necessary to look at publication of cases and the implications for
researchers. The Judicial Conference encouraged appellate courts to establish criteria
for publishing opinions with precedential value in the 1970s and said “[O]pinions
should be restricted to appellate decisions of precedential import, and have ‘[a]
uniform set of procedures and mechanisms for access to court of appeals opinions,
guidelines for publication or distribution, and clear standards for citation’” (Hooper,
Miletich, and Levy 2011). In response to the volume of opinions, circuits adopted
their own rules for publication. For example, the Fourth Circuit will only publish
cases that were briefed and had oral arguments while the Ninth publishes all opinions
except memoranda or orders unless the court orders their publication (Hooper,
Miletich, and Levy 2011, 31). In circuits such as the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth,
publication is ordered if there is a concurring or dissenting opinion to the case. Due to
the variation in circuit rules, publication rates can range from 7% to 40.2% (Hooper,
Miletich, and Levy 2011, 30).
The importance of case publication is that only published cases serve as
precedent in the circuit they are decided (Malmsheimer, Keele, Floyd 2004). With the
Court of Appeals as the effective court of last resort, this means the published
opinions establish the rule of law that applies to subsequent cases. Due to only
approximately five to ten-percent of all cases being published and difficulties in
obtaining unpublished opinions, scholars initially focused more on published
11

decisions for research (Ringquist and Emmert 1999). Carp and Rowland (1983)
argued published cases were representative of all case and that because they were the
most important decisions, excluding unpublished opinions would not significantly
affect the results. Subsequent scholars disagreed and began exploring whether there
were meaningful differences between published and unpublished opinions.
Ringquist and Emmert (1999) test an integrated model to determine if there
are differences in penalty severity between published and unpublished district court
cases for the CAA, CWA, and RCRA from 1974–1991. They find penalties in
published cases are much higher than those for unpublished cases and argue that sole
reliance on published opinions would have suggested significantly different
conclusions.
Using both district and appellate cases of Forest Service litigation, Keele et al.
(2009) analyze differences in ideological effects in published and unpublished
opinions. At the appellate level, judges were less likely to follow their ideological
preferences in unpublished cases, whereas at the district court level, there was no
difference between published and unpublished opinions and judges did not follow
their ideological preferences in either type. Their findings not only demonstrate
differences between case publications, but also differences within the federal judicial
hierarchy.
Songer et al. (1989) use the upperdog/underdog typology to this publication
debate and find that opinions in which upperdogs such as the government won had a
statistically significant higher publication rate. Similarly, Swenson (2004) observed
12

that district court judges were also more likely to publish opinions in which the
upperdogs won. Publication rates also varied across circuits when upperdogs were the
petitioners (Songer and Sheehan 1992). These findings suggest that both publication
type and the upperdog/underdog are important to understand judicial behavior and
case outcomes.
This research on opinion publication, demographics, and judicial behavior at
multiple levels of the court illustrates the dominance of a few theories, but also the
fact that we do not know the extent to which they apply to different time periods and
specifically to environmental cases. With most environmental cases not reaching the
Supreme Court and staying at the circuit level, published and unpublished cases at the
Court of Appeals will be the focus of this work.

Role of Litigant Resources
No matter which level of court under study, resources available to litigants are critical
and can be a deciding factor in a case. Galanter (1974) argued that litigants with
greater resources, status, and experience have more advantages in court as repeat
players over one-shot litigants. He constructed a matrix of one-shot litigants and
repeat players as a way of explaining different match-ups in the courtroom and
showing how the system advantages repeat players such as the government. Galanter
(1974) notes several ways one-shotters can gain the advantages provided to the
system by repeat players and emphasizes that while these players are successful more
often than not, the “haves” do not always prevail in litigation (Kritzer and Silbey
13

2003). Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan, and Friedman (1987) studied litigant resources
and, in contrast to Galanter, argued that the “haves” do not have an advantage in
cases at the State Supreme Court level.
Songer and Sheehan (1992) tested these inconsistent results on cases at the
Court of Appeals using published and unpublished opinions and studied the effect of
litigant resources at the circuit level. Cases from the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuit in 1986 were included, a total of 4,281 cases. Each litigant type was put in one
of the following categories: individuals, businesses, state and local governments, or
other which include nonprofit organizations, private/nonprofit schools, organizations,
political parties, or otherwise unclassifiable litigants. The authors then did a second
analysis focusing on specific business types and created a category of “underdogs” of
poor and racial minorities. Underdogs were the least successful litigants in this
second analysis on specific business types. Litigant resources made the most
difference and upperdogs won more than other litigant types, even after controlling
for ideology, region, and case characteristics (Songer and Sheehan 1992). Farole
(1999) also used the classifications put forth by Wheeler et al. (1987) and used by
Songer and Sheehan (1992) to compare litigant resources and confirmed that stronger
litigants, those with greater resources, were again more successful than litigants with
fewer resources. It is this typology and finding that I test with environmental cases at
the Court of Appeals.
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Administrative Procedures and Chevron Deference
In addition to the greater resources upperdogs have, there are advantages and
challenges inherent in administrative law and precedents, specifically the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 and the Supreme Court ruling in
Chevron U.S.A. vs. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) that favor upperdog
litigants, particularly the federal government, and make it more likely for them to
prevail in a case against other litigant types because it calls for judicial deference to
agency decisions. The APA forms the foundation of administrative law, defining
“agency,” agency functions, types of agency action, procedures for adjudication and
rulemaking, and setting standards for judicial review (Funk, Shapiro, and Weaver
2001). Chevron further clarifies when and how deference to decisions of the federal
agencies is required under the APA, further stacking the deck against underdog
litigants. Being aware of both the APA and Chevron decision is important to
understanding the environment in which litigants with fewer resources must operate.
The APA provides a critical foundation for administrative law in the United
States and sets the stage for how agencies operate and their responsibilities. Passed in
1946 after years of lobbying and reports by the Special Committee on Administrative
Law of the American Bar Association (ABA), the APA was passed. The statute’s
purpose was to establish a uniform code across all federal agencies. It contains six
major sections all with relevance to environmental law: “definitions of terms used in
the act; the rules for fair information practices; guidelines for rulemaking; procedures
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for adjudication; creation of administrative law judges; and provisions for judicial
review of agency action” (Buck 2006).
Several sections are of particular relevance. Section 551, known as the
definitions section, defines “agency” with particular exceptions such as the President
not being considered an agency and a government corporation not automatically
defined as an agency (Funk et al. 2001). Under the APA, agencies are responsible for
implementing laws of the U.S. and categorized as regulatory agencies, those that
administer social entitlement programs, and other agencies such as the Department of
State or Forest Service that do not fall into either of the previous categories (p. 17).
For the cases in this dissertation, the EPA is the agency appearing most often.
The judicial review section of the APA, §701, clarifies procedures for review
of agency actions including when they are exempt. By covering agency actions, the
APA is the standard the courts use (Keele et al. 2006). An action is exempt from
review if the “statutes preclude judicial review” or the action has been “committed to
agency discretion by law” (Buck 2006). A related section §706(2)(A) prohibits
“arbitrary and capricious action and abuses of discretion” and specifies when these
actions are subject to review. It is therefore the responsibility of the court to
determine if an action falls under the agency’s discretion or if it was an abuse of such
discretion. A judge may “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed” and “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions”
deemed “arbitrary, capricious, abuses of discretion, violation of constitutional rights,
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exceed statutory authority, violate due process, or are unsupported by substantial
evidence” (Buck 2006, 116; Pierce et al. 1992).
In the 1970s, a series of environmental statutes were passed and opportunities
for the courts and interested parties to become involved in both procedural aspects
and substantive acts of agencies were expanded (Shapiro 1995). By the 1980s, a
majority of the significant decisions of federal regulatory agencies were the subject of
litigation (Tate and Vallinder 1995). Provisions included in the APA for judicial
review under §701 and §704 that ranged from no deference to almost complete
deference to agency action were broadened by laws such as the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and by provisions in the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). NEPA added the requirement for all federal agencies to include the public in
both the planning and analysis before the agency made a decision while the ESA
allowed for more public access to remedies through the courts (Anderson 1973,
Alden and Ellefson 1997).
In addition to the APA, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
(1984) has had a major impact on administrative law and exempted some instances of
discretionary action from judicial review (Buck 2006). Chevron is one of the most
significant Supreme Court decisions effecting how the courts evaluate rules
promulgated by federal agencies (467 U.S. 837 [1984]). It is the central opinion on
deference to the EPA and how the courts interpret EPA discretionary acts, though its
value as precedent is not limited to the agency or even environmental law (Ferrey
2010). The case involved defining a “major stationary source” to improve the
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efficiency of control measures listed in the Clean Air Act (CAA) 1977 Amendments.
The statute did not define this source type referred to in §172(b), and the EPA chose
to define it with a “bubble concept” that treated all polluting activities belonging to
one industry group and located on neighboring properties as one source. By treating
an entire plant as a “stationary source,” an existing plant only had to install/modify
one piece of equipment rather than make plant-wide modifications to meet terms of
their initial permit as long as the modification did not increase their overall emissions
(Galalis 2004, 80). Environmentalists disagreed with the EPA’s rule and “bubble
concept” and the D.C. Circuit Court agreed, finding the EPA’s statutory interpretation
inconsistent with congressional intent (Cross and Tiller 1998). The Supreme Court
sided with the EPA, however, and in the 6-0 opinion, the Court ruled judges must
defer to agencies and put forth a two-step process for interpreting agency rules
(Hurwitz 2006).
The first step in the process is for the court to ask whether Congress has
directly addressed the question at hand. In cases where Congress clearly expressed its
view on the issue, the court and agency must defer rather than give a new
interpretation. If the court finds that “Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue” and the statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue,” then the court moves to the second step in the process (Galalis 2004).
The second step of the Chevron process is to determine whether the agency
regulation in the dispute is a “permissible construction” of the statute. If the agency’s
interpretation is a “permissible construction” then the court must defer to the agency’s
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rule. This does not mean the court has to agree with the construction or feel that it
was the best possible interpretation of ambiguity on the statute, only that the
interpretation was reasonable. If a regulation passes the first part of the Chevron test,
it is highly probable the agency will win at this step as well. As of 2004, the Supreme
Court had not invalidated any agency rule failing step two (Galalis 2004). Several
circuit courts have overturned agency rules at this step, however, making a closer
analysis of the circuit level interesting in exploring the force of Chevron and to what
extent this court level defers to the Supreme Court.
Chevron is one of the most cited cases in contemporary law, making its
impact on judging important to examine (Ferrey 2010). If the court characterizes an
issue in the dispute as a question of law, courts will rule on the issue independently
and not defer to the decision of the agency (p. 63). For interpretive rules, this is
particularly the case because these rules do not receive the same level of deference as
a formal rule (Ferrey 2010, 64). Despite the Chevron ruling specifically calling for
judges to “reconcile competing political interests [but] not on the basis of the judges’
personal policy preferences,” ideology can also influence how Chevron factors in to a
judge’s decision with a court deferring to an agency action if they agree with the
agency’s policies (Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC 1984, Cross and Tiller 1998, Caruson
and Bitzer 2004, Sheehan 1990).
A number of scholars debate the extent to which courts actually defer to
agency decisions and whether the Supreme Court’s precedents since Chevron provide
clear guidance on how much lower courts must defer to agency rules (Cohen and
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Spitzer 1994, Elliott 2005, Galalis 2004, Gossett 1997, and Hurwitz 2006). Deference
is justified by one of three reasons: expertise of agency officials, increased political
accountability, and congressional intent. The first two were stated specifically in the
Chevron decision while the third was implied (Gossett 1997). Advocates of the
Chevron decision argue it was a positive administrative law change because decisions
are now vested in substantive policy experts in the agency rather than relying on
lawyers in the Office of General Counsel (OGC) or congressional staffers. Some,
such as Elliott (2005), go as far to say Chevron has improved the administrative
state’s democratic legitimacy. Critics argue this deference shifts the balance of power
to an agency that is part of the executive branch and likely heavily influenced by the
political priorities of the president, rather than to objective policy experts within the
agencies.
The significance of Chevron for litigant success today is the advantage it gives
to federal agencies. Agency decisions are the status quo or controlling precedent. Any
party challenging a decision made by the EPA has to overcome this Chevron
deference, which is very difficult for any litigant type to do, especially underdogs
with limited resources. A litigant must also show why an agency action is subject to
judicial review, which may be as difficult. The combined effect of both the APA and
the Chevron decision is to put forth administrative processes consistent across all
agencies in the federal government. This dissertation focuses on the Chevron decision
specifically, but it must be understood within the context of the APA.
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Role of Amicus Briefs
A number of articles have brought together research on amicus briefs and the
upperdog/underdog or “haves” and “have-nots” literature. This body of work
examines whether briefs submitted advantage particular litigant types, if they level
the playing field, or if they have no influence. Results for litigant success change
slightly when amicus briefs are added in to the upperdog/underdog work. Barker
(1967) notes that “the activity of third parties in sponsoring litigation has made the
judicial forum much more accessible to individuals who raise issues of broad-scale
significance” (43). For environmental actors pursuing broad-scale issues such as air
and water pollution, this is particularly the case. Songer et al. (2000) find that the
briefs level the playing field, and upperdogs have little advantage when the underdog
is supported by an amicus brief. At the Supreme Court level, briefs are influential in
shaping both the Court’s policy outputs and are not simply submitted in cases where
the submitting party believes the case is more likely to go in their favor (Collins
2007). A particularly interesting finding in Collins (2007) is the threshold effect of
briefs where after a large number of briefs in favor of a particular position, there are
diminishing returns. It remains to be seen if this finding applies at other courts or with
specific issue areas.
Amicus briefs are an additional way for actors to participate in the legal
process and possibly influence the final opinion. The briefs can be an additional
resource for any litigant. McGuire (1990) and Wolpert (1991) focus on specific issue
areas (obscenity and gender discrimination) and find that there was a positive
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correlation and greater probability of winning based on the number of amicus briefs
filed in support of the litigant. Songer and Sheehan (1993) tested this finding on a
larger number of issues areas and looked at litigants with at least one amicus brief in
support at the Supreme Court, compared to those who do not receive support. They
found the briefs had little impact overall. Litigants with at least one brief in their
favor were one percent more likely to win, appellants who were supported by briefs
were slightly more likely to lose, and respondents with amicus briefs were more
likely to win (Songer and Sheehan 1993). At the state supreme court level, Songer
and Kuersten (1995) find a positive and strong relationship between litigant success
and amicus support. Litigants with one or more briefs were more likely to win than
those with no support in published decisions from state supreme courts in Georgia,
South Carolina, and North Carolina.
In the judicial literature, little work has been done in the specific area of
environmental litigation to determine whether amicus briefs influence litigant
success. With the technical nature of environmental legislation, there are significant
demands placed on the legal system, requiring judges to make decisions on complex
scientific regulations. For example, provisions of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act for distinguishing whether a solid waste is hazardous can be
scientifically complex to interpret and apply and amicus briefs could arguably play a
critical role in explaining the broad-scale significance of this statutory language and
in translating the technical issues into more understandable points of law. Hassler and
O’Conner (1986) look at environmental litigation and find that amicus briefs from
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specific groups do play an important role, but were unable to say if this was due to the
groups studied or the issue area.

Environmental Statutes
During the ‘Environmental Decade’ of the 1970s, Congress passed a series of
environmental laws regulating, water, air, and hazardous or toxic substances and the
courts became more involved in the implementation of the laws (Wenner 1982).
These statutes set acceptable levels of pollutants, required technologies, and
attempted to regulate a substance from its creation and release through its disposal
and clean-up.
In her early examination of the court’s role in environmental policy, Wenner
(1982) coded 1,900 cases at the district and circuit court level from 1970–1979 to
understand the judicial system’s growing role in implementing policy. The six types
of laws included were as follows: pollution controls laws (including the CAA, CWA,
TSCA, and FIFRA), wildlife laws, public trust laws, public works laws, state laws,
and miscellaneous. The largest number of cases, 728, dealt with pollution control
issues. The four most frequent types of match-ups were interest groups challenging
the government, businesses challenging the EPA, the government challenging the
industry, and intergovernmental disputes (Wenner 1982, 39).
Most relevant to the statutes coded for this dissertation are Wenner’s findings
on the CAA and CWA. For air pollution cases, the federal government was usually
the defendant and businesses were the most frequent petitioner, often claiming the
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new National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) were too strict. The CAA has
a unique feature requiring anyone challenging the NAAQS or motor vehicle
emissions to start the case in the D.C. circuit which Wenner’s research finds to be
more favorable to environmentalists (p. 110). The EPA also has exclusive jurisdiction
with regards to air quality cases. For these cases, the federal government was usually
successful.
For the CWA, there were twice as many cases from 1970–1979 compared to
air pollution litigation. The government was again the most frequent defendant, but in
this area of law, environmentalists petitioned more cases than businesses and were
much more successful pursuing citizen suits. Additionally, the CWA requires no
exclusive jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit and primary responsibility for enforcement
resides with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Coast Guard, rather than the EPA.
Both the federal government and industry, “upperdogs” under the Songer typology,
were very successful in water pollution cases (Wenner 1982).
An interesting finding from Wenner’s work is differences among circuits and
among statues, providing support for the strategy of litigants engaging in forum
shopping. Looking first at circuit differences, D.C. issued the most pro-environmental
decisions and along with the First and Seventh Circuits, was more supportive to
environmental groups and less favorable to industries. In contrast, the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits ranked low in environmental values and ruled more often in favor of
business demands. Businesses avoided the circuits environmental groups often
prevailed in, supporting the claim of forum shopping and seeking the most favorable
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location to one’s position. In research on forest litigation, Malmsheimer et al. (2004)
found litigant success for the Forest Service varied by circuit with the Seventh and
Eighth being the most favorable to the agency compared to low success in the Ninth
Circuit, likely reflecting the greater frequency of environmental groups petitioning
case in this circuit. Jones and Taylor (1995) compare litigant success by statue and
find the government wins most often in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
cases and, along with Native American tribes, is one of the most successful litigants
under the National Forest Management Act (NFMA). Varying success rates for
litigants by circuits and by litigant type will be tested in subsequent chapters.
For this dissertation, I focus on five substantive and heavily litigated
environmental laws addressing water, air, and hazardous or toxic substances. This is a
more narrow focus than Wenner (1982), but makes the important contribution of
adding the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and examining whether trends
from the environmental decade still hold over thirty years later. RCRA looks
primarily at how hazardous wastes are used, handled, and discharged. The Clean Air
Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act (CWA) address problems of air pollution and water
contamination. Lastly, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) regulate the manufacture and
distribution of toxic substances. By selecting these statutes, two of the most salient
pollution control issues of clean air and clean water are addressed in addition to
covering the ‘cradle-to-grave’ process for hazardous and toxic substances.
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Legislative Background for RCRA
RCRA was enacted in 1976 as an effort to provide a cradle-to-grave monitoring
system for hazardous waste. It regulates the creation, transportation, storage,
treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste substances at a final waste site (Ferrey
2007). Congress amended the statute in 1984 to try and phase out disposal of toxic
chemicals and force development of better technology to reduce the toxicity of
hazardous wastes. While RCRA technically covers both nonhazardous solid wastes
and hazardous wastes, states have more responsibility to address and regulate
nonhazardous solid wastes.
Enforcement for RCRA provisions includes regulation by the EPA and other
government entities and citizen suit provisions. The EPA is responsible for
establishing permit conditions, determining when the conditions are violated and the
public welfare is endangered, and can demand information and access to the business
or contaminated site when needed. A weakness of this enforcement is its dependence
on voluntary self-monitoring by the industries and on the tracking system for waste
generators and transporters. This reliance on industry action invites litigation for
failing to report the required tracking information.
Citizen suits, under §7002 of RCRA allow any individual to pursue a civil
action against another person or against the EPA for failure to perform “a nondiscretionary act.” Citizens cannot sue the EPA if the agency chooses to not pursue
action against an alleged RCRA violator and there are a number of barriers to
pursuing citizen suits. One of the largest barriers is that citizen suits are preempted by
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state litigation or litigation filed by the EPA. In order to file a suit, citizen plaintiffs
must provide 60 days’ notice of intent to litigate or 90 days’ notice for imminent
hazard actions, they may not try to stop the siting of a new facility or issuance of a
permit, they may not pursue a suit if the EPA is prosecuting the action or a CERCLA
clean-up, they may not pursue enforcement action if it overlaps with state efforts, and
any suit must allege “continuous or intermittent violations” and cannot be based
completely on past RCRA violations. In addition to challenges of fewer resources,
these limitations make it difficult for citizen suits to be successfully pursued in the
courts and put the burden on other litigant types to challenge the federal government
and statute (Ferrey 2010). Ultimately, citizen suits are one way for underdog litigants
to pursue enforcement of environmental laws, but not without significant challenges.

Legislative Background for the CAA
The Clean Air Act (CAA) was originally adopted in 1963, with significant
amendments in 1970, 1977, and 1990. The statute marked a significant expansion of
the federal government’s role and authorized the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare to formulate air quality standards through discussions with polluters and
government representatives (Ferrey 2010). In 1970, legislation was passed amending
the CAA and creating a cooperative relationship between the federal government and
states. National ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ambient air were
established, along with minimum technology-based standards for emissions. The
states’ responsibility was to enforce these standards through State Implementation
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Plans (SIPs) (Ferrey 2010). The CAA amendments, along with other environmental
statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water Act, and the
Endangered Species Act were all part of President Nixon’s expansion of the federal
government’s regulatory role and oversight during the 1970s (Percival 2001).
Since the 1990 amendments, a large portion of cases arise from one of the
CAA’s regulatory provisions, specifically § 108/109 (NAAQS), § 111 (New Source
Performance Standards), or § 112 (emissions standards). The CAA contains
enforcement provisions for the EPA, which include civil actions, administrative
actions, and field citations. Additionally, the CAA has a provision allowing citizen
suits to be filed by individuals or private interest groups against the EPA or a private
party for civil penalties. Before a suit is filed, a 60-day notification must be given to
the EPA, which allows a grace period for compliance. In the event the EPA chooses
to pursue the case, the citizen suit becomes moot. One of the critical portions of this
statute is that it allows for attorney fees to be awarded if the citizen or group is
successful (Ferrey 2010). With individuals and nonprofit groups (“underdogs”) who
operate with more limited budgets, awarding attorney fees can be a critical factor
enabling them to bring suits challenging a business or federal agency “upperdog.”
A second provision with implications for individuals are the criminal penalties
for any violations “knowingly” committed by the accused which include forging
records, refusing to pay permit fees, failure to install mandated equipment to monitor
emissions, not following procedures set forth in SIPs, or the most serious violation
where a “source knowingly releases hazardous emissions creating ‘imminent danger
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of death or serious bodily injury.’” If convicted of these actions, a corporation or
individual acting on behalf of a corporation could face a large fine and jail (Ferrey
2010). The CAA also includes provisions and protections for whistleblower
complaints. A number of the cases from 2001–2007 at the appellate courts include
whistleblower complaints and decisions made by Administrative Review Boards
(ARBs) who originally heard the dispute.
The CAA includes citizen provisions, but the procedural requirements
established make it very difficult for individuals to pursue claims under this statute.
Individuals must not only understand the science behind the act, they must also have
the resources to prove how the federal or state actor erred and this can require
extensive research and testing. Nonprofits or businesses also wishing to challenge a
federal agency must overcome this research and resource hurdle, making any party
opposing an agency the underdog. Although it is difficult for underdogs to pursue
litigation in this area, they still chose to do so and in some cases succeed.

Legislative Background for the CWA
The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) we know today has its origin in the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, referred to as the Refuse Act. Originally intended to protect
U.S. waters from interference with navigation, it is the oldest environmental statute
and the first to regulate discharges into waterways (Ferrey 2010). The CWA’s goals
differed from those of previous statutes, focusing instead on restoring waterways to
the fishable and swimmable quality of 1983 and eliminating pollutant discharges by
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1985. A series of amendments later extended these target dates and further defined
the Act’s standards for what constituted a “discharge,” “navigable waters,” and
“waters of the United States” (Ferrey 2010). The importance of this change is the
additional discretion afforded to the EPA in establishing and interpreting standards.
This mandated deference, in addition to Chevron, makes it difficult for any litigant to
successfully challenge an EPA rule or interpretation.
Enforcement provisions for the CWA are similar to the CAA and §505 of the
CWA permits citizen suits. States are also allowed to challenge an EPA administrator
if the state feels the agency has failed to enforce an existing rule, if the agency has
failed to take action, or if the state feels its interests have been harmed. Finally, CWA
§507 contains a “whistleblower” provision allowing individuals to challenge a federal
agency or business and attempting to protect them from retaliation. This provides
underdogs with another legal avenue to pursue environmental protection while also
protecting them from retaliation by the upperdogs.

Legislative Background for the TSCA and FIFRA
In the last fifty years, more than 10,000 chemical substances have been put in use and
many are still consumed commercially. The two statutes that regulate the manufacture
and distribution of these statutes are the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) and the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Unlike other
environmental statutes, these regulate toxic products both at the production and
market stage. The two statutes complement each other well, as FIFRA regulates
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pesticides excluded by TSCA. Combined, these laws encompass chemical substances
produced, distributed, and consumed in the United States.
In 1976, TSCA was enacted to “prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health
or the environment associated with the manufacture, processing, distribution in
commerce, use or disposal of chemical substances” (Ferrey 2010). Imported
chemicals to the United States are also covered. TSCA’s structure involves an
inventory of all chemical substances commercially used and manufacturers are
required to submit a notice a minimum of 90 days before a new substance is
manufactured or imported or an existing substance is used for a “significant new use.”
The statute was the first to regulate all of the stages of a chemical substance for the
purpose of protecting public health (Ferrey 2010, 602). Today it is considered a
balancing statute requiring the EPA to establish a “‘reasonable basis’ . . . that the
manufacture, processing, distributing, use, or disposal of a specific chemical
substance presents an ‘unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment’” (p.
604). A substance is only allowed into public commerce if its benefits outweigh the
environmental costs (p. 606).
FIFRA is similar to TSCA in that it regulates toxic substances, but it
exclusively covers pesticides and herbicides. A pesticide is defined as “any substance
of mixture of substances that is (1) intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest, or (2) intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or
desiccant” (Ferrey 2010). It is important to note that the statute’s focus is on the
intended use of a substance and not its level of toxicity.
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This statute was enacted in 1947 with no purposeful concern for
environmental protection or secondary impacts from the use of pesticides. FIFRA’s
main goals were to make sure a pesticide performed its function of killing the target
pest and that consumers using the products were sufficiently protected by instructions
on the pesticide label. It focused on the users of the pesticides, farmers, and not
potential effects of people living in areas near where pesticides were used. Following
the public awareness created by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962, creation of
the EPA in 1970, and amendments including the Federal Environmental Pesticide Act
of 1972, provisions in FIFRA were strengthened to now make the statute one that
protects both human health and the environment (Ferrey 2010).
Each of these five environmental statutes addresses a critical aspect of
environmental policy in the United States. While it is not an exhaustive list of
environmental statutes passed by Congress, it is sufficient to provide extensive data
and enable new analysis of judicial behavior and litigant resources in this issue area.
The literature summarized here provides the foundation with which to apply
predominant models in judicial politics to a specific issue area previously
understudied. My dissertation uses an original dataset to provide an understanding of
judicial opinions for litigants pursuing environmental cases. This research will add
substantially to the body of work on judicial behavior as well as environmental policy
and provide an unprecedented level of insight into these types of cases.
Chapter 2 will go into more depth on the legal model, importance of litigant
resources and the specific variables used to test the hypotheses. Subsequent chapters
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will describe meaningful differences for each statute with a concluding chapter
evaluating when and how underdog litigants can succeed in environmental cases.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Introduction
My theory is based on applying the legal models and litigant resource theory to the
specific issue area of environmental law at the Court of Appeals. With a majority of
environmental laws now written and implemented by agencies instead of Congress,
the courts play a central role for litigants challenging agency decisions or statutory
provisions purposely left vague by the legislature. Few environmental cases reach the
U.S. Supreme Court, further increasing the importance of the Court of Appeals as the
effective court of last resort. Previous scholars have used the Court of Appeals
database to understand appellate cases, but I focus more specifically on
environmental laws and resources of the litigants who pursued these cases,
necessitating an original dataset collection.
For the statutes I have chosen to include in this dataset, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is the agency primarily responsible for enforcement and
thus appears in a large number of the cases (Ferrey 2010). This authority is delegated
to the agency by specific provisions in the laws. Each statute has one or more
provisions requiring the EPA to take a number of varied actions such as monitoring
pollution levels, approving permits, or developing management plans. As part of this
research, I will look at the success underdogs have challenging the EPA, but do not
do a separate analysis into these different types of agency actions.
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Another important agency consideration is the role of the Chevron decision
instructing courts to defer to discretionary agency decisions and the procedures put
forth by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Chevron decision puts federal
agencies at an advantage in the courtroom and may play a meaningful role in
explaining upperdog success in environmental law. I expect it to put an underdog
challenging a federal agency at a disadvantage because they will have to go above
and beyond convincing the court to rule in their favor over an agency’s expertise.
Additionally, for a litigant challenging an agency decision or action, the APA
sets requirements and procedural rules for federal agencies such as the EPA to follow,
with Section 7 specifically recognizing federal court authority to “compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” (5 U.S.C. §706(1)). Litigants
are not only able to challenge the statutes and decisions by the agencies, but also the
process and timeline followed. This statute may not necessarily advantage underdog
litigants, but it gives them the requisite standing with which to bring their case to
court. The environmental laws in this dataset have comparable provisions enabling
underdogs to challenge the process and timeline. In contrast to substantive provisions
requiring competing science and substantial resources, sections addressing timeline
requirements are less resource-intensive and I expect underdogs to be more likely to
both cite these provisions and win more when they do.
When incorporated with litigant resource theory, the legal model provides a
useful framework with which to test how litigants can prevail in environmental law
and claims the facts of the case matter most in explaining outcomes. This finding has
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been tested at the Court of Appeals using search and seizure cases and fact pattern
analysis. For environmental cases, however, we do not know if these case provisions
predict outcomes in a similar way. Part of my research examines whether specific
legal provisions of the statutes level the legal playing field for litigants, if they
advantage underdogs who are given standing by the statutes, or if in the situation such
as the Chevron precedent, they disadvantage underdogs by instructing the court to
defer to the upperdog federal agency. (See Appendix A for a detailed list of variables,
measurement, and associated hypotheses for each model.) The characteristics will
vary for each statute and Appendix B illustrates the provisions used in the final
models.
Though not the primary theories used for this research, the attitudinal and
strategic behavior models are important to note and a few variables to control for
them are included in my final model. The attitudinal model argues judges decide
cases based on their ideology and that whether a judge is liberal or conservative
matters most in explaining judicial behavior. If ideology explains behavior, then the
resources of litigants, or lack thereof, should not be important. Strategic behavior uses
this ideological component and explains how judges choose to advance their
preferences both at the panel and circuit level. Previous scholars used data from the
Court of Appeals database and found the ideology of a judge can help explain case
outcomes, however it is not yet known if this will hold true for environmental law
cases.
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Key Concepts
The first variable for the attitudinal model is panel ideology. Songer and Sheehan
(1992), Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer (1992), and Revesz (1997) found panel
ideology affects litigant success with some litigant types more likely to succeed than
others depending on the panel’s composition. Environmental scholars such as
Kovacic (1991), Resevz (1997), Klein (2002), and Keele et al. (2009) coded judges
on an ideological scale in addition to coding outcomes of decisions seeking greater
environmental protection as liberal. In this dissertation, only the liberal-conservative
scale for judges is used and cases are coded for panel composition and not whether
they seek more or less environmental protection.
The measure of ideology used is the median justice’s Judicial Common Space
(JCS) score for each panel (Epstein et al. 2007, Poole and Rosenthal 1997). These
scores were chosen for several reasons. Building on the initial work done by Giles,
Hettinger and Peppers (2001), the scores are a more precise look at judicial ideology
than simple partisanship identification. Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (GHP) argued
that in cases of senatorial courtesy with judicial appointments, the senator’s ideal
point policy preferences, as calculated by Poole and Rosenthal’s Common Space
scores, are a valid measure of a judge’s ideology. For instances when senatorial
courtesy does not apply and the president appointed a judge, the president’s Common
Space scores can be used. The JCS scores used in this dataset are built from the same
Poole and Rosenthal Common Space and GHP scores to get the ideal point of
Supreme Court justices and to get comparable measures for lower court judges. It is
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important to note that JCS scores are not preferences of the judges themselves, but it
is an accepted practice in judicial literature to use them as a better measure of judicial
ideology than party of the appointing president.
An additional measure important for testing the role of ideology is ideology of
the entire circuit.1 Songer and Sheehan (1992) find liberal circuits to be positively
related to underdog success. Since some circuits are more or less liberal than others
based on the GHP scores, controlling for the influence of ideology at the circuit level
is important. Circuit ideology is used to calculate an ideological distance variable
between the circuit in which the opinion was issued and the deciding panel. This is a
variable used in strategic behavior literature and its inclusion controls for effects the
overall circuit may have on the deciding panel. The median justice JCS score of the
panel is subtracted from the median JSC score for the circuit the year the case was
decided.
The remaining control measures are for circuit location and litigant type. (See
Appendix C for a map of the federal circuits.) Wenner and Dutter (1988) note some
litigants at the district court level are more successful than others depending on the
circuit and I test that finding at the Court of Appeals. With the exception of a federal
agency’s increased likelihood of success in the D.C Circuit and the increased
likelihood of environmental organizations’ success in the Ninth Circuit, I have no
theoretical expectations for why other litigant types would be more or less likely to
prevail in a given circuit.
1

Special thanks to Denise Keele for providing data to measure ideology of the circuit
courts. 	
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Next, I use a typology for litigant types with upperdogs having the most
resources at their disposals and individuals having the fewest. This is the key variable
to test the explanatory power of litigant resource theory. Litigant type tests Galanter’s
(1974) haves/have-nots theory and Songer and Sheehan’s (1992) upperdog/underdog
typology (1–5) to determine if the type of the litigant explains judicial behavior. The
litigant types are individuals (1), nonprofits (2), businesses (3), state/local
governments (4), and the federal government (5). Individuals are always considered
underdogs, based on the assumption they will have the fewest resources. The federal
government is always an upperdog, based on the idea that the government has the
most resources and an added advantage because of specific language of the statutes,
APA, and the Chevron decision. For cases involving tribal governments, the tribe is
coded as a federal government actor, recognizing its legal sovereignty. In cases with
the same type of litigant, such as businesses, the party with the most financial
resources is classified the upperdog because this was an easily measurable
comparison. Upperdogs are considered ‘haves’ because they possess more resources
than the opposing party in the case. Resources can include financial means, appearing
frequently in court, or experienced legal counsel. I use Sheehan’s typology as a way
to approximate the difference in resources each litigant type possesses.
One of the disadvantages of this typology is that it generalizes litigants within
each type and may obscure meaningful differences because not all litigants within a
category are truly equal. For example, a small community water association and a
large national organization such as the Sierra Club would both be coded as a
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nonprofit litigant despite differences in resources and litigation experience. Similarly,
a Fortune 500 company and a local hardware store would be coded as businesses.
This is a drawback to using the typology, but it remains a reasonable approximation
used for litigant resources and is consistent with prior literature such as Songer,
Sheehan and Haire (2003).
A second challenge with coding of litigant type is that I only code the first
appellant and appellee. This was done for ease of data management and classifying
the upperdog and underdog in each case, but it does not take into account other types
of litigants whose participation could influence the court opinion. Future research will
expand on this coding to include a more detailed measure of all litigants party to a
case.
The theoretical focus of this dissertation continues with the legal model. The
legal model argues precedent and case facts best explain judicial behavior. Beginning
in 1970 with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act
(CAA), a number of environmental statutes were passed by Congress and vested
administrative and enforcement powers in the agencies (Ferrey 2010). This delegation
of authority places an even greater emphasis on the courts to interpret both the initial
statute and subsequent agency rules. For environmental cases, judges are specifically
instructed by the Chevron precedent and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
defer to decisions made by the agencies, limiting their discretion even more for this
issue area and most relevant to my focus on litigant resources, further advantaging
upperdogs. Considering the unique importance of the Chevron precedent in
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administrative and environmental law, citation to it in the majority opinion is
included.
Additionally, the legal model emphasizes the role case facts play in explaining
judicial behavior. With the exception of FIFRA, the statutes in this research have
citizen suit provisions giving underdogs legal standing to bring these cases before the
court. Each environmental statute has different substantive provisions specific to its
environmental issue, though, and it is important to test how these may influence
litigant success. Appendix B lists the provisions for each statute.
From prior work such as Wenner (1982) we know upperdog litigants such as
the federal government often prevail in appellate cases and I plan to look at whether
they are still as successful in environmental cases as they were in the decade after
implementation of the environmental laws. In addition to the Chevron decision
calling for deference to agencies of the federal government, the federal government
has the most resources both in terms of experienced counsel and as a repeat player in
the court. For cases where the Solicitor General is involved, the federal government
also has the support of the presidential administration. The important question is less
about why upperdogs prevail because everything suggests they should, but instead
how any underdog is able to overcome all of the upperdog’s advantages. The legal
model posits underdogs are able to do this through specific statutory provisions and
case precedents such as Chevron.
Lastly, four dichotomous variables are included. The first two are gender and
race, and whether there is a woman or minority judge on the panel. Boyd, Epstein,
41

and Walker (2010) found gender differences in sex discrimination cases with female
judges voting more liberally. Wenner and Ostberg (1993) note that women and
minorities are more likely to vote liberally across issue areas than their white-male
Republican-appointed counterparts. In earlier works, Farhang and Warwro (2004)
examined whether minority and female judges influence legal policy, finding that
women do have a greater influence on panels they sit on when the legal issue is of
particular relevance to them. Songer, Davis, and Haire also looked at gender effects at
the Court of Appeals in particular case types, specifically obscenity, search and
seizure, and employment discrimination to see if women are more liberal than men
(1994). As discussed in Chapter 1, the liberal outcome in environmental cases is
considered ruling in favor of the party seeking greater environmental protection,
which is not how the cases were coded. At this stage of my research, gender is
included to see if it plays a role in underdog success, but there are no expectations to
whether race will help or hurt underdog litigants.
Third, Chapter One described the value and potential benefit of amicus briefs
for underdog litigants up to a certain threshold. In environmental law cases, amicus
briefs can help judges make sense of scientifically complex issues. They can also be
an opportunity for underdog litigants to receive legal support from actors with more
resources and expertise, so it is important to indicate whether amicus briefs were part
of each case. Data limitations prevented content analysis of the amicus briefs, so I use
a dichotomous variable for the presence of a brief in support of either the petitioner or
respondent in the case.
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Research Design and Data
The research design for applying these models to the area of environmental law
involved a lengthy data collection process, as there is little in-depth data on these
statutes during the given period of time. In order to determine whether the patterns
predicted by the legal model or suggested by litigant resources exist in environmental
cases, it is necessary to collect data on many cases; a simple case study might
demonstrate that one model applies in a particular case, but would not reveal any
consistent patterns. An analysis of many of these cases over time is much more
appropriate. Since there were no preexisting datasets of environmental cases available
to use, I collected all of the data used in this dissertation as part of the process.
I acquired the data by conducting a search in LexisNexis and Westlaw for
cases decided between 1993–2008. The initial search was done using LexisNexis with
a second search in Westlaw, a similar approach to that used by Songer (1988) and
Swenson (2004) in their research on Court of Appeals decisions. Westlaw’s database
neither includes the universe of unpublished cases nor a random sample, but using it
in conjunction with Lexis Nexis, I accessed as many cases as publicly available
(Hannon 2001). The databases differ in the secondary sources available due to
licensing agreements, but there is little meaningful difference between the databases
for available court opinions. I utilized both to ensure I had the universe of publicly
available cases. The unit of analysis was each opinion, not the final outcome of
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litigation, meaning that a party could have appealed multiple times and each one
would be coded separately.
The time period was selected for several reasons. First, the period provided
eight years of data each from both a Republican and Democrat presidency and 16
consecutive years of cases. Second, no major revisions took place to any of the five
statutes chosen which improves the comparability of rulings. Third, the number of
cases in these years provided a large enough sample to perform a quantitative
analysis. Fourth and finally, ideology scores were available for most judges during
this time period.
Searches in LexisNexis and Westlaw produced a large number of cases that
did not meet the coding criteria. I read each case and excluded it if the opinion did not
decide a statutory issue on the merits, if the petition is denied, remanded, or granted
in part, or if the case only has a citation to the statute. For example, a case had to rule
on a specific statute such as the Clean Air Act and not just reference the statute as
part of a case precedent. A number of cases did have split verdicts in which the court
would uphold part of the district court opinion and remand or deny other claims. I
was unable to determine the upperdog or underdog “winner” in these situations, and
therefore the cases were excluded (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2003; McCormick
1993).
The final original dataset includes 41 FIFRA cases, 24 TSCA, 100 CAA, 157
RCRA, and 266 CWA cases for a total of 588. For the Clean Air Act, I used Excel to
draw a random sample of 100 from the population of 292 cases meeting the coding
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criteria during this time period. This provided a representative sample and enough
cases for a quantitative analysis.
The number of variables for each statute varied and the only limitation I
considered prior to starting the coding process was using a slightly abbreviated list of
statutory provisions as noted in Percival (2011). No dataset of this kind was
previously available, necessitating a careful reading of each case, generation of
spreadsheets for the data, and original quantitative analysis. For the combined
FIFRA/TSCA chapter, I coded 133 variables for 65 observations. RCRA included
115 variables and 157 observations. The CAA had 549 variables for the random
sample of 100 cases. The CWA was the largest statute coded with 230 variables and
266 observations. In summary, 1,027 variables were calculated and entered into Excel
and STATA. Each chapter will go into more depth about the specific variables for
each statute, including the frequency and significance.

Methods and Hypotheses
The data collected are analyzed quantitatively due to the number of cases and
variables to be included in the models. With a dichotomous categorical dependent
variable measuring whether or not the underdog won the case (0=underdog loss,
1=underdog win), I use a multivariate logistic regression model in STATA (Songer,
Sheehan, Haire 1999). This MLE regression technique is used because the dependent
variable can only have two predefined values (Halcoussis 2004). Logit produces a
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model estimate that can be used to calculate the probability of underdogs winning,
given the values of the predictor variables described below.
My final model tests competing influences of the legal model, litigant
resources, and ideology variables to test the attitudinal and strategic interaction
models. Specifically, the model will including the following variables: Chevron
citation (dichotomous variable for whether the opinion was cited in the majority
opinion), case characteristics (statute-specific dichotomous variables for whether a
particular provision was cited in the majority opinion), litigant typology (values from
1–5), panel ideology (JCS score of median judge), ideological distance (JCS score of
median judge by case year subtracted from median JCS score of the circuit), circuits
(dichotomous variable for each circuit), gender (dichotomous variable for presence of
a female judge), race (dichotomous variable for presence of a minority judge), amicus
brief (dichotomous variable for if a brief was submitted), and respondent success
(dichotomous variable for whether the respondent won).

Dependent Variable: Underdog Success
Each chapter will discuss a different statute with FIFRA and TSCA combined, but the
dependent variable will be the same. Underdog success is a dichotomous variable
indicating whether or not the comparative underdog is successful in the case before
the Court of Appeals. This is a different approach than Songer and Sheehan (1992)
who looked at whether the petitioner or respondent prevailed, because I wanted to
focus on the resources of the litigants rather than their position in the case. Cases are
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excluded if there is no clear “winner,” such as cases where the decision is denied and
granted in part, affirmed and remanded, or affirmed and vacated in part. Cases with
cross-appellees are also dropped from the analysis because a clear petitioner and
respondent could not be coded.

Independent Variables: Litigant Type
For this variable, only the first petitioner and first respondent listed are coded using
the 1–5 typology described previously. If an individual was acting within their
organizational capacity, such as the head of the EPA, this litigant would be coded as
the federal government, in contrast to an individual acting as a whistleblower who
would be coded as an individual (Songer, Sheehan, Haire 1999). The coding strategy
was used for ease of managing a large dataset, but it is important to note that many
cases had multiple litigants and this coding decision will not take additional litigants
into account. This coding approach also treats litigants of the same type equally. For
example, large environmental organizations like the Sierra Club or Natural Resources
Defense Council are coded as nonprofits (=2) as well as small community activist
organizations, despite the resource differential. The typology is not without such
limitations, but ultimately it provides the best approximation available for comparing
resources large groupings of litigants have and what this means for underdog success.
I expect this variable to have a negative relationship with underdog success.
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Hypothesis 1. I expect upperdogs to remain the most successful litigants in
environmental cases with the federal government remaining the most effective litigant
type of those coded for this research.
Hypothesis 2. I expect litigant type to be negatively correlated with underdog success.
As the opposing litigant has more resources, using the litigant typology as a proxy,
the underdog will be less likely to win.

Demographic Variables
Each judge is coded for his or her Judicial Common Space (JCS) score, race, and
gender (Epstein, et al. 2007). JCS scores range from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most
conservative). Cases in this dataset were heard either by three-judge panels of
appellate judges, or a combination of appellate and district judges sitting by
designation. JCS scores were included for all available judges at both the appellate
and district courts. In the final model for each statute, the median JCS score for the
panel is used. This is consistent with the judicial literature approach of JCS scores
and liberal or conservative ideology in a political sense.
Little work has been done on minority behavior in environmental cases, but
this data will allow comparisons between white and minority judges, building on
prior works analyzing minority judicial behavior (Spohn 1990, Walker 1985). Race is
measured by whether or not there is at least one minority judge on the panel. There
are no independent theoretical expectations for how race will advantage or
disadvantage underdogs, so this variable remains a control at this point my research.
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The gender variable measures whether or not there is at least one female judge
on the panel, building on the work by Boyd, Epstein, and Walker (2010), Collins and
Moyer (2008), and Songer, Davis, Haire (1994). In previous research, female judges
rule significantly different than their male counterparts in issue areas such as sexual
harassment or employment discrimination. This finding has not been tested yet with
environmental cases. I expect the presence of one or more women on an appellate
panel to increase the likelihood of the underdog prevailing.
Hypothesis 3. The presence of a female judge on the panel will be positively
correlated with underdog success.

Circuits
Following Wenner and Dutter’s approach (1988), there is a dichotomous variable for
each appellate circuit (1–11) and the D.C. Circuit (12). Depending on the statute, one
circuit is dropped as a baseline indicator. There are no theoretical expectations for the
circuit control variables and they are included to control for any independent effects
the location of a case decision might have.
An additional circuit-related variable included is ideological distance between
the circuit and the panel issuing the case opinion. The median JCS score for the panel
is subtracted from the median JCS score by circuit for the year the case was decided.
Historically, some circuits such as the Fifth are more conservative while others such
as the Ninth are measured as being more liberal. It is important to test for circuit-level
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effects with each case in addition to JCS scores for each panel and see if the circuitlevel ideology helps underdogs win their cases.

Case Characteristics
Each case is coded for specific statutory provisions to help understand whether
litigants are more or less likely successful arguing on specific grounds as the legal
model would suggest. Every statutory provision mentioned in a case during this time
period is included in the dataset based on the list from Percival’s Statutory and Case
Supplement (2011). Only provisions that appeared ten or more times are included in
the final models for each chapter.
One valuable component of including case characteristics is gathering
descriptive data on which legal provisions are most litigated at the Court of Appeals
and how this varies by statute. For some statutes, we will observe cases primarily
litigating definitions whereas others challenge administrative processes such as
permits or management plans. Part of this research is first understanding the
provisions litigants feel are most important in environmental law. One of the specific
provisions I expect to see benefit underdogs is the citizen suit. All of the statutes,
excluding FIFRA and TSCA, have a citizen suit provision allowing litigants to bring
a case before the court provided the litigant proves statute-specific findings of
endangerment and if the litigant is challenging the EPA’s failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. Since access to the courts can be an obstacle for litigants with
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fewer resources, I expect that when citing this specific provision at the appellate
level, underdogs are more likely to prevail.
Hypothesis 4. Underdogs will be more successful when bringing a case under the
citizen suit provision.

A second aspect of case characteristics are their value in understanding the
prevalence of Chevron and if it is cited as precedent to the extent literature would
suggest. At this point in my research, each case is coded for whether Chevron is cited
in the majority opinion. As discussed in Chapter One, the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) is the guiding statute for administrative law, whereas Chevron is one case
ruling on administrative law. I did not code for citation to the APA but use Chevron
citation as both an important case in environmental law and also a significant case for
administrative law. Descriptively, I expect this precedent to be cited more often in
cases where a federal agency is the petitioner or respondent because it instructs the
courts to lean in the agency’s favor and support the agency’s decision as the expert
authority. It is included for each case in the dataset because other litigant types may
be using the precedent to persuade the court in their favor and because I only code the
first party of each side in a case. Data limitations at this time do not enable examining
which party, if any, made the Chevron claim; I only look at whether the opinion
writer cited it in the final majority opinion. This limits interpretations on the value of
Chevron to specific litigants types, but is sufficient to test how the case helps or hurts
underdogs as a category.
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Hypothesis 5. I expect underdogs to be less likely to win when Chevron is cited in the
majority opinion.

Amicus Briefs
Literature on the influence of amicus briefs at the Supreme Court is well documented
by scholars such as Collins (2007), but less is known about their role at the Court of
Appeals. For environmental law, amicus briefs can play a critical role in providing
judges with technical information they would otherwise not have. Judges in the D.C.
Circuit will have the most experience dealing with federal agencies and judges in
more politically liberal circuits such as the Ninth will have experience and be more
favorable to environmental organizations, but for judges who do not regularly handle
these types of cases, amicus briefs have the potential to be meaningful. Additionally,
the number of amicus briefs can be a measure of issue salience for the court. Data
limitations of Westlaw and LexisNexis prevented full access to the amicus briefs
submitted, but a dummy variable for the presence of a brief is included in both the
legal and attitudinal models. Considering the potential scientific value of amicus
briefs, I expect them to be more advantageous for litigants who would lack the
resources to provide competing research on their own.
Hypothesis 6. I expect amicus briefs to be statistically significant in favor of
underdogs.
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Respondent Success
Each case is coded for whether the petitioner or respondent prevailed. There is a
dichotomous variable for whether the respondent won the case. At the appellate level,
a large number of the cases are challenging federal agencies or the U.S. government,
meaning the litigant with the greatest amount of resources will also be the most
frequent respondent. Therefore, I expect the respondent winning to have a negative
relationship with underdog success. Understanding this is a more controversial
variable to include because of the federal government’s frequency as respondent, each
statute is also analyzed without it and the results are presented in the respective
chapters.
Hypothesis 7. I expect underdogs to be unsuccessful when the respondent wins.

Organization of the Dissertation
The remaining chapters in this dissertation will involve empirically testing the
hypotheses using the data I gathered. Chapter 3 will focus on RCRA, which regulates
the creation, transportation, storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste
substances at a final waste site. It covers both nonhazardous solid wastes and
hazardous wastes. Though similar to TSCA that also regulates chemical substances,
RCRA is in a separate chapter because it is a cradle-to-grave system with different
regulatory provisions. Descriptive statistics will be included to show the provisions
being litigated under this statute in addition to quantitative analysis to test the
hypotheses.
53

Chapter 4 is on the CAA, which was originally a health-based statute
regulating air quality standards for six criteria pollutants. However as the initial
health standards failed to make the meaningful progress hoped for, a set of
amendments in 1990 led to the adoption of a stronger emphasis on technology. By the
time period of study in this research begins, the EPA has shifted more toward
regulating pollution source types and the required technology based on the source
type and location. This chapter draws cases from years after this regulatory shift in
addition to testing the influence of changes made by President Clinton and President
Bush. Both descriptive data and quantitative analysis is presented in this chapter.
Chapter 5 examines the CWA which is a technology-based statute attempting
to regulate discharges of pollution into navigable waters of the United States from a
point source. Similar to the air quality standards of the CAA, the CWA has ambient
water quality standards based on the designated use for the water. Any discharge must
be listed in a permit, leading to a number of cases challenging permit approvals or
denials. With the range of designated uses in the statute, there are a wide variety of
litigants pursuing cases in this area of environmental law. Descriptive summaries of
these litigant types, in addition to a quantitative analysis, are included in this chapter.
Chapter 6 is on FIFRA and TSCA. These statutes are combined in one chapter
because they both regulate the manufacture and distribution of over 10,000 chemical
substances at the production and market stages. The statutes are complementary with
FIFRA regulating pesticides excluded by TSCA. Due to the nature of the chemicals
involved and lengthy registration processes for both laws, businesses are the primary
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litigant type. Descriptive and quantitative results are discussed in this final
substantive chapter.
Chapter 7 will summarize all of the findings and evaluate implications for
both judicial and environmental scholars. This dissertation makes an original
contribution to understanding the types of cases litigated at the Court of Appeals, how
different litigant types win, and finally factors that can help explain litigant success in
environmental law.
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CHAPTER 3
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
Introduction
In 1978, residents of the Niagara Falls suburb Love Canal learned their community
was on top of a toxic waste pit. Oils and fumes had existed for years with the
community experiencing highly elevated rates of cancers, birth defects, miscarriages,
and numerous chronic illnesses. Nearly 800 homes and an elementary school were
built directly on the toxic pit of 352 million pounds of industrial waste from Hooker
Chemical Company who had placed it on top of additional waste from Niagara and
the U.S. Army (Collins 2010). The activism of community member Lois Gibbs to
organize the Love Canal Homeowners Association catapulted her on to the national
scene and made this the first toxic waste site to receive both widespread media
attention and political concern, culminating in the passage of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (Collins 2010,
82). Toxic waste was suddenly a politically salient issue.
Love Canal, and the passage of CERCLA, had an important effect of
strengthening the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), passed two
years before Love Canal. RCRA’s strict procedures for containing, transporting, and
treating, and disposing of hazardous wastes were reinforced with severe
consequences for leaking and abandoned dumps under CERCLA (Buck 2006).
Combined, these statutes established a body of environmental law regulating
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hazardous wastes and the court system became involved in another area of
environmental policy.
While CERCLA is a critical statute in this area of law, and related to RCRA
with many RCRA corrective action sites later becoming listed as Superfund sites
under CERCLA, it is not used in this analysis because its technical complexity and
difficulty in classifying upperdog/underdog success makes it unsuitable for the coding
scheme I utilize. The main focus of this chapter instead is the relationship between
judicial behavior and litigant resources at the Court of Appeals using cases involving
RCRA. Specifically, how do we explain underdog success in this policy area of
hazardous wastes? Using key concepts and variables from Chapter 2, I examine the
role litigant resources and case characteristics can have when challenging this statute
and whether underdogs are able to prevail.

Legislative Background for RCRA
RCRA was one of these statutes passed towards the end of the ‘Environmental
Decade’, setting acceptable levels of pollutants, specifying required technologies, and
attempting to regulate a substance from its creation and release through final disposal.
It looks at how hazardous wastes are used, handled, and discharged (Wenner 1982).
RCRA was enacted in 1976 as an effort to provide a cradle-to-grave
monitoring system for solid and hazardous wastes. Congress amended the statute in
1984 to try and phase out disposal of toxic chemicals and force development of better
technology to reduce the toxicity of hazardous wastes. Prior to this statute, there was
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no hazardous waste office to manage or regulate these types of substances. RCRA
regulates the creation, transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal of listed
hazardous waste substances at a final waste site. The first question to answer, and the
source of litigation in some cases, is whether the substance in question is a solid
waste. Garbage, sludge, other discarded material in solid, liquid, or gaseous forms are
all considered to be solid waste. Exclusions to this regulation include domestic
sewage, irrigation return flows, individual discharges (covered under the Clean Water
Act), and nuclear materials. The second question the statute speaks to is if the
substance in question is hazardous based on four characteristics: ignitability,
corrosivity, reactive, and toxicity (Ferrey 2007). Exclusions include household waste,
agricultural wastes reused, utility waste from coal production, oil and gas, and
mining/extraction by products.
The listing process in this statute is based on three categories of waste;
hazardous wastes from nonspecific sources, hazardous wastes from specific sources,
and commercial chemicals that are considered hazardous wastes when discarded. A
business can petition the EPA or state for its waste to be delisted, but it must show
that the waste at the facility is no longer hazardous. Consequently, industries and the
permitting agency (either state or federal) are the main litigants in this policy area.
While RCRA technically covers both nonhazardous solid wastes and
hazardous wastes, states have more responsibility to address and regulate
nonhazardous solid wastes. Enforcement for RCRA provisions includes regulation by
the EPA and other government entities and citizen suit provisions. The EPA is
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responsible for establishing permit conditions, determining when the conditions are
violated and public welfare is endangered, and can demand information and access to
the business or contaminated site when needed. A state can get federal authority to
run a RCRA program if it receives approval from the EPA. A weakness of this
enforcement is its dependence on voluntary self-monitoring by the industries and on
the tracking system for waste generators and transporters.
One of the provisions built in to strengthen public accountability and address
these enforcement weaknesses is §6972 authorizing citizen suits. Citizen suits, under
§6972 of RCRA allow any individual to pursue a civil action against another person
or against the EPA for failure to perform “an act which is not discretionary.” The suit
must demonstrate “imminent and substantial endangerment” claims that directly
impact human healthy and the environment. Citizens cannot sue the EPA if the
agency chooses to not pursue action against an alleged RCRA violator and there are a
number of barriers to pursuing citizen suits. One of the largest barriers is that citizen
suits are preempted by state litigation or litigation filed by the EPA. In order to file a
suit, citizen plaintiffs must provide 60 days’ notice of intent to litigate or 90 days’
notice for imminent hazard actions, they may not try to stop the siting of a new
facility or issuance of a permit, they may not pursue a suit if the EPA is prosecuting
the action or a CERCLA clean-up, they may not pursue enforcement action if it
overlaps with state efforts, and any suit must allege “continuous or intermittent
violations” and cannot be based completely on past RCRA violations. In addition to
challenges of fewer resources, these limitations make it difficult for citizen suits to be
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successfully pursued in the courts and put the burden on other litigant types to
challenge the federal government and statute (Ferrey 2010). Ultimately, though
litigants cannot regain recovery costs, citizen suits are one way for underdogs to
pursue enforcement of environmental laws.

Theoretical Relationships
To understand if and how underdog litigants prevail in hazardous and solid waste
cases under RCRA, I run a model with variables testing the legal model, litigant
resources, and two variables to test for the influence of ideology (per the legal model)
and strategic behavior. (See Appendix A for a detailed list of variables, measurement,
and associated hypotheses for each model.)
The legal model argues that precedent and case facts best explain judicial
behavior. For environmental cases, judges are specifically instructed by the Chevron
precedent to defer to decisions made by the agencies, limiting their discretion even
more for this issue area and most relevant to my focus on litigant resources, further
advantaging upperdogs. RCRA further adds to this culture of deference by giving the
EPA authority to make the critical listing decision for hazardous wastes and vesting
primary permit jurisdiction in the agency. The legal model also emphasizes the role
case facts can play in explaining judicial behavior. RCRA has unique provisions such
as the types of solid and hazardous wastes necessary to regulate and it is important to
test how such characteristics may influence litigant success not only in this issue area,
but also in comparison to other environmental statutes. CERCLA is also included in
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this model as a control measure. CERCLA governs the federal response to abandoned
or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, but has a number of similarities to RCRA and
is important to control for since a RCRA site can later be classified a CERCLA
“Superfund” site. There is no theoretical expectation for CERCLA and underdog
success.
In contrast, the attitudinal model argues judges decide cases based on their
ideology and that whether a judge is liberal or conservative matters most in
explaining judicial outcomes. This approach would explain upperdogs winning a case
in this area by the ideology of the three-judge panel or by ideology of the federal
circuit. In order to control for this influence, I include two variables: panel ideology
and ideological distance. Median JCS scores are used to measure ideology of the
panel and circuits. Ideological distance is a variable intended to control for circuit
influence on the panel, as described in Chapter 2. The median JCS score for the
circuit in the year the case opinion was issued is used and panel ideology is subtracted
to get the ideological distance between the circuit and panel.
Finally, I have a series of variables that are litigant type, federal circuits, and
independent variables including gender and race of the panel, amicus briefs, and
whether the respondent won. Litigant type tests Galanter’s (1974) haves/have-nots
theory and Songer and Sheehan’s (1992) upperdog/underdog typology to determine if
the type of the litigant and the litigant’s resources explain judicial behavior. By the
nature of substances covered under RCRA and the listing process conducted by the
EPA, I expect businesses and the federal government to be the most involved litigant
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types. The federal government often prevails in appellate cases and I plan to look at
whether they are as successful in RCRA cases.
Gender is included to determine whether or not it explains underdog/upperdog
success in hazardous waste cases. We know that in sex discrimination cases, female
judges vote more liberally, but not the extent to which gender can explain outcomes
in environmental law broadly or hazardous waste specifically (Boyd, Epstein, and
Walker (2010), Wenner and Ostberg (1993)). Similarly, race is an indicator as to
whether or not the presence of a minority judge helps underdog litigants. Amicus
briefs are considered a measure of salience by some judicial scholars and can also
advantage underdog litigants, making them an important variable to include in the
models. For this area of hazardous wastes, amicus briefs may help underdog litigants
challenging businesses or help businesses challenging the state or federal regulatory
authorities. All of these concepts are included in one model to determine which one(s)
best explain underdog success in a multivariate setting. The specifics of the data and
measurement will be discussed next.

Research Design and Data
I acquired the data from LexisNexis and Westlaw for cases decided between 1993–
2008, covering the Clinton and W. Bush administrations. The initial search was done
using the term “Resource Conservation and Recovery Act” in LexisNexis with a
second search in Westlaw. With the exception of differences in supplemental
materials and copyrights, there is little meaningful difference between the two
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databases, but both search sites were used to ensure no cases were missed. There were
also no major revisions during this time period to RCRA, making the cases during the
time period comparable.
Searches in LexisNexis and Westlaw produced a large number of cases that
did not meet the coding criteria. I read each case and excluded it if the opinion did not
decide a statutory issue on the merits, if the petition was denied, remanded, or granted
in part, or if the case only had a citation to the statute. A number of cases had split
verdicts in which the court upheld part of the district court opinion and remanded or
denied other claims. I was unable to determine the upperdog or underdog “winner” in
these situations, and therefore the cases were excluded. The number of variables
varied by statute and the only limitation I considered prior to starting the coding
process was using a slightly abbreviated list of statutory provisions as noted in
Percival (2011). RCRA included 115 variables and 157 observations. The final
original dataset for RCRA is 157 case opinions.

Data, Methods, and Hypotheses
I collected and analyzed the data quantitatively due to the number of cases and
variables to be included in the models. With a dichotomous categorical dependent
variable measuring whether or not the underdog won the case (0=underdog loss,
1=underdog win), I use logistic regression model in STATA. This MLE regression
technique is used because the dependent variable of underdog success can only have
two predefined values (Halcoussis 2004). Logit produces a model estimate that can be
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used to calculate the probability of underdogs winning, given the values of the
predictor variables described below. Cases are excluded if there is no clear “winner,”
such as cases where the decision is denied and granted in part, affirmed and
remanded, or affirmed and vacated in part. Cases with cross-appellees are also
dropped from the analysis because a clear petitioner and respondent could not be
coded.
The final model controls for the attitudinal variable of panel ideology, and
strategic behavior (ideological distance between the panel and circuit), but largely
focuses on the legal model and case characteristics and precedents this model predicts
should explain judicial decisions. Specifically, it tests the following variables: circuits
(dummy control variable for each circuit), typology for respondent type (1–5),
typology for petitioner type (1–5), race (dichotomous variable for presence of a
minority judge), gender (dichotomous variable for presence of a female judge), panel
ideology (JCS score of median judge), ideological distance (distance between median
JCS score of the circuit and the panel), amicus brief (dichotomous variable for if a
brief was submitted), Chevron citation (dichotomous variable for whether the opinion
was cited in the majority opinion), CERCLA citation (dichotomous variable for
whether it was also a CERCLA case), respondent success (dichotomous variable for
whether the respondent won), and case characteristics (statute-specific dichotomous
variables for whether a particular provision was cited in the majority opinion).
Appendix B notes the characteristics included in the final model.
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Each case is coded for specific statutory provisions to help understand
whether litigants are more or less likely successful arguing on specific grounds. Every
statutory provision mentioned in a case during this time period is included. Only
provisions that appeared ten or more times are in the final model. This included the
following: §6901 (congressional findings), §6921 (identification and listing of
hazardous waste), §6922 (standards applicable to generators of hazardous waste),
§6924 (standards applicable to owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities), §6925 (permits for treatment, storage, or disposal of
hazardous waste), §6928 (federal enforcement), §6941 (objectives of subchapter IV
on state or regional solid waste plans), §6972 (citizen suits), §6973 (imminent
hazard), §6976 (judicial review), §6902 (objectives and national policy), §6903
(definitions), and §6926 (authorized state hazardous waste programs). The hypotheses
for the model are listed below.

Hypotheses
1. I expect upperdogs to remain the most successful litigants in RCRA with the
federal government remaining the most effective litigant type.
2. I expect litigant types to be negatively correlated with underdog success. As
the opposing litigant has more resources, using the litigant typology as a
proxy, the underdog will be less likely to win.
3. The presence of a female judge on the panel will be positively correlated with
underdog success.
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4. Underdogs will be more successful when bringing a case under the citizen suit
provision (§6972).
5. I expect underdogs to be less likely to win when Chevron is cited in the
majority opinion.
6. I expect amicus briefs to be statistically significant in favor of underdogs.
7. I expect underdogs to be unsuccessful when the respondent wins.

Results
Descriptively, upperdog litigants were very successful in these toxic waste cases.
From 1993–2008, underdogs only prevailed in 23% (n=36) of the 157 cases.
Individuals and businesses were the most frequent petitioners, 27.39% (n=43) and
45% (n=70), respectively. Individuals often challenged convictions under RCRA,
particularly jury instructions and fines for violating terms of the statute from the
district court. They also brought a number of cases under the citizen suit provision.
Businesses frequently challenged disposal costs, identification and listing of
hazardous wastes, and permits for treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste.
Businesses and the federal government appeared most often as respondents,
24% (n=38) and 57.32% (n=90), respectively. The largest number of statutory
provisions cited were from Subchapter III of RCRA, which addresses Hazardous
Waste Management and largely pertains to how businesses operate hazardous waste
facilities and federal/state monitoring of the facilities. Additionally, many of the cases
were litigated under Subchapter 1, focusing on congressional findings, national
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policy, and definitions. The classification of a hazardous waste has significant
implications for the permitting process and how a business must treat, store, and
dispose of a particular hazardous waste, making it a heavily litigated area for both
businesses seeking fewer restrictions and federal environmental agencies
concentrated on environmental health and safety.
Nearly twenty-percent of the cases were decided in the D.C. Circuit which is
an expected result in light of the federal government’s participation in a majority of
the litigation and the government’s option to file suit in the D.C. Circuit. Another
20% of the cases were decided in the 6th and 9th Circuits. See Table 1 below.

67

Table 1: Litigant Success under RCRA by Federal Circuit
(Number of Cases Each Litigant Type Won Per Circuit)
Circuit

Litigant Type
Individual

Nonprofit

Business

State and Local

Federal

Government

Government

1

0

1

1

0

3

2

0

1

4

5

3

3

1

1

2

0

3

4

1

0

5

3

2

5

0

0

1

2

7

6

0

0

8

2

6

7

1

1

5

0

2

8

1

0

5

1

0

9

3

1

3

2

9

10

0

1

2

2

12

11

2

0

3

0

3

D.C.

0

1

6

0

25

Federal

0

0

2

0

2

Total

9 (5.73%)

7 (4.46%)

47 (29.94%)

17 (10.83%)

77 (49.04%)

Finally, 78% (n=123) of RCRA cases were published which is similar to
publication rates of the other statutes in this dataset.2 With Ringquist and Emmert

2

Publication rates for the other statutes in this dataset are as follows: 70.77% of
FIFRA/TSCA cases, 77% CAA cases, and 59% of CWA cases.	
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(1999) estimating only five to ten-percent of cases get published, this is a much
higher rate that does not represent the actual case population. The findings may be
biased as a result when comparing this dataset to the universe of cases heard by the
Court of Appeals (Keele et al. 2009).
Only 17% (n=27) of cases had an amicus brief submitted in support of either
party which is much lower than cases from the same time period for the Clean Water
Act and Clean Air Act. A possible explanation for this could be litigants choosing to
be a party to the case instead of submitting a brief. With only the first petitioner and
first respondent coded, participating by other litigants was not included in the
analysis.
One of the more surprising results was how little Chevron was cited in the
majority opinions; 85% of the cases made no mention of what is arguably one of the
most important precedents in administrative law. As discussed in Chapter One, this
may be the result of judges using the Administrative Procedure Act instead.
Since I had a dichotomous dependent variable, I ran a logistic regression
model in STATA. Table 2 below illustrates the final results. The only variables
reaching a meaningful level of statistical significance (p<0.05) were the First Circuit,
litigant (whether the petitioner or respondent won the case), presence of a woman on
the panel, and four case characteristics; objectives and national policy, definitions,
federal enforcement, and citizen suits.
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Table 2: Logit Model of Underdog Success for RCRA Cases

LR Chi-2
Pseudo R2
Circuit 1
Circuit 2
Circuit 3
Circuit 4
Circuit 5
Circuit 6
Circuit 7
Circuit 8
Circuit 9
Circuit 10
Circuit 11
D.C. Circuit
Respondent type

Model without
Litigant Included
58.45
0.3779
0.8228 (0.617)
0.3131 (0.852)
2.7783 (0.084)
1.2044 (0.358)
…
−0.8507 (0.572)
3.0477 (0.025)*
0.1722 (0.909)
1.6447 (0.342)
…
0.8655 (0.571)
−1.2347 (0.401)
−0.2231 (0.494)

Petitioner type
Minority judge
Female judge
Panel ideology
Circuit ideology
Amicus

0.4949 (0.103)
1.1077 (0.141)
0.5329 (0.430)
0.3117 (0.745)
2.5474 (0.368)
0.3586 (0.710)

Chevron
CERCLA
6901

0.7019 (0.448)
1.0756 (0.172)
0.7652 (0.217)

6902
6903
6921
6922
6924

1.5446 (0.119)
0.9984 (0.197)
−0.3567 (0.707)
1.8567 (0.252)
0.8274 (0.301)

6925
6926
6928

−0.3284 (0.758)
−0.0232 (0.985)
−1.7207 (0.065)

6941
6972

3.673 (0.002)**
−1.8098 (0.030)**

6976
Litigant

−0.9669 (0.316)
…

Distance
* p<0.05

…
**p<0.01

Final Model
92.22
0.5963
5.211001 (0.033)*
1.953205 (0.463)
3.210073 (0.207)
2.628972 (0.153)
…
−4.814703 (0.129)
3.675608 (0.060)
2.782111 (0.134)
1.768461 (0.559)
…
0.9342952 (0.723)
−3.263029 (0.160)
−0.0102694
(0.981)
0.5450616 (0.194)
1.994798 (0.088)
3.41204 (0.013)**
8.10024 (0.144)
…
−0.2382526
(0.858)
1.750063 (0.206)
0.4129439 (0.699)
−0.3174412
(0.732)
4.034388 (0.035)*
2.629468 (0.048)*
−1.890171 (0.200)
4.575682 (0.127)
−0.4295536
(0.720)
0.107348 (0.941)
0.5281266 (0.800)
−3.83424
(0.013)**
3.639423 (0.018)*
−2.767747
(0.053)*
−1.62028 (0.228)
−5.453642
(0.000)***
7.126132 (0.149)
***p<0.001
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Looking first at the circuit results, the Sixth Circuit approached significance
with a p-value of 0.059, but only the First Circuit was significant at 0.043 in favor of
underdog success. This was one of the strongest variables in the model for predicting
underdog success. Descriptively, different litigants were more successful in some
circuits than others. Individuals were most successful in the Ninth (n=3) and Eleventh
(n=2) Circuits and least successful in the Tenth (n=17) and Sixth (n=16). Nonprofit
litigants were equally successful across a majority of the circuits (n=1), but lost the
greatest number of cases in the D.C. (n=31) and the Ninth (n=17) Circuit. Businesses
prevailed most often in the Sixth (n=8) and D.C. (n=6) Circuits and lost the most
number of cases in Ninth (n=15), Tenth (n=15), and D.C. (n=26) Circuit. State and
local governments prevailed the most in the Second (n=5) and Fourth (n=3) Circuits
and were the least successful in the D.C. (n=32) and Ninth (n=16) Circuits. Finally,
the federal government won most in the D.C. (n=25) and Tenth (n=12) Circuits. The
EPA was the most successful in the D.C. Circuit, winning 26 of their cases and only
losing six in that circuit.
One measure was included to control for the effect of ideology; panel
ideology using the median JCS score of judges on the panel. This variable did not
achieve statistical significance. The mean JCS panel score for RCRA cases was
0.0927 and scores ranged from −0.543 to 0.581. Each judge was also coded for party
of the appointing president. 31.79% of the panels had two Democrat-appointed judges
and 6.62% were entirely comprised of judges appointed by Democrat presidents.
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The strategic behavior variable, ideological distance, was also not statistically
significant, meaning we cannot draw meaningful conclusions about the existence of
strategic behavior by the panel judges. This variable is not traditionally used in the
underdog/upperdog literature, but my approach of using the ideological distance
between the panel and circuit is consistent with the judicial literature and it was an
important control measure for effects of circuit ideology. The mean distance was
0.0930872 and the range was −0.714 to 1.045.
Independent variables in the legal model performed well, with four reaching
statistical significance. §6928, federal enforcement, significantly decreased the
likelihood of the underdog winning. This section addresses how the Administrator
enforces violations of compliance orders, process for public hearings, criminal
penalties, and consequences for “knowing endangerment” which was the basis for
many individuals challenging their convictions under RCRA. In many of the matchups under this provision, underdogs, most often individuals or businesses, were
appealing a decision made by the EPA and the courts deferred to the agency’s initial
decision.
The other statutory provision decreasing the likelihood of underdog success
was §6972. This section specifies the process for citizen suits including prohibited
actions, notice, costs, and the necessary process to commence a civil action. For
underdogs, this provision provides the opportunity to challenge an upperdog, but for
the cases during this time period, it was not a section on which they prevailed.
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The three provisions underdogs successfully argued were §6903 and §6902.
§6903 specifies foundational terms of the statute and 43 cases in the dataset
challenged definitions under this section. The specific definitions are important
because they clarify obligations all parties have when dealing with hazardous waste
including the required technologies, disposal processes, agency actions, and others.
Underdogs successfully challenged how these terms were defined, whether by the
EPA or the lower courts.
The most successful provision for underdogs was §6902, Objectives and
National Policy. The purpose of §6902 is to “promote the protection of health and the
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy resources.” This section
specifies how technical and financial assistance is provided to State and local
governments, partnerships between Federal and state entities, and other waste
management practices. With only twelve cases citing this provision, this was one of
the surprising results.

Hypothesis 1. I expect upperdogs to remain the most successful litigants in RCRA
with the federal government remaining the most effective litigant type.
The data for RCRA support this hypothesis. Businesses and industries won 47
(or 30%) of RCRA cases to which they were a party. They were the second most
successful litigant type after the federal government who won 49% (n=77) cases.
Nonprofit organizations were the least successful and won only seven out of 157
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cases. Individuals were only marginally more successful, winning nine (or 6%) of the
cases in which they were involved.

Hypothesis 2. I expect litigant types to be negatively correlated with underdog
success. As the opposing litigant has more resources, using the litigant typology as a
proxy, the underdog will be less likely to win.
With neither petitioner nor respondent type statistically significant, the data
does not support or disprove this hypothesis. Descriptively, the data show upperdogs
won 77% (n=121) of the cases under this statute. When businesses won the case, the
upperdog was successful in 28 of the cases and the underdog in 19 of them.
Businesses faced the federal government most often due to the nature of this statute,
but with winning 50% of its cases, the federal government made underdog success
unlikely. Table 3 below illustrates the frequency of each litigant type facing the other
types and the frequency of underdog success.
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Table 3: Percentage of Cases in Which Underdogs Were Successful under RCRA by Litigant
Type
(n=Number of Match-ups Between Litigant Types)

Individual

Respondent
Nonprofit
Business

Individual

…

…

Nonprofit

100%
(n=1)
50%
(n=1)
100%
(n=1)

…
50%
(n=4)
100%
(n=1)

7.69%
(n=13)
66.67%
(n=2)
36.36%
(n=11)
50%
(n=4)

100%
(n=1)

100%
(n=1)

16.67%
(n=6)

Petitioner

Business
State and
Local
Government
Federal
Government

State and
Local
Government
0%
(n=6)
20%
(n=5)
60%
(n=5)
…

Federal
Government

100%
(n=2)

…

8.33%
(n=24)
14.29%
(n=14)
20.83%
(n=48)
25%
(n=4)

Hypothesis 3. The presence of a female judge on the panel will be positively
correlated with the liberal outcome of underdog success.
The only demographic variable reaching statistical significance was the
presence of a woman on the panel. As hypothesized, the presence of a woman on the
panel increased the likelihood of the underdog winning. 50.99% (n=77) of the panels
had at least one female judge. The significance of a woman on the panel is unique to
RCRA, compared to other statutes such as the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act.
More research is needed to understand why these cases are unique.
Figure 1 illustrates the probability of an underdog’s success when a woman or
minority was on the panel. An underdog’s probability of success was highest, 0.19,
when there was both a woman and minority on the panel. The probability of success
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was lowest when there was neither a woman nor minority on the panel (0.01) or when
there was only a minority present (0.01). If there was only a woman on the panel, an
underdog’s probability of success was 0.03.

Figure 1: Probability of Underdog Success in RCRA Cases

Hypothesis 4. Underdogs will be more successful when bringing a case under the
citizen suit provision (§6972).
The citizen suit provision was almost statistically significant (p<0.057), but in
the opposite direction I expected. Instead of helping underdog litigants, underdogs
were very unsuccessful when pursuing RCRA cases on this provision. Looking at all
of the RCRA cases, §6972 was cited 40% of the time (n=63). Upperdogs won 48
cases when this section was cited in contrast to underdogs only winning 15.
Businesses won 24 cases when §6972 was under dispute and the federal government
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prevailed in 20 cases. Individuals and nonprofit litigants only won four cases each
when citizen suits were one of their legal claims.
As described earlier, citizen suits are an opportunity for litigants to commence
a civil action and be awarded litigation costs. The financial costs can be an important
consideration for underdog litigants seeking to recoup expenses from the legal
process. Businesses involved in handling RCRA substances and cases, whether they
are generators, transporters, or disposal facilities, invest a significant amount of
financial resources to meet the statute’s technology requirements and citizen suits
provide one means of getting some of the litigation costs back. However, this was not
the most successful provision for underdog litigants.

Hypothesis 5. I expect underdogs to be less likely to win when Chevron is cited in the
majority opinion.
Citation to Chevron did not achieve statistical significance. It was only cited
in 15% of the cases, suggesting it is perhaps not as prevalent or meaningful a
precedent as the judicial literature suggests. Another possibility is that Chevron is
considered settled law and there are other cases judges consider as more important
precedents for RCRA cases today. Judges may also be citing the APA instead of a
single case such as Chevron due to the statute’s procedures for agency deference.

Hypothesis 6. I expect amicus briefs to be statistically significant in favor of
underdogs.
77

This variable did not achieve statistical significance, so there is no evidence to
support this hypothesis. One possible explanation could be the measurement used for
this variable. Data on which party submitted the amicus brief or for which party the
brief was submitted in support of was not available and this information would likely
have enabled better analysis of whether amicus briefs help underdog litigants.

Hypothesis 7. I expect underdogs to be unsuccessful when the respondent wins.
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, if the prevailing party was the respondent, the
likelihood of the underdog winning dramatically decreased. This is likely due to the
federal government appearing as the respondent 57% of the time.
Success of the respondent is one of the more controversial variables to include
in the model, but its removal significantly decreases the explanatory power of the
model as illustrated in Table 2, suggesting a problem of an underspecified model. It is
also consistent with judicial literature to include respondent success when explaining
judicial behavior. The more fully specified model is therefore used for this analysis.

Conclusion
This statute provides insight into how hazardous waste cases are decided at the Court
of Appeals, giving underdog litigants insight into case provisions on which they are
more or less likely to prevail. §6902 and §6941, two sections explaining underdog
success, are both general parts of the statute and describe broad goals and objectives
of RCRA. §6902 also emphasizes protection of human health and the environment,
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which was a goal of RCRA since its inception, and therefore an unsurprising
provision of litigation. The greater ambiguity of these sections, with more provisions
of greater specificity, may have enabled underdog litigants to make persuasive
arguments and complicated the court’s tendency to defer to the federal government.
Upperdogs were more likely to win when §6928 or §6972 were cited, the
former addressing federal enforcement and the latter specifying provisions of a
citizen suit under RCRA. When considering the deference of the APA and Chevron,
it is unsurprising that courts would defer to upperdogs under these technical sections.
§6928 specifically details compliance orders, public hearings, criminal and civil
penalties, and corrective action orders. At the district courts, underdog litigants such
as businesses would have challenged issues of fact with the court then assessing
penalties or evaluating whether administrative hearing processes were properly
followed. By the time the case reaches the appellate courts, businesses or individuals
had less room to contest the action leading to the penalty and in many cases were
seeking a reduction of fines or timeline of corrective actions. If the court felt the EPA
had properly followed required administrative procedures, it would defer to the
agency and the underdog litigant opposing the agency was unsuccessful.
Prior to this original data collection and analysis, I would have expected
Chevron to play a larger role in explaining outcome. The absence of citation to this
statute was a surprising result, but may be the result of coding or a culture of agency
deference created over the years by the APA. Future research is needed to determine
the influence of the APA or language suggesting deference to federal agencies
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without citing Chevron specifically. Additionally, the significance of a female judge
on the panel for underdog success is an important contribution of this research and
unique to this statute of the dataset. The role of gender in environmental cases has not
been empirically tested before with hazardous waste cases, making it an important
and interesting explanatory variable. More research is needed into understanding why
gender only mattered for this statute.
For RCRA, variables testing the legal model best explain underdog success or
failure. The data did not support the role of ideology or strategic behavior explaining
judicial outcomes, but there were only two variables testing for these influences and
they were not the primary focus of analysis. Overall, previous research demonstrating
the success of upperdogs is confirmed with this dataset of RCRA cases though
underdogs were able to prevail in certain cases depending on which section they
chose to litigate. Underdog litigants pursuing RCRA cases should understand they are
more likely to win in the First Circuit and when challenging district court rulings on
less procedural or specific provisions of the statute.
Opposing the federal government will remain an uphill battle, but the findings
from RCRA cases suggest windows of opportunity to prevail do exist. The next
chapter will look at Clean Air Act cases and whether similar opportunities exist for
underdogs litigating air pollution regulations.
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CHAPTER 4
CLEAN AIR ACT
Introduction
In 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) marked the 40th anniversary of
the Clean Air Act’s (CAA) passage. Signed by President Richard Nixon on December
31, 1970, the EPA estimates the statute has prevented over 200,000 premature deaths,
helped avoid 700,000 cases of chronic bronchitis, and significantly improved the
nation’s air quality by targeting six of the leading air pollutants (EPA, 2010). The
agency’s 2011 report states the CAA and its amendments have cost $65 billion in
implementation costs, but will have reaped direct benefits of $2 trillion by the year
2020 (EPA, 2011). Despite the economic and health benefits of this legislation, the
statute has been controversial, particularly to industries facing a new regulatory
system with additional costs of compliance. The controversy added a new area of
environmental law to be ruled on by the courts and will be the focus of this chapter.
I look at cases involving the Clean Air Act (CAA) at the Court of Appeals.
Variables described in Chapter 2 are used to test the legal model and litigant resource
theory to provide a better understanding of the relationship between judicial behavior
and decisions handed down by the federal circuits. Historically, this statute marks the
beginning of the ‘Environmental Decade’ in 1970 and was one of the first large-scale
federal efforts at environmental regulation. The regulatory framework in the CAA
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was used as a model for subsequent legislation in this area, making it an important
one to understand and examine for litigant success.

Legislative Background
The Clean Air Act’s origins can be found in the Air Pollution Control Act (APCA) of
1955 that was the first federal statute on air pollution. This legislation focused on
supporting research on air pollution. In 1963, the first federal attempt to address air
pollution control was made through the Clean Air Act. The statute marked a
significant expansion of the federal government’s role and authorized the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare to formulate air quality standards through
discussions with polluters and government representatives (Ferrey 2010). It moved
beyond the APCA to include monitoring and controlling air pollution. A few years
later, the Air Quality Act (AQA) of 1967 bolstered these federal efforts and expanded
federal research support and enforcement into interstate air pollution transport. The
most significant addition of the AQA was its requirement for stationary source
inspections, which later became a critical part of the amended CAA.
In 1970, Congress amended the CAA and created a cooperative relationship
between the federal government and states. The primary focus of this amendment was
regulating stationary (mostly industrial) sources and mobile source emissions. With
creation of the EPA the same year, enforcement powers of the federal government to
regulate air pollution also expanded under this amendment. The 1970 amendments
added four major regulatory programs: National Ambient Air Quality Standards
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(NAAQS) in §109, New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) in §111, National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) in §112, and State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) in §110. NAAQS were set for six criteria pollutants:
carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, volatile organic compounds,
particulates, and lead (Percival et al. 2009). Minimum technology-based standards for
emissions were set based on the NAAQS for stationary sources. States bore the
responsibility to enforce these standards through State Implementation Plans (SIPs)
that were also federally enforceable (Moya and Fono 2011). NSPS are technologybased standards set for stationary sources that regulate “new, modified and
reconstructed affected facilities in specific source categories such as manufacturers of
glass, cement, rubber tires and wool fiberglass” (EPA 2013). NESHAPs were created
for hazardous air pollutants emitted by stationary sources and include asbestos,
beryllium, mercury, vinyl chloride, benzene, arsenic, and radon/radionuclides (EPA,
2013).
To strengthen the statute further, the next wave of CAA amendments occurred
in 1977. At this time, the EPA was evaluating the success of the NAAQS and
observed the need for geographic-specific reforms based on an area’s success or
failure at meeting the standards. Provisions for areas meeting the NAAQS were called
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and new facilities in these areas were
required to use the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) (Moya and Fono
2011). Existing facilities in non-attainment (NA) areas were required to use
“reasonably available control technology” (RACT) while new facilities had a stricter
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standard of “lowest achievable emission reduction” (LAER) technology (Percival et
al. 2009). These changes reflect the statute’s goal of not only maintaining air quality,
but also improving it in the long-term.
The last major revision to this statute occurred in 1990 during the H.W. Bush
administration. The 1990 amendments placed an emphasis on acid rain, stationary
source operating permits, and considerably improving federal enforcement powers.
Since the 1990 amendments, a large portion of cases arise from one of the CAA’s
regulatory provisions, specifically § 108/109 (NAAQS), § 111 (New Source
Performance Standards), or § 112 (emissions standards) (Moya and Fono 2011).
The enforcement powers strengthened in the 1990 Amendments are a
contested part of the statute today. These enforcement provisions for the EPA include
civil actions, administrative actions, and field citations. The CAA also has a provision
allowing individuals or private interest groups to file citizen suits against the EPA or
a private party for civil penalties. Before a suit is filed, the EPA must be given a 60day notification as a grace period for compliance. If the EPA chooses to pursue the
case, the citizen suit becomes irrelevant. Importantly, this statute allows for attorney
fees to be awarded if the citizen or group is successful (Ferrey 2010). With
individuals and nonprofit groups (“underdogs”) who operate with more limited
budgets, awarding attorney fees can be a critical factor enabling them to bring suits
challenging a business or federal agency “upperdog.” This is comparable to the
citizen suit provisions in the other statues analyzed in this research.
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The statute also includes criminal penalties levied on individuals for any
violations “knowingly” committed by the accused which include forging records,
refusing to pay permit fees, failing to install mandated equipment to monitor
emissions, not following procedures set forth in SIPs, or the most serious violation
where a “source knowingly releases hazardous emissions creating ‘imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury.’” If convicted of these actions, a corporation or
individual acting on behalf of a corporation could face a large fine and jail (Ferrey
2010). There are also provisions and protections within the CAA to protect and
address whistleblower complaints. A number of the cases from 2001–2007 at the
appellate courts include whistleblower complaints and decisions made by
Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) who originally heard the dispute.
The CAA includes citizen provisions, but the procedural requirements
established make it very difficult for individuals to pursue claims under this statute.
Individuals must understand the science behind the act and have the resources to
prove how the federal or state actor erred, which can require extensive research and
testing. Nonprofits or businesses wishing to challenge a federal agency must
overcome this research and resource hurdle, which means that any party opposing an
agency, including businesses, is the underdog. Although it is difficult for underdogs
to pursue litigation in this area, they still chose to do so and in some cases succeed. In
this chapter, I examine if and how underdog litigants are able to challenge one of the
most significant pieces of environmental legislation in the United States.
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Theoretical Relationships and Concepts (See Appendix A)
The primary models I test in this chapter are the legal model and role of litigant
resources. If the legal model explains judicial outcomes, then the significant variables
will be those measuring citation to case characteristics or the Chevron precedent. As
described in Chapter 2, every case characteristic appearing ten or more times is tested
in the final model. For the Clean Air Act, the following provisions cited in ten or
more cases are as follows: §7401–7671 (general citation to the CAA), §7401
(congressional findings and declaration of purpose), §7409 (national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards), §7410 (state implementation plans for
national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards), §7607b (judicial
review), §7607b1 (petition to EPA administrator), §7607d9a (whether Administrator
action is arbitrary or capricious), §7661c (permit requirements and conditions), and
§7661d (notification to Administrator and contiguous states). Appendix B also
references the case provisions included in the final model.
Chevron is coded for every statute for this dissertation, but its inclusion in the
CAA model is of particular importance because it was a CAA case. In Chevron, the
Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s “bubble concept,” which allowed the agency to
interpret “stationary source” to mean that all devices emitting pollution in the same
industrial grouping should be treated as though they were in a single “bubble” (Moya
and Fono 2011). This is important not only on substantive grounds for judges
interpreting the statute, but on procedural grounds for setting a precedent on when
courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of terms in environmental laws. It
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has become an important case for agency deference and this chapter tests whether it
explains judicial outcomes at the Court of Appeals for air pollution cases.
The same two variables from Chapter 3 controlling for the influence of
ideology are included; panel ideology and ideological distance between the circuit
and panel. For these variables I use Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores (Epstein et
al. 2007, Poole and Rosenthal 1997). These are built from the Poole and Rosenthal
scores to get the ideal policy point of Supreme Court justices and comparable
measures for lower court judges. Most of the justices on the CAA cases are from the
appellate courts, but district court judges sit by designation at times and the JCS
scores exist for most judges in both courts. For the panel ideology measure, I use the
median JCS score for judges on the panel. For ideological distance, I subtract the
median JCS score for the panel from the median JCS score of the circuit the year the
case was decided.
All variables are combined in one model to allow the variables to directly
compete with one another. I also include the following explanatory variables: federal
circuits (dichotomous variable for each circuit), petitioner and respondent type (using
the Songer typology), respondent success (dichotomous variable for whether the
respondent won), presence of a minority on the panel (dichotomous variable),
presence of a woman (dichotomous variable), and amicus brief (dichotomous variable
for whether a brief was submitted in support either the petitioner or respondent).
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Data, Methods, and Hypotheses
I analyze the data quantitatively due to the number of cases and variables to be
included in the models. This modeling procedure uses a dichotomous categorical
dependent variable measuring whether or not the underdog won the case (0=underdog
loss, 1=underdog win). I use a logistic regression model in STATA because this MLE
regression technique accounts for the fact that the variable of underdog success can
only have two predefined values (Halcoussis 2005). Logit produces a model estimate
that can be used to calculate the probability of underdogs winning cases involving the
Clean Air Act, given the values of the predictor variables described below.
I acquired data from LexisNexis and Westlaw for cases decided between
1993–2008, covering the Clinton and W. Bush administrations. The initial search
used the term “Clean Air Act” in LexisNexis with a second search in Westlaw. Both
search sites were used to ensure no cases were missed. There were also no major
revisions during this time period to CAA, making the cases during the time period
comparable and sufficient for a quantitative analysis.
Searches in LexisNexis and Westlaw produced a large number of cases that
did not meet the coding criteria. As with all statutes, I read each case and excluded it
if the opinion did not decide a statutory issue on the merits, if the petition is denied,
remanded, or granted in part, or if the case only has a citation to the statute. A number
of cases did have split verdicts in which the court would uphold part of the district
court opinion and remand or deny other claims. I was unable to determine the
upperdog or underdog “winner” in these situations, and therefore the cases were
excluded. The number of variables varied by statute and the only limitation I
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considered prior to starting the coding process was using a slightly abbreviated list of
statutory provisions as noted in Percival (2011). The CAA included 549 variables and
a random sample of 100 cases. Due to the volume of cases that dealt with the Clean
Air Act, a random sample was taken instead of the full universe. Cases were selected
by compiling a complete list of all qualifying cases, then assigning random numbers
using Microsoft Excel’s random number generator. Excel sorted the cases by the
random numbers and I selected the first 100 for this analysis. This process of random
selection ensures that there was no bias in which cases were selected; every case had
the same probability of being selected and there was no researcher bias introduced
since Excel did the random number assignment. We can be certain that the random
sample is representative of the full population of cases and does not harm the quality
of the data or conclusions in any way (Jupp 2006). The final original dataset for this
statute is 100 cases.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses for the CAA are based on my expectations described previously in
Chapter 2 and the results for each one will be discussed in the following results
section.
1. I expect upperdogs to remain the most successful litigants in the CAA with
the federal government remaining the most effective litigant type.
2. I expect litigant types to be negatively correlated with underdog success. As
the opposing litigant has more resources, using the litigant typology as a
proxy, the underdog will be less likely to win.
89

3. The presence of a female judge on the panel will be positively correlated with
the liberal outcome of underdog success.
4. Underdogs will be more successful when bringing a case under the citizen suit
provision (§7604).
5. I expect underdogs to be less likely to win when Chevron is cited in the
majority opinion.
6. I expect amicus briefs to be statistically significant in favor of underdogs.
7. I expect underdogs to be unsuccessful when the respondent wins.

Results
This sample of 100 cases was drawn from a population of 292 using a random
number generator in Excel as described above. The largest number of cases was
decided in 1999 (n=11, 11%) and 2003 (n=9, 9%). Most of the cases were published
(77%, n=77). As discussed in Chapter 1, this is much higher than the standard
publication rate, and the conclusions may be biased as a result. Compared to the other
statues in the research, Chevron was cited often with 39 of the opinions (39%) citing
it. Only 19 cases had amicus briefs, but this may reflect the greater involvement of
nonprofit litigants as parties to the case. Just over half of the cases (n=55) had at least
one woman on the panel, but only 33 had one or more minority justices.
Similar to the other statutes, in these cases the federal government was the
most successful litigant type, winning 63 (63%) of the cases in this sample. The EPA
won 60 (60%) of these cases. Contrasted with other statutes involving different
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federal agencies or military branches, the EPA was the main agency for air pollution
cases. This may be due to the statute’s enforcement powers specifically requiring
agency actions and due to the state plans being federally enforceable by the EPA
(Moya and Fono 2011). The federal government was also the most frequent
respondent (n=81).
As illustrated in Table 4 below, a majority of the cases involved match-ups
with the federal government with nonprofits being the most successful underdog in
those cases. Of the 29 cases in which a nonprofit organization faced the federal
government, nonprofits won 34.48%. This was also the most common litigant matchup of nonprofits v. the federal government, with businesses v. the federal government
as the second most frequent, followed by individuals v. the government. Nonprofits
were the most frequent petitioners (n=33), then businesses (n=30), and finally
individuals (n=19).
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Table 4: Underdog Success in Clean Air Act Cases by Litigant Type
(n=Number of Matchups Between Litigant Types)

Individual

Respondent
Nonprofit
Business

Individual

…

…

Nonprofit

100%
(n=1)
50%
(n=2)
…

…

100%
(n=1)

…

Petitioner

Business
State and
Local
Government
Federal
Government

100%
(n=1)
0%
(n=2)

100%
(n=1)
0%
(n=1)
…
66.67%
(n=3)
33.33%
(n=3)

State and
Local
Government
…
0%
(n=2)
0%
(n=1)
…

100%
(n=1)

Federal
Government
11.11%
(n=18)
34.48%
(n=29)
23.08%
(n=26)
25.00%
(n=8)
…

Looking at the legal characteristics, the most cases were brought under §7401
on congressional findings and declaration of purpose (n=28). One of the critical parts
of this provision is section a(3) which states “air pollution control at is source is the
primary responsibility of States and local governments.” Another important clause is
subchapter b(1–4) which declares the purpose of the statute’s air quality and
emissions limitations. Litigants who disagree with how a state is addressing air
pollution control within its borders may choose to pursue a case under this section
and subchapters. Upperdogs prevailed in 19 of the cases in which §7401 was cited
with the federal government winning 18 of those.
§7607b1, standards on motor vehicles or new engines, was also cited in 28
cases. Since the 1970 Amendments targeted motor vehicle emissions, businesses have
heavily litigated this provision and the case sample reflects that. Upperdogs,
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specifically the federal government, won 19 of these cases. Four of the times this
provision was cited, nonprofit litigants won. The least successful litigants were
individuals and state/local governments, winning only one case each with §7607b1
cited.
The third most cited provision is §7409, which addresses National Primary
and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The EPA Administrator is
required to review the NAAQS on a regular basis and publish proposed regulations
revising these standards based on the best available science. Underdog litigants
challenged the agency in each of these areas, often frustrated with the agency’s delay
in revising the standards and strongly disagreeing with the agency on both the
standards set and science used. For example, during the G. W. Bush administration,
the EPA stalled on revising primary and secondary NAAQS for ozone and then set
levels that conflicted with recommendations of the Advisory Committee. This led to
litigants pursuing relief through the D.C. Circuit and a series of delays that continued
into the Obama administration and were only recently resolved in 2013. Of the 16
times the provision was cited, upperdogs won 11 cases and the federal government
prevailed in ten instances.
§7410 was cited in 16 cases and upperdogs won 11. The federal government
prevailed in ten. §7410 specifies State Implementation Plans for National Primary and
Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards. The most common match-ups where this
provision was cited were nonprofits challenging the EPA and being wholly
unsuccessful against the agency. SIPS are federally enforceable, but also EPA93

approved, meaning any underdogs challenging the plans have to overcome both the
state and federal government. Not only are the underdogs challenging the federal
standards that serve as the baseline for the SIPS, but they are also disputing any
additional standards the state has included. This poses a tremendous hurdle that
underdogs were not able to overcome in this sample.
The next most commonly cited provision was §7607b describing judicial
review and explaining how a petition for judicial review may be filed in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if “such action is based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect” or in the appropriate circuit if it “local or
regionally applicable.” Thirty-two percent (n=32) of the Clean Air Act cases were
from this circuit, followed by 20% (n=20) in the Ninth Circuit, and 11% (n=11) in the
Sixth Circuit. Upperdogs won seven of the 12 cases in which this provision was cited.
The final three provisions, §7607d9a, §7661c, and §7661d, each appeared in
ten cases with upperdogs winning nearly every instance. §7607d9a states “In the case
of review of any action of the Administrator to which this subsection applies, the
court may reverse such action found to be—a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” While this provision does allow
judicial review of agency decisions, it also references similar language to that of
Chevron and agency deference. The provision sets a very high burden for underdog
litigants to overcome and considering so many cases were in the federal government’s
backyard of the D.C. Circuit (n=32), proved to be a very unsuccessful one for
underdogs.
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Under Title IV of the CAA, §7661c states, “A single permit may be issued for
a facility with multiple sources” with §7661d explaining the submission and approval
process. These permits have been one of the most contested parts of the statute and
heavily criticized by the industries required to operate with them. The challenge with
this particular part of the statute is its reliance on the states for primary enforcement
of the permits that includes inspections and fines. Feeling the EPA looks past states
failing to fulfill these obligations, environmental groups have adopted the strategy of
suing the state or regional air boards in charge (Collins 2010). Both of the
administrations covered in this dataset put forth half-hearted efforts to enforce these
provisions, but ultimately were unsuccessful and in the case of President Bush, even
relaxed some of the permitting conditions. These provisions were not statistically
significant in the final model, but they are important to understanding the types of
cases litigated at the Court of Appeals in air pollution.
In describing the cases of this dataset, the breakdown of cases by circuit is
important although the circuits were not statistically significant. Compared to other
statutes where cases were more evenly distributed, the Clean Air Act cases were
primarily in the D.C. Circuit (n=32), Ninth Circuit (n=20), and the Sixth Circuit
(n=11). The large number of cases heard by the D.C. Circuit is less surprising in this
statute because of the jurisdiction under §7607b of the CAA. However, this circuit is
considered the most favorable to the federal government and agencies and while they
were the most frequent respondents, they were also the smallest category of
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petitioners. Underdogs were the least successful in this circuit. Table 5 below
illustrates litigant success by circuit.

Table 5: Litigant Success in Clean Air Act Cases by Litigant Type and Circuit
(Number of Cases Won)
Circuit

Litigant Type
Individual

Nonprofit

Business

State and Local

Federal

Government

Government

1

2

0

0

0

6

2

1

0

0

1

4

3

0

0

0

0

2

4

1

0

1

0

4

5

0

0

0

1

0

6

0

0

2

1

8

7

0

1

2

0

4

8

0

0

0

0

1

9

1

3

1

6

8

10

0

0

0

0

0

11

1

1

1

1

3

D.C.

0

6

4

0

22

Federal

…

---

…

…

…

Total

6 (6%)

10 (10%)

11 (11%)

10 (10%)

63 (63%)
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The Ninth Circuit is unsurprising because this is anecdotally considered the
most pro-environmental circuit and nonprofit litigants, who were the most frequent
petitioners, are thought to have the greatest chance of success in this circuit. In this
sample, however, the Ninth Circuit was one of the least favorable to underdogs and
nonprofits only won three of twenty cases in it.
The Sixth Circuit was one of the most successful circuits for the federal
government as it won eight of its 63 cases here. It includes Kentucky, Michigan,
Ohio, and Tennessee. Michigan produces the most automobiles in the country and
Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee all have large numbers of factories within their
borders. The CAA’s provisions targeting both air emissions from industrial sources
and mobile emissions make it a very salient statue for litigants in these states. This
was a very unsuccessful circuit for businesses and nonprofits, though, and underdogs
only won three cases in it. (See Table 5 for litigant success by circuit).
Lastly, the two ideological measures for the Clean Air Act are panel ideology
and ideological distance. Twenty-percent of the cases (n=20) have no judges
appointed by a Democrat president, 39% (n=39) have one Democrat-appointed judge,
and 32% of the panels are majority-Democrat. The JCS scores for the panels ranged
from −0.543 to 0.581 and leaned conservative with an average of 0.058755. At the
circuit level, the average ideological distance between a panel and circuit was
0.11456 and the scores ranged from −0.808 to 1.045. This is the widest margin of any
statute in this dataset.
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Table 6 illustrates the logit model of underdog success. The only variables
reaching statistical significance are respondent type and whether the respondent won
the case, both of which had a negative relationship to underdog success. For
respondent type, the more resources the respondent had, the less likely the underdog
was to win, supporting the litigant resource theory. The variable with the largest
effect on underdog success was whether the respondent won the case. These findings
will be discussed in greater depth shortly. Table 1 also compares the final model with
one in which ideological distance is removed. The notable difference is the
significance of panel ideology in the model without ideological distance and its
negative relationship with underdog success. Because the model with ideological
distance is a better-specified model, it is the focus of the analysis below.
Table 6: Logit Model of Underdog Success by Federal Circuits for CAA Cases

LR Chi-2
Pseudo R2
Circuit 1
Circuit 2

Model without
Litigant
included
97.16
0.8211
−0.2630 (1.000)

Circuit 3
Circuit 4

−11.8134
(0.998)
…
3.2099 (0.999)

Circuit 5

−5.2317 (0.999)

Circuit 6

5.8713 (0.999)

Circuit 7

9.8148 (0.998)

Circuit 8
Circuit 9

…
−7.6580 (0.998)

Circuit 10

…

Final Model

97.16
0.8211
−0.2630303
(1.000)
−11.81348
(0.998)
…
3.209928
(0.999)
−5.231778
(0.999)
5.871339
(0.999)
9.814858
(0.998)
…
−7.658014
(0.998)
…
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Table 6—Continued
Circuit 11

−7.7998 (0.998)

D.C. Circuit

4.8372 (0.999)

Respondent
type
Petitioner type

−2.9304
(0.054)*
−.2035 (0.836)

Minority judge

1.2146 (0.652)

Female judge

1.4150 (0.581)

Panel ideology
Circuit
ideology
Amicus

−7.2558
(0.050)*
−10.1212
(0.360)
5.7017 (0.074)

Chevron

−5.6294 (0.154)

s74017671

−0.2588 (0.938)

s7401

1.2706 (0.697)

s7409

2.5835 (0.506)

s7410

−7.8299 (0.133)

s7607b

1.3771 (0.646)

s7607b1

6.5855 (0.117)

s7607d9a

1.5738 (0.842)

c

5.7123 (0.754)

s7661d
Litigant

−12.2907
(0.504)
…

Distance

…

* p<0.05

**p<0.01

−7.799828
(0.998)
4.837276
(0.999)
−2.930494
(0.054)*
−0.2035158
(0.836)
1.214692
(0.652)
1.415049
(0.581)
−17.37702
(0.200)
…
5.701795
(0.074)
−5.629483
(0.154)
−0.2588151
(0.938)
1.270621
(0.697)
2.583542
(0.506)
−7.829941
(0.133)
1.377192
(0.646)
6.585536
(0.117)
1.573813
(0.842)
5.712377
(0.754)
−12.29075
(0.504)
−16.52394
(0.013)**
−10.1212
(0.360)
***p<0.001

Conclusions for each hypothesis will now be discussed.
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Hypothesis 1. I expect upperdogs to remain the most successful litigants in the CAA
with the federal government remaining the most effective litigant type.
This hypothesis is supported by the data. Upperdogs won 71% of the CAA
cases in this dataset. The federal government was the most successful litigant type,
winning 63% of the cases (n=63), followed by businesses (11%, n=11). The EPA
specifically won 60 of the cases (60%). In addition to the federal government having
the most resources and is afforded deference under the APA and Chevron, this litigant
type’s success may also be due to the case provisions appearing most often in the
dataset. The most frequent case provision cited (n=28) was §7401 specifying
congressional findings and declaration of purpose, which is a general section of the
statute and one in which the court would be able to defer to the agency’s perspective
under the Chevron two-step. Of the 28 times this provision was cited, the upperdog
won 19 with the federal government winning 18 of those. Dominance of the federal
government specifically was consistent across every case provision in the final model.

Hypothesis 2. I expect litigant types to be negatively correlated with underdog
success. As the opposing litigant has more resources, using the litigant typology as a
proxy, the underdog will be less likely to win.
As shown in Table 6, respondent type was statistically significant for this
statute and in the direction expected. As the respondent had more resources,
underdogs were less likely to win. 81 of the 100 cases in the sample involved the
federal government as respondent.
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Petitioner type was not statistically significant. This may be due to the fact
that a large number of petitioners were nonprofits (n=33) or businesses (n=30), which
had limited success under this statute, winning 10% (n=10) and 11% (n=11)
respectively. This hypothesis is therefore partially supported with respect to the Clean
Air Act.

Hypothesis 3. The presence of a female judge on the panel will be positively
correlated with the liberal outcome of underdog success.
Gender was not a statistically significant variable. Just over half of the panels
had at least one woman on the panel, though, reflecting increased gender diversity on
the appellate courts. This data does not support this hypothesis.
Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of underdog success from the logit
model when a woman or minority justice was on the panel. If there are no women or
minorities on the panel, the underdog has a 0.001 probability of winning.
Substantively, the presence of a woman on the panel changes the probability only
slightly (0.004), and when there is a minority on the panel, the probability of
underdog success is 0.003. When there is a woman and a minority on the panel, the
probability of underdog success is 0.013.
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Figure 2: Probability of Underdog Success under the Clean Air Act Based on Demographic
Factors of Race and Gender

Hypothesis 4. Underdogs will be more successful when bringing a case under the
citizen suit provision (§7604).
This hypothesis was not tested in the final model because only six cases were
brought under the citizen suit provision and each characteristic had to be cited ten or
more times to be included.

Hypothesis 5. I expect underdogs to be less likely to win when Chevron is cited in the
majority opinion.
With Chevron not statistically significant in this model, there is not enough
data to support this hypothesis. One possible explanation for this result is that litigants
brought a number of cases under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ provisions of the CAA
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or APA and when writing opinions, judges could refer to the statutory language
instead of the Chevron precedent. Chevron was cited in 39 cases with upperdogs
winning 27 of those and the federal government alone winning 26. Although not a
statistically significant variable for underdog success, Chevron citation was part of
the federal government’s success in CAA cases.

Hypothesis 6. I expect amicus briefs to be statistically significant in favor of
underdogs.
As described in Chapter 2, the purpose of this hypothesis is to test Collins
(2010) findings on how amicus briefs can help less advantaged litigants. Amicus
briefs are an explanatory variable and the data does not support this hypothesis.
Amicus briefs were not significant in the final CAA model (p<0.074). A more precise
measure of briefs to include how many were cited in support of each party would
enable better analysis of how the briefs helped or hurt underdogs depending on
whether they were the petitioner or respondent, but this data was not available at the
time.

Hypothesis 7. I expect underdogs to be unsuccessful when the respondent wins.
Consistent with prior literature summarized in Chapter 2, and using this
original dataset, the hypothesis is supported. It was the strongest predictor for
upperdog success. When the respondent won, underdogs were highly unlikely to win.
This is likely due to the federal government appearing as the respondent 81% (n=81)
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of the time in the CAA. With the cooperative federalism structure of the CAA that
delegates responsibilities both to the states and federal government, and fact that the
SIPs are federally enforceable, this result is not surprising. If the respondent variable
is removed, as shown in Table 6, the explanatory strength of the model notably
declines.
The results of this analysis speak to the theory that litigant resources matter
for success in the courts. In the final model, none of the case characteristics were
significant and neither of the ideology variables explained underdog success or
failure. The role of ideology at the Court of Appeals has varied depending on the
issue area and for this environmental issue area, a judge’s ideology using the JCS
scores, does not explain judicial outcomes.

Conclusion
This chapter offers mixed findings for underdog litigants. Litigant resources still
matter and upperdogs remain likely to prevail, particularly if the federal government
is a party to the case. Although Chevron was not statistically significant, this opinion
may have created a culture of agency deference, represented by the high success rate
of the EPA. Underdog litigants will always face challenges when opposing a federal
actor. However, underdogs are able to win when certain legal provisions of the CAA
are cited in the case. This may mean the court is more willing to rule in favor of the
underdog litigant for certain types of cases. It suggests if litigants strategically select
which cases they choose to put their limited resources towards, it may lead to greater
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success in the courts. A larger sample may yield to statistically significant
relationships between statutory provisions and underdog success than what this
analysis bore out.
As one of the foundational statutes from the Environmental Decade, the Clean
Air Act has an important position in environmental law history. It was the first statute
the EPA was tasked with enforcing and served as the blueprint for many other
statutes. The CAA establishes a federal role in both monitoring and improving air
pollution, but delegates enforcement to the states, making it very difficult for
underdog litigants to successfully prevail in either forum as one level. Nonprofits and
businesses were petitioners in 63% of the cases, yet the federal government wins 62%
of the time. Even pursuing cases in traditionally environmental-friendly circuits,
underdogs were unable to prevail that often. These results speak to the strong
deference afforded to the federal government in environmental law and to the
importance of resources.
For underdog litigants evaluating legal strategies, these findings suggest that
pursuing scientific provisions such as the NAAQS is more likely to lead to success
than challenging the agency on issues of discretion or EPA-approved SIPS. Since
passage of the CAA, the EPA has been tasked with enforcement and monitoring of
several major statutes. It is overburdened and consistently behind with required
revisions for the NAAQS. In addition to arguing new science has emerged justifying
revisions, underdogs can reasonably and successfully take the agency to court for
these administrative failures.
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In the future, air pollution will remain a high-profile issue as the Obama
administration plans to enact sweeping climate change reform with additional
regulations on power plants, and as a new EPA administrator is appointed. President
Obama’s current nominee, Gina McCarthy, is the acting Assistant Administrator for
Air Quality with a history of compromising with industries and businesses on air
pollution regulation, but her nomination has been met with strong political
congressional opposition. The resolution of this appointment will have important
implications both for how the EPA addresses air pollution moving forward and for
the direction environmental policy and legislation in this area will take.
The findings in this chapter provide an initial look at how litigants succeed in
air pollution control cases and the unique challenges the CAA poses for underdogs. It
offers promising results for underdogs, but also speaks to the continued dominance of
the federal government and upperdogs in the appellate courts. With the policy and
administrative changes proposed by the Obama administration, this will be a
constantly evolving policy area and therefore a busy one for the courts. The next
chapter on the Clean Water Act will look at another environmental policy area facing
enforcement challenges and calls for reform.
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CHAPTER 5
CLEAN WATER ACT

Introduction
With over 3.5 million miles of rivers and streams, 58,421 miles of ocean shoreline,
5,559 miles of Great Lakes shoreline alone, and only 22% of these water bodies
partially supporting their intended use, the Clean Water Act (CWA) is intended to
cover large environments which are rapidly deteriorating (Ferrey 2010). Its goals to
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters” reflect the statute’s comprehensive approach to improve water quality in the
United States (Murphy 2013). This broad mandate involves a large number of cases at
the Court of Appeals and a diversity of litigants making it well-suited for quantitative
analysis.
In this chapter I examine cases involving the CWA at the Court of Appeals. I
focus on the relationship between judicial behavior and litigant resources, specifically
how to best explain underdog success in this policy area. Using variables and key
concepts from Chapter 2, I test whether the legal model or litigant resources best
explains judicial decision-making. (See Appendix A). Similar to the Clean Air Act,
the CWA involves more underdogs such as nonprofits and individuals and provides
an analysis of how the least-advantaged underdogs can prevail at the Court of
Appeals.
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Legislative Background
The federal CWA we know today has its origin in the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, referred to as the Refuse Act. Originally intended as a law to protect U.S.
waters from interference with navigation, it is the oldest environmental statute and the
first to regulate discharges into waterways (Downing, Winer, Wood 2003; Ferrey
2010). The Refuse Act created two permit systems for discharges that were later
incorporated into the CWA. The next legal attempt at improving water quality in the
United States occurred in 1948 through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA). Water quality standards (WQS), now a key component of water law, were
first set under this statute, but initially only targeted publicly owned treatment works
(POTWs) or sewage treatment facilities. It would take several more years and
heightened congressional frustration at states’ failure to improve their waters before
WQS would be tied to funding and accompanied by technology-based effluent
standards (Malloy 2011).
The CWA’s goals differ from those of previous statutes, focusing instead on
restoring waterways to the fishable and swimmable quality by 1983 and eliminating
pollutant discharges by 1985. The pollutant levels for waterways based on their
designated use(s) are set by the states under the EPA’s guidance and based on the best
available scientific information. A series of amendments later extended the original
target dates and further defined the Act’s standards for what constituted a
“discharge,” “navigable waters,” and “waters of the United States” (Ferrey 2010).
Distinctions between effluent limitations for direct sources, new sources, and POTWs
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and differing timelines for standards were also refined (Crawford 2010). Similar to
the CAA, deadlines for reducing the pollutants are staggered over time and vary
depending on the source type. The importance of these amendments and deadlines is
the additional discretion afforded to the EPA in establishing and interpreting
standards. This mandated deference, in addition to Chevron and the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA), make it difficult for any litigant to successfully challenge an
EPA rule or interpretation. However, if the EPA fails to follow its duty to establish
standards, litigants have an opportunity to challenge the agency and demand
enforcement action.
From its inception, the CWA has been based on the principle of cooperative
federalism in which implementation and enforcement tasks are divided between the
federal government and states. States have the primary responsibility for setting WQS
through Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), but if they fail to do so, the federal
government is required to set them. WQS establish the discharge limits for the
individual permits, which are the basis of litigation under this statute (Molloy 2011).
Another core element of the permits and litigation is the source of pollution:
nonpoint or point. Nonpoint source pollution is not regulated by the CWA and left to
the states to address. In contrast, the CWA heavily regulates point sources, defined as
“any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants may be discharged” (§402). Congress did not further specify what it meant
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by point sources and subsequent cases in the lower courts have had to do this in
addition to clarifying the difference between a point and nonpoint source. U.S. v.
Plaza Health Laboratories (1993) held that individuals could not be classified a
“point source” and that the statute’s criminal sanctions were not intended for human
polluters. Pronsolino v. Nastri (2002) upheld the EPA’s determination that applied
TMDLs to both point and nonpoint sources under §303d of the CWA.
While nonpoint sources account for half of all water pollution and pose a
major threat to water quality, their regulation falls to the states. Section 319 requires
states to identify water bodies unable to meet the WQS because of nonpoint source
pollution and develop management plans which include “best management practices
and measures, an implementation plan, and deadlines,” subject to EPA approval
(Ferrey 2010). The EPA has also tried to manage nonpoint source pollution through
TMDLs, but the statute’s failure to specifically regulate this kind of pollution is one
of the biggest criticisms of the CWA and one of the greatest hurdles to the statute
achieving its goals (Murphy 2013).
Stormwater and runoff are additional types of challenging pollution to
regulate. §405 requires permits for stormwater discharge defined as “stormwater
runoff, snow melt runoff, and surface runoff and drainage” (40 C.F.R. 122.26(b)(13)).
From 1994 on, permits have been required for discharges of stormwater from most
municipal storm water sewer systems. Industrial facilities such as hazardous waste
treatment plants, storage or disposal facilities, landfills, junkyards, battery reclaimers,
and sewage treatment works are a few of the types of places subject to these
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stormwater permit requirements. For a majority of the time this data covers, EPA
regulations requiring permits for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs)
were in operation. These permits required a CAFO to apply for a permit if it intended
to discharge and to include a nutrient management plan for the phosphorus and
nitrogen runoff. Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA (2005) struck down parts of this rule
and modified permit and reporting requirements for CAFOs and the last few years of
the dataset reflects this change in policy. States also have jurisdiction to regulate
stormwater discharges and CAFOs, but the financial and political costs make it very
unpopular and therefore unlikely for elected officials to pursue.
In addition to enforcement provisions for the CWA being similar to the CAA,
§505 of the CWA permits citizen suits. In writing this statute, Congress purposely
went beyond the public participation procedures of the APA and emphasized citizen
participation in the CWA through suits, enforcement, administrative penalty actions,
and public hearings. Though not permitted under the APA, attorney and expert
witness fees were made available for citizen suits under the CWA (Craig 2009). As in
other statutes in this dataset, a citizen is defined as “a person who has an interest that
is adversely affected, or that may be adversely affected” by the standing case Sierra
Club v. Morton (1972). States are also allowed to challenge an EPA administrator if
the state feels the agency has failed to enforce an existing rule, if the agency has
failed to take action, or if the state feels its interests have been harmed because of
EPA inaction. From 1970–2003, an estimated 2000 environmental citizen suits were
filed with 1500 reported court decisions and most were CWA cases. Since 1995,
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citizen suits are responsible for 315 “compliance-forcing judicial consent orders”
under the CWA and CAA combined and more CWA citizen suits are filed every year
than for any other federal environmental statute (Craig 2009). Citizen suits are part of
both RCRA and the CAA, but they have a historically important role in enforcing
water pollution regulations under the CWA.
The last important provision to discuss is §507. This section contains a
“whistleblower” provision allowing individuals to challenge a federal agency or
business that also attempts to protect them from retaliation. It provides underdogs
with another legal avenue to pursue environmental protection while also protecting
them from retaliation by the upperdogs (Ferrey 2010). Though this provision was not
cited enough to be used in the final model, it is an important one for understanding all
of the options underdogs have under the CWA.

Theoretical Relationships and Concepts (See Appendix A)
The first theoretical relationship I test is the legal model that argues case
characteristics and legal precedents best explain judicial outcomes. The CWA is a
lengthy statute as written and with 244 cases for this research it was the largest in the
dataset. Consistent with the other four statutes in this research, I include every case
characteristic appearing ten or more times in the model. For the Clean Water Act, the
following provisions are incorporated: §1251 (research and related programs,
declaration of goals and policy), §1251a (objectives), §1291 (sewage collection
systems), §1311 (effluent limitations), §1311a (discharge of pollutants), §1311b
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(objectives for effluent limitations), §1312 (water quality related effluent limitations),
§1313 (water quality standards and implementation plans), §1313c (governor’s role in
public hearings to review water quality standards), §1313d (state identification of
waters in need of new effluent standards), §1314 (information and guidelines), §1316
(National Standards of Performance), §1317 (toxic and pretreatment effluent
standards), §1318 (inspections, monitoring, and entry), §1319 (federal enforcement),
§1319a (Administrator authority to issue compliance orders), §1319b (Administrator
authority to start civil action), §1319c (criminal penalties), §1319d (civil penalties),
§1319g (administrative penalties), §1328 (aquaculture), §1341 (certification), §1341a
(requirements for permit applicants), §1342 (National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System), §1342a (Administrator authority for permits to discharge
pollutants), §1342b (Governor authority to administer state permit system), §1342c
(Administrator to suspend state program), §1342p (municipal and stormwater
discharge), §1344 (permits for dredged or fill materials), §1344a (Secretary authority
to issue permits for discharges into navigable waters), §1344f (explanation of
discharge of dredge and fill materials), §1345 (disposal of sewage sludge), §1362
(general definitions), §1365 (citizen suits), §1365a (citizen standing to commence
civil action), §1365b (restrictions on citizen suits), and §1369b (administrative
procedure and judicial review). Lastly, Chevron is included to test the explanatory
power of case precedents in the legal model and this is measured by whether or not
the case was cited in the majority opinion.
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Two variables to control for the influence of ideology and strategic behavior
are included; panel ideology and ideological distance. I measure these variables using
the Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores as developed by Epstein et al. (2007) and
Poole and Rosenthal (1997). JCS scores measure the ideal policy points of Supreme
Court justices with comparable measures for appellate and trial court judges. This
enables comparison across multiple court levels and allows me to include panels that
have district court judges sitting by designation. Panel ideology is measured using the
median justice’s JCS score from the deciding panel. For the ideological distance
variable, I subtract the median JCS score on the panel from the median JCS score of
the circuit the year the case was decided.
To examine the explanatory power of litigant resources, I include petitioner
and respondent type (using the Songer typology) and respondent success
(dichotomous variable for whether the respondent won). Presence of a minority on
the panel (dichotomous variable), presence of a woman (dichotomous variable),
dichotomous variables for each circuit, and amicus brief (dichotomous variable for
whether a brief was submitted in support of either the petitioner or respondent) are
control variables for the final model. All of the variables are put into one model for
testing. This allows the variables to directly compete to explain outcomes in a
multivariate setting. A single model is therefore a more stringent test for the theories
than two separate models would be.
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Data, Methods, and Hypotheses
I collected and analyzed the data quantitatively due to the number of cases and
variables to be included in the models. With a dichotomous categorical dependent
variable measuring whether or not the underdog won the case (0=underdog loss,
1=underdog win), I use a logit model in STATA. This MLE regression technique is
used because the dependent variable of underdog success can only have two
predefined values (Halcoussis 2005). Logit produces a model estimate that can be
used to calculate the probability of underdogs winning, given the values of the
predictor variables described below (Baum 2006).
I acquired data from LexisNexis and Westlaw for cases decided between
1993–2008, covering the Clinton and W. Bush presidential administrations. My initial
search used the term “Clean Water Act” in LexisNexis with a second search in
Westlaw to ensure the universe of available cases had been considered and no cases
were missed. There were also no major revisions during this time period to the CWA,
making the cases during the time period comparable for a quantitative analysis.
Searches in LexisNexis and Westlaw produced a large number of cases that
did not meet the following coding criteria. I read each case and excluded it if the
opinion did not decide a statutory issue on the merits, if the petition is denied,
remanded, or granted in part, or if the case only has a citation to the statute. A number
of cases did have split verdicts in which the court would uphold part of the district
court opinion and remand or deny other claims. I was unable to determine the
upperdog or underdog “winner” in these situations, and therefore the cases were
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excluded. The number of variables varied by statute and the only limitation I
considered prior to starting the coding process was using a slightly abbreviated list of
statutory provisions as noted in Percival (2011) and Appendix B. The CWA dataset
included 230 variables and 266 observations. The final original dataset for this statute
contains 244 cases.

Hypotheses
1. I expect upperdogs to remain the most successful litigants in the CWA with
the federal government remaining the most effective litigant type.
2. I expect litigant types to be negatively correlated with underdog success. As
the opposing litigant has more resources, using the litigant typology as a
proxy, the underdog will be less likely to win.
3. The presence of a female judge on the panel will be positively correlated with
the liberal outcome of underdog success.
4. Underdogs will be more successful when bringing a case under the citizen suit
provision (§1365 or 1365a).
5. I expect underdogs to be less likely to win when Chevron is cited in the
majority opinion.
6. I expect amicus briefs to be statistically significant in favor of underdogs.
7. I expect underdogs to be unsuccessful when the respondent wins.
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Results
The dataset for the CWA includes a total of 266 cases with the majority decided in
2003 (n=27 or 10.15%) and 1993 (n=22, 8.27%). Approximately 85% (n=225) of the
cases were published which is an unusually high percentage and as discussed in
Chapter One, may bias the conclusions of this analysis. Chevron was cited in 47 cases
(17.67% of CWA cases), as compared to 24 cases (15.29%) in RCRA or 39 citations
(n=29%) in the CAA. Almost one-quarter of the CWA cases (n=63) had one or more
amicus briefs submitted. Half of the CWA cases had one or more women on the panel
(n=131) and 33% had one or more minority justices on the panel (n=85). The EPA
was a party to 74 cases and won 58 (78%) of them. 41.63% (n=107) of the panels had
only one Democrat-appointed justice on the panel, 69 (26.85%) had two Democratappointed justices, and 32 panels (12.45%) were comprised of all Democratappointed justices.
The most successful litigant was the federal government, winning 55.64% of
cases (n=148), and the least successful was the individual litigant, winning only 17
cases (6.39%). The federal government was the most frequent respondent (n=164,
61.65%) and the least frequent petitioner (n=23, 8.65%). As with other statutes, the
CWA authorizes the EPA to make a number of decisions and places the agency at the
center of disagreement with other litigant types. Table 7 below illustrates the
frequency with which each litigant type faced the others and the percentage of
underdog success.
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Table 7: Percentage of Underdog Success in CWA Cases
(n=Number of Match-ups Between Litigant Types)

Individual

Respondent
Nonprofit
Business

Individual

…

…

Nonprofit

…

…

Business

100%
(n=2)
50.00%
(n=4)

63.64%
(n=11)
75.00%
(n=4)

11.11%
(n=9)

50.00%
(n=6)

Petitioner

State and
Local
Government
Federal
Government

Federal
Government

66.67%
(n=6)

State and
Local
Government
15.38%
(n=13)
40.00%
(n=15)
50.00%
(n=2)
0.00%
(n=1)

16.67%
(n=6)

0.00%
(n=1)

100.00%
(n=1)

0%
(n=3)
42.11%
(n=19)
…

16.36%
(n=55)
34.15%
(n=41)
15.09%
(n=53)
7.14%
(n=14)

One of the more surprising results was the success of nonprofit litigants in this
statute. Using the litigant typology as a proxy for resources, nonprofits are one of the
least-advantaged litigants and almost always outmatched by resources of upperdogs
in court. However, nonprofits won 39 cases (14.66%) and they were the most
frequent petitioner (n=75, 28.20%). They were also the second-most winning litigant
type. This finding is consistent with what the earlier literature by Craig (2009) argues
is the intent of language in the statute encouraging public participation. It is easier to
formalize participation through interest or nonprofit groups and though they did not
always file under the citizen suit provision, litigants in this category did actively
pursue a number of cases.
This result may also be explained by the specific nonprofit organizations
involved in these water pollution cases and the policy priorities they have. Larger
nonprofits such as the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC), Sierra Club, and
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Defenders of Wildlife were involved as organizations with water quality as one of
their top policy priorities. A number of location or water body-specific organizations
litigated this statute as well. Some groups such as Highway J Citizens Group or
Friends of Pinto Creek focus on specific geographic areas and concentrate their
limited resources on cases directly impacting their members. This focused litigation
may have helped improve claims to standing which can be a big legal hurdle for lessadvantaged litigants. Nonprofit litigants were most successful in the Ninth Circuit,
winning 18 of their 39 cases there. This circuit is considered to be the most
environmental-friendly, particularly for water law cases, and it proved to be favorable
to this litigant type. It was also the most favorable circuit for the federal government
and businesses, however.
For this statute, there were fewer cases litigated in the D.C. Circuit. Only 12
of the 266 cases were decided in this circuit and this is unusual because of the federal
government’s extensive involvement in the statute. This may reflect decisions by
individuals and nonprofits, the two most common petitioner types, to choose other
circuits than D.C. believing they would have greater chances of winning outside the
federal government’s home turf. Table 8 below illustrates litigant success by type and
circuit. The CWA also does not have a comparable provision to the CAA calling for
cases to be sent to the D.C. Circuit and this may explain the difference between the
two statutes with that circuit. Additional research into forum shopping is needed to
better analyze this finding.
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Table 8: Litigant Success By Circuit for CWA cases (Number of Cases Won)
Circuit

Litigant Type
Individual

Nonprofit

Business

State and Local

Federal

Government

Government

1

1

1

4

1

12

2

2

4

7

2

6

3

1

1

0

2

5

4

2

2

3

4

20

5

1

2

1

1

8

6

4

3

1

3

14

7

0

1

4

2

19

8

0

0

2

1

2

9

2

18

5

8

25

10

1

3

3

1

12

11

2

2

1

2

12

D.C.

0

2

4

0

6

Federal

1

0

0

0

7

Total

17 (6.39%)

39 (14.66%)

35 (13.16%)

27 (10.15%)

148 (55.64%)

With 35 legal provisions being cited ten or more times, this model was the
largest of my research. The three provisions cited most often were §1362 (n=95),
§1342 (n=73), and §1344 (n=63). The first, §1362, is the most frequently litigated
because it defines critical terms of the statute such as “pollution,” “navigable waters,”
“point source,” “toxic pollutant,” and “pollution,” all of which are strongly contested
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during the permit and TMDL processes. How the federal government and courts
define these terms directly affects the regulations that must be followed and permit
conditions. The federal government won 56 of the 95 cases in which this provision
was cited. For businesses, defining these terms in their favor is a strong economic
motivation to challenge the vague language in court. They won 15 of the 95 cases.
Nonprofit litigants were almost as successful, prevailing in 14 cases.
§1342 puts forth the process for permits and the National pollutant discharge
elimination system (NPDES), an essential component of the CWA. It is through this
section that the statute relies on technology-based controls for implementation
(Murphy 2013). Upperdogs won 51 of the 73 cases in which this provision was cited.
The federal government won 33 of these while nonprofits won 14, businesses won 13,
state and local governments won 10, and individuals won three.
§1344 addresses permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into
waters of the United States, including the controversial discharge into wetlands.
These permits are reviewed by the Army Corps of Engineers. This was a very
successful provision for the federal government who won 41 of the 63 cases in which
§1344 was cited. Upperdogs prevailed in 52 of the 63 cases. A more detailed content
analysis is necessary to determine if this is due to the court upholding the federal
government’s decision granting permits the discharge or if the government was
limiting such discharges.
In the final model, the statistically significant variables presented in Table 9
were §1344a and litigant (whether the respondent won). Table 9 below notes the final
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model used for this analysis and compares it to one in which litigant is removed.
When litigant is removed, respondent type becomes significant in the expected
direction reducing the likelihood of underdog success and §1313c is also significant
in favor of upperdog success. However, since the log likelihood indicates that the
model with litigant included (127.10) is more fully specified than the model without
that variable (74.45), the more fully specified model is reported and analyzed.
Table 9: Logit Model of Underdog Success for CWA Cases

LR Chi-2
Pseudo R2
Circuit 1
Circuit 2
Circuit 3
Circuit 4
Circuit 5
Circuit 6
Circuit 7
Circuit 8
Circuit 9
Circuit 10
Circuit 11
D.C. Circuit
Respondent
type
Petitioner
type
Minority

Model
without
Litigant
included
74.45
0.2626
14.12985
(0.993)
15.01242
(0.993)
15.90523
(0.992)
13.99688
(0.993)
14.00331
(0.993)
14.5184
(0.993)
14.05399
(0.993)
…
15.05663
(0.993)
14.29972
(0.993)
14.744
(0.993)
15.43724
(0.992)
−0.5032249
(0.012)**
−0.1335188
(0.528)
0.2108788

Final Model

127.10
0.4482
12.24671
(0.995)
13.7358
(0.994)
14.81321
(0.993)
10.87661
(0.995)
115962
(0.995)
12.5556
(0.994)
11.96452
(0.995)
…
13.9699
(0.994)
11.63428
(0.995)
12.27474
(0.995)
12.9129
(0.994)
−0.43777879
(0.79)
−0.3191015
(0.225)
0.5692723
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judge
Female
judge

(0.622)
−0.5796888
(0.180)

(0.276)
−0.2752575
(0.618)

Table 9—Continued
Panel
ideology
Circuit
ideology
Amicus
Chevron
1251–1387
1251
1251a
1291
1311
1312
1313c
1313d
1314
1316
1317
1318
1319
1319a
1319b
1319c
1319d
1319g
1328
1341

−0.8801111
(0.224)
0.5098364
(0.755)
0.0362423
(0.946)
0.6658412
(0.285)
−0.0018492
(0.997)
−0.1379891
(0.857)
0.0473571
(0.938)
−0.3712483
(0.559)
−1.358632
(0.077)
−1.79571
(0.367)
−3.044906
(0.049)*
2.101749
(0.106)
−1.841819
(0.225)
3.0453
(0.070)
1.491675
(0.235)
−2.766747
(0.092)
−0.9212268
(0.510)
−1.110236
(0.329)
0.67935
(0.555)
−1.236771
(0.110)
0.3242167
(0.122)
1.382087
(0.139)
0.4708289
(0.781)
0.1175335

2.340593
(0.270)
…
−0.2662403
(0.676)
0.8590503
(0.297)
−0.0006313
(0.999)
0.5342963
(0.546)
0.0897352
(0.908)
−0.1974216
(0.802)
−1.539699
(0.105)
0.1376556
(0.951)
−2.107342
(0.255)
2.588448
(0.127)
−1.873168
(0.268)
3.478414
(0.075)
0.5907961
(0.40)
−0.8269131
(0.663)
−1.403665
(0.329)
−2.307214
(0.178)
−0.531431
(0.765)
−1.388514
(0.112)
0.3229343
(0.798)
1.890234
(0.125)
−2.776689
(0.237)
−0.8019779
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(0.904)
0.2680785
(0.610)

1342

(0.558)
0.289747
(0.658)

Table 9—Continued
1342a

Litigant

0.1244989
(0.853)
0.445213
(0.509)
0.1644659
(0.861)
−1.121494
(0.429)
−0.4384189
(0.488)
−2.089574
(0.036)
−0.0798961
(0.948)
0.1216449
(0.912)
0.5886378
(0.222)
−0.5312379
(0.398)
0.7854885
(0.187)
−0.6628368
(0.382)
…

Published
Distance

…
…

1342b
1342c
1342p
1344
1344a
1344f
1345
1362
1365
1365a
1365b

* p<0.05

**p<0.01

0.1075555
(0.894)
−0.0901845
(0.913)
1.045109
(0.348)
−1.977279
(0.286)
0.3730301
(0.617)
−2.391803
(0.040)*
−0.1814606
(0.906)
−1.142158
(0.446)
0.3561593
(0.551)
−0.1546312
(0.830)
1.103199
(0.127)
−0.9357869
(0.331)
−3.602139
(0.000)***
…
2.140531
(0.996)
***p<0.001

Looking at §1344a, this is the first sub-section under the dredge or fill
permitting discussed earlier. It specifically addresses “discharge into navigable waters
at specific disposal sites” and the Secretary’s authority to issue permits after the
opportunity for public hearings. This would occur after the lengthy permitting process
had already taken place. Underdog litigants are afforded a number of opportunities to
challenge the EPA prior to the final permit issuance, making it difficult to
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successfully oppose the final decision. The variable was significant at p<0.040 and
predicted upperdog success who won 37 of the 42 cases in which this provision was
cited. The federal government won 31 of the 42 cases suggesting the court deferred to
the Secretary’s discretion and authority with permit decisions. Businesses were the
second most successful litigants when this provision was cited, winning five cases.
This provision helping upperdogs is consistent with the theory of agency deference
and courts supporting discretionary decisions the agencies or federal government
makes.
The other significant variable in this model is whether the respondent won.
The federal government appeared as respondent 61.65% of the time, supporting the
theory that litigants with the most resources will prevail and suggesting the court does
defer to the federal government even if Chevron is not cited. Table 9 illustrates the
difference in models when this variable is removed.
The main variable to control for ideology, panel ideology, was not significant
and we cannot draw any meaningful conclusions about this hypothesis. The mean
ideology score was 0.0640645 and it ranged from −0.4535 to 0.581 for Clean Water
Act cases. This is very close to the mean ideology for the CAA (0.058755) and range
of −0.543 to 0.581. The specific hypotheses for the CWA will now be discussed.

Hypothesis 1. I expect upperdogs to remain the most successful litigants in the CWA
with the federal government remaining the most effective litigant type.
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This hypothesis is supported by the data. Upperdogs won 72.56% of the cases
(n=193) in the Clean Water Act, supporting this hypothesis and consistent with prior
research on upperdog success in the court system. Additionally, the federal
government was the most successful litigant type, winning 55.64% (n=148) of its
cases with 130 of these cases as respondent.

Hypothesis 2. I expect litigant types to be negatively correlated with underdog
success. As the opposing litigant has more resources, using the litigant typology as a
proxy, the underdog will be less likely to win.
As shown in Table 9, this hypothesis is almost supported by the data for
respondent type with underdog success declining as the opposing litigant has more
resources (p<0.079). Petitioner type approached statistical significance (p<0.125),
suggesting that as a litigant had more resources, underdogs were less likely to win.
Neither of these variables were statistically significant at the p<0.05 level, though, so
there is not enough support for this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3. The presence of a female judge on the panel will be positively
correlated with the liberal outcome of underdog success.
Gender was not statistically significant in the logit model shown by Table 9
and we cannot draw conclusions about this hypothesis. Figure 3 below illustrates the
probabilities of underdog success when a woman or minority was on the panel. When
there are no women or minorities on the panel, an underdog litigant’s probability of
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success is 0.14. If there is a woman on the panel, there is a 0.10 probability of
underdog success. Presence of a minority slightly increases an underdog’s probability
of winning to 0.23 and if there is both a woman and minority on the panel, the
probability of underdog success is 0.17. Upperdogs had a 0.80 or above probability of
winning regardless of whether there was a woman or minority on the panel.

Figure 3: Probability of Underdog Success by Litigant Type under the CWA

Hypothesis 4. Underdogs will be more successful when bringing a case under the
citizen suit provision (§1365 or §1365a).
Suggesting support for this hypothesis in Table 9, §1365a is not statistically
significant (p<0.127). Nonprofit litigants were the most successful type when this
provision was cited, winning 18 of the 57 cases involving citizen suits under §1365a
alone. The federal government won 14 of the cases, state and local governments won
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11, businesses prevailed in 10, and individuals only won four cases. Citizen suits are
covered by §1365(a-h) and when these are added, this section of the statute was cited
132 times. After §1365(a-h) are collapsed into a dichotomous variable, 73 CWA
cases involved citizen suits. Since there was no statistical difference in the model with
the citizen suit provisions combined, I used the more fully specified model with the
provisions separated. Citizen suits are a valuable legal resource, particularly for
underdog litigants, and this data suggests that they may be an important part of
underdog success in water pollution cases.

Hypothesis 5. I expect underdogs to be less likely to win when Chevron is cited in the
majority opinion.
The Chevron variable was not statistically significant so we cannot speak to
its relationship to underdog success. As previously discussed, the lack of citation to
this case may be due to the Administrative Procedure Act being cited instead. The
APA was not coded separately at this time.

Hypothesis 6. I expect amicus briefs to be statistically significant in favor of
underdogs.
Amicus briefs were not statistically significant in the model shown in Table 9.
This could be due to the way in which it was measured as a dichotomous variable. A
more precise measure of which briefs were submitted for which party might better
illustrate the relationship between underdog success and the briefs. Data limitations
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prevented such analysis at the time of research. Additionally, it may be the case that
in light of greater nonprofit litigant participation in Clean Water Act cases, this
litigant type is less likely to submit an amicus brief and more likely to pursue cases.

Hypothesis 7. I expect underdogs to be unsuccessful when the respondent wins.
This hypothesis is supported by the data with respondent success being one of
the strongest predictors of upperdog success (p<0.000). Underdogs were highly
unlikely to prevail when the respondent won. Considering the federal government
was the respondent in 61.65% (n=164), this is not a surprising result. The federal
government will have the most resources of any litigant, making legal challenges very
difficult for opposing parties.

Conclusion
As one of the largest statutes in this dataset, the Clean Water Act provided a good
source of data for analyzing underdog success at the Court of Appeals. The federal
government, and upperdogs in general, consistently prevailed, but this was also a
statute where underdogs won twenty-percent of the time. Nonprofits were the most
successful underdog, winning 39 cases. This was the most favorable statute for
nonprofit litigants in the entire dataset and could provide insight into how lessadvantaged parties can prevail in court. Additional research is needed into the
resources nonprofits had and how they chose to allocate them in the legal system.
Was their unique success due to the issue area of water pollution? Did nonprofit
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litigants use different legal strategies for CWA cases than the other statutes in this
dataset? What can litigants learn from the success of nonprofit organizations in this
area?
It would also be helpful to know if more amicus briefs were submitted in
support of the nonprofits as compared to other environmental law areas. Limited
access to the amicus briefs prevented analysis at this time, but it would be interesting
to look at which types of litigants chose to submit briefs and if those briefs mattered
in the final outcome or influenced content in the final opinion. We know amicus
briefs can help less-advantaged litigants in other issue areas and they may also be a
meaningful component to nonprofits prevailing under the Clean Water Act.
Lastly, the findings in this chapter provide a good foundation for future
research into the potential success of forum shopping and the success of nonprofit
litigants when they are almost entirely outmatched in the legal arena. None of the
circuit variables were statistically significant, but descriptively, litigant success rates
varied depending on the circuit. The Ninth Circuit is often thought to be a friendlier
pro-environment circuit and it was the most successful for nonprofit litigants. It was
also the most successful for the federal government, though. Were nonprofits better at
selecting the forums than other underdog litigants? Why did the federal government
win more cases in the Ninth Circuit than on their home turf in the D.C. Circuit? For
litigants with more limited resources, understanding which circuits are likely to be
more favorable to their interests can be an effective way to make resource allocation
decisions. Ultimately, the findings in this chapter illustrate the continued dominance
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of the federal government and upperdog litigants, but show that underdogs can
prevail on a limited basis.
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CHAPTER 6
FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT AND
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
Introduction
In the last fifty years, more than 10,000 chemical substances have been put to use in
the market and many are still consumed commercially. The two statutes that regulate
the manufacture and distribution of these statutes are the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA) and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
Unlike other environmental statutes, these regulate toxic products both at the
production and market stage. The two statutes complement each other well, as FIFRA
regulates pesticides excluded by TSCA. TSCA’s inventory includes more than 84,000
chemical substances and over 1300 substances are registered under FIFRA.
Combined, these laws encompass chemical substances listed by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) that are produced, distributed, and consumed in the United
States.
The final two statutes in this analysis are a departure from the previous
chapters on the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Clean Air Act
(CAA), and Clean Water Act (CWA) in their purpose and process, but are an
important area to address within environmental law and policy. FIFRA and TSCA
target businesses working with chemical substances, offering the opportunity to
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observe how underdog resources with financial resources succeed or fail in the court
system at the Court of Appeals.

Legislative Background: TSCA and FIFRA
In 1976, TSCA was enacted to “prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health or the
environment associated with the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce,
use or disposal of chemical substances” (Ferrey 2010). Chemicals are defined in
§3(2) as “any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity.”
Exclusions include substances regulated under FIFRA, substances such as drugs and
cosmetics covered by the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, and nuclear material
covered by the Atomic Energy Act. TSCA’s structure involves an inventory of all
chemical substances used commercially. The statute was the first to regulate all of the
stages of a chemical substance for the purpose of protecting public health (Ferrey
2010, 602). Its intent was to be proactive and restrict or ban products prior to
introduction into the market and thus prior to the chemicals causing toxic pollution
(Collins 2010).
Procedurally, this statute establishes an inventory of chemicals meeting the
statutory standards. For a new chemical substance or for an existing substance used
for a “significant new use,” there is a required 90-day pre-manufacture notice before
the manufacture or import can take place under §5 (Ferrey 2010). Failure to do so can
result in the EPA banning the manufacture, imposing restrictions, or restricting the
processing or distribution. Of the 23,971 new chemicals approved by the EPA from
133

1976–1994, however, 90% were approved with no restrictions on use or production,
making this one of the most heavily criticized parts of TSCA (Collins 2010).
Under §4, the EPA is authorized to issue chemical test rules, regulate or ban
chemical substances (§6), solicit research on possible risks of injuries for substances
that may significantly impact human health or the environment (§8), and finally
impose regulations on the import and export of listed chemicals (§13) (Ferrey 2010,
602). Fines for violating this process can be up to $32,500 each day of the violation or
up to a year imprisonment. The EPA can also seek criminal and civil penalties. There
are several challenges with these provisions, leading Ken Cook of the Environmental
Working Group to refer to TSCA as “a largely toothless statute” (Collins 2010).
One of the most significant challenges related to §6 arose in 1991 after
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA was decided. In this case, Corrosion Proof Fittings
challenged an EPA rule establishing a three-stage ban of asbestos to prohibit the
future manufacture, importation, processing, or distribution of products containing the
substance. The court held that the EPA committed a procedural error in not allowing
for public comment, that it violated provisions of TSCA by not selecting the “least
burdensome, reasonable regulation,” and by not conducting a separate cost-benefit
analysis (Stadler 1993). The court argued “the EPA’s regulation cannot stand if there
is any other regulation that would achieve an acceptable level of risk as mandated by
TSCA” and the result of this decision is the EPA no longer being able to restrict
dangerous chemicals currently in production and use (Collins 2010). This case
eliminated the EPA’s ability to use TSCA to restrict dangerous chemicals and with its
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occurrence right before the dataset starts, it is likely a number of the cases were the
result of this limitation on the EPA’s regulatory authority in this area.
The other significant challenge relates to an important testing and reporting
loophole created. Twenty-two years after the passage of TSCA, the EPA only tested
263 high-priority chemicals for over 70,000 existing chemicals (Collins 2010). For
other substances covered by the statute, the EPA has to rely on testing data provided
by the very companies marketing the chemicals. There is minimal to no EPA
enforcement of corrupt laboratories or fraudulent testing with the agency even
offering an amnesty program in 1990. This program limited fines for fraudulent
human studies to $15,000 or $6,000 for animal studies with no corporation’s fines
higher than $1 million if companies who violated the TSCA reporting requirements
sent the data they had illegally withheld. Without the program, fines would have been
$32.9 million for any fraudulent study. During this time of this amnesty program,
over 120 companies sent more than 11,000 reports detailing harmful health effects of
their chemicals, saving the companies billions of dollars (Collins 2010, 121). The
agency and chemical manufacturing leaders declared the program a success, repeating
it several times, as environmentalists renewed their legal and reform efforts.
Today TSCA is considered a balancing statute requiring the EPA to establish
a “‘reasonable basis’ . . . that the manufacture, processing, distributing, use, or
disposal of a specific chemical substance presents an ‘unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment’” (Ferrey 2010). Determining what constitutes
“reasonable” is very difficult with the data limitations and offers a gaping hole for
135

businesses to escape fines through. A substance is only allowed into public commerce
if its benefits outweigh the environmental costs (p. 606). This cost-benefit analysis
can often be very time-consuming and expensive to complete, but if a business does
not voluntarily comply, the EPA can take the noncompliant party to court for testing
expenses. Expenses are calculated using a penalty formula in which the nature,
extent, and circumstance are evaluated with a maximum amount of $25,000 per day
in civil penalties. On paper, this may sound cost-prohibitive, but the lax enforcement
and amnesty deals of the EPA make prosecution by the agency rare and in this
dataset, the agency never appeared as petitioner for a TSCA or FIFRA case.
FIFRA is similar to TSCA in that it regulates toxic substances, but it
exclusively covers pesticides and herbicides and is less controversial. A pesticide is
defined as “any substance or mixture or substances that is (1) intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, or (2) intended for use as a plant
regulator, defoliant, or desiccant” (Ferrey 2010). It is important to note that the
statute’s focus is on the intended use of a substance and not its level of toxicity. Every
pesticide under this statute is required to bear an EPA-approved label that articulates
the risks it presents and instructions on proper use.
This statute was enacted in 1947 with no purposeful concern for
environmental protection or secondary impacts from the use of pesticides. FIFRA’s
main goals were to ensure a pesticide performed its function of killing the target pest
and that consumers using the products were sufficiently protected by instructions on
the pesticide label. It focused on the users of the pesticides and farmers. This user136

centered perspective is a distinct difference from other statutes with regulations based
on levels that could have hazardous effects on people in the area. Use of a substance
in any way other than for what is expressly listed on the label is illegal.
The process for FIFRA is comparable to that of TSCA with companies first
submitting an application detailing the formula of inactive and active ingredients, a
proposed label, and description of tests conducted and the results. The EPA reviews
the application for four registration standards: the chemical composition warrants the
proposed claims, labeling meets FIFRA standards, the pesticide will perform the
intended function without unreasonable adverse effects, and when used with
commonly recognized practices, the substance will not cause unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment. If, at any point, a company adds a new active ingredient,
the pesticide must be registered again. The EPA is authorized to cancel a substance if
it determines it poses a substantial threat to human safety and issues a Notice of Intent
to Cancel in that situation. The agency can also issue an immediate ban if there is an
imminent hazard to humans or the environment.
Following the public awareness created by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in
1962, creation of the EPA in 1970, and amendments including the Federal
Environmental Pesticide Act of 1972, FIFRA provisions were strengthened to make
the statute one that protects both human health and the environment (Ferrey 2010).
States have primary authority for enforcement under FIFRA, but the licensing
conducted by the EPA means the agency has a significant role as well.
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While FIFRA and TSCA have differing areas of emphasis, they both attempt
to regulate the use and production of chemical substances through similar procedures,
and are therefore sufficiently comparable for this research. They also represent an
important area of environmental law by regulating substances that have the potential
to cause significant human and environmental damage.

Theoretical Relationships and Concepts (See Appendix A)
As described in Chapter 2, the main theoretical focus is on how the legal model and
litigant resources explain underdog success at the Court of Appeals.
The legal model will test concepts of Chevron and statute-specific case
characteristics to measure the impact of case facts, which this model predicts should
explain court decisions. Specifically, this calls for the following independent
variables: Chevron citation (dichotomous variable for whether the opinion was cited
in the majority opinion), FIFRA (whether or not it is a FIFRA case), case
characteristics (statute-specific dichotomous variables for whether a particular
provision was cited in the majority opinion), gender (dichotomous variable for
presence of a female judge), race (dichotomous variable for presence of a minority
judge), amicus brief (dichotomous variable for if a brief was submitted), and
respondent success (dichotomous variable for whether the respondent won). The main
variables of interest for the legal model are case characteristics, Chevron citation, and
FIFRA.
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To control for the influence of ideology as described by the attitudinal model
and for strategic behavior, two variables are included: ideological distance (JCS
score3 of median judge on the panel subtracted from the median circuit ideology by
case year) and panel ideology (median JCS score of the panel). All of the variables
for both the legal and litigant resource models are put into one model for testing. This
allows the variables to compete directly to explain outcomes. It is better than testing
separate models because the only variables that will be significant are those that
explain outcomes after accounting for the variables in the competing theory. The
single model is therefore a more stringent test of the theories.

Data, Methods, and Hypotheses
I analyze the data quantitatively to test the theories and due to the number of cases
and variables included in the models. With a dichotomous categorical dependent
variable measuring whether or not the underdog won the case (0=underdog loss,
1=underdog win), I use a logit model in STATA. This MLE regression technique is
appropriate because the dependent variable of underdog success can only have two
predefined values (Halcoussis 2005). Logit produces a model estimate that can be
used to calculate the probability of underdogs winning, given the values of the
predictor variables described below.
3	
  The	
  Judicial

Common Space (JCS) scores are built from the Poole and Rosenthal
Common Space and the Giles, Hettinger, Peppers (GHP) scores to get the ideal point
policy preferences of Supreme Court justices and obtain comparable measures for
lower court judges (Epstein et al 2007, Poole and Rosenthal 1997, and Giles,
Hettinger, and Peppers 2001).	
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I acquired the data using a search in LexisNexis and Westlaw for cases
decided between 1993–2008, covering both the Clinton and W. Bush presidential
administrations. Both search sites were used to ensure all available cases were
considered. Cases were excluded if the opinion did not decide a statutory issue on the
merits, if the petition is denied and granted in part (with no clear winner), or if the
case only has a citation to the statute. This resulted in twenty-four TSCA cases and
forty-one FIFRA cases. The final dataset included 64 cases with one case dropped
because of missing data.
As shown by the logit model in Table 10 below, the statutes were combined
into one dataset with a dichotomous independent variable added for FIFRA. On
statistical grounds, the statutes were combined to increase the number of cases and
have sufficient degrees of freedom for a quantitative analysis. From a theoretical
perspective, TSCA covers aspects of chemical substance use that FIFRA does not, but
they are in the same class of environmental law, making them comparable for a single
analysis.
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Table 10: Logit Model of Underdog Success for FIFRA/TSCA Cases

LR Chi-2
Pseudo R2
Respondent
type
Petitioner type
Minority judge
Female judge
Panel ideology
Circuit ideology
Amicus
Chevron
FIFRA
136
136aa
136vab
V119
Published
Litigant

Model without
Litigant included
24.51
0.3026
−0.571223
(0.232)
0.7395672
(0.080)
1.868725
(0.058)
−0.6320171
(0.452)
−0.5339836
(0.655)
0.705312
(0.692)
3.115468
(0.014)**
0.5067418
(0.644)
3.694216
(0.096)
−1.231906
(0.363)
−2.362878
(0.056)
−3.319652
(0.030)**
2.232104
(0.070)
…
…

Distance
* p<0.05

**p<0.01

Final Model
61.74
0.7621
0.255466
(0.811)
1.277425
(0.257)
1.491318
(0.537)
−1.158423
(0.542)
3.93646
(0.286)
…
4.080879
(0.293)
−0.1697533
(0.941)
7.253873
(0.143)
−2.333661
(0.377)
−4.534524
(0.138)
−5.341391
(0.190)
2.996306
(0.255)
...
−7.413437
(0.002)**
0.0717656
(0.982)
***p<0.001

Each case is coded for specific statutory provisions to help understand
whether litigants are more or less likely successful arguing on specific legal grounds.
Every statutory provision mentioned in a case during this time period is included. As
with the other statutes in this dissertation, only provisions that appeared ten or more
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times in cases are included in the model. For FIFRA this included the following: §136
(definitions), §136a(a) (registration of pesticides), and §136v(a-b) (authority of
states). For TSCA, only §2601(2) (findings, policy, and intent) appeared a minimum
of ten times. The logit results for the final combined model are summarized in Table
10 and I find only the respondent winning to be a significant predictor of upperdog
success/underdog failure.

Hypotheses
The hypotheses for FIFRA/TSCA are based on my expectations described previously
in Chapter 2 and the results for each one will be discussed in the following results
section.

Results
For FIFRA, there were a total of 41 cases from 1993–2008. As described in Tables 11
and 12 below, the majority of cases were decided in 1999 (n=6 or 14.63% of FIFRA)
and 1993 (n=5 or 12.20% of FIFRA). Approximately 70% of these opinions were
published and similar to RCRA, Chevron was cited very rarely (n=1). As discussed in
the previous chapters, this is a very high publication rate and may bias the
conclusions. Six cases had amicus briefs submitted. 36.59% (n=15) of FIFRA panels
had at least one minority judge on the panel. For the four cases in which the EPA was
listed as the first party, they always appeared as the respondent and prevailed in each
case. Out of a total forty-one cases addressing FIFRA, nineteen panels had at least
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one female judge (46.34%). 47.69% of the panels in the combined statutes had at
least one female judge.
Table 11: Frequency of FIFRA and TSCA Cases by Year
Year

FIFRA

TSCA

1993

5 (12.20%)

…

1994

2 (4.88%)

2 (8.33%)

1995

4 (9.76%)

2 (8.33%)

1996

1 (2.44%)

…

1997

2 (4.88%)

3 (12.50%)

1998

1 (2.44%)

…

1999

6 (14.63%)

1 (4.17%)

2000

2 (4.88%)

5 (20.83%)

2001

2 (4.88%)

1 (4.17%)

2002

4 (9.76%)

2 (8.33%)

2003

1 (2.44%)

1 (4.17%)

2004

2 (4.88%)

…

2005

4 (9.76%)

2 (8.33%)

2006

2 (4.88%)

1 (4.17%)

2007

2 (4.88%)

…

2008

1 (2.44%)

2

Total

41

24
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Table 12: Frequency of FIFRA and TSCA Cases by Circuit
Circuit

FIFRA

TSCA

1

2 (4.88%)

1 (4.17%)

2

4 (9.76%

1 (4.17%)

3

3 (7.32%)

…

4

4 (9.76%)

2 (8.33%)

5

5 (12.20%)

3 (12.50%)

6

4 (9.76%)

2 (8.33%)

7

2 (4.88%)

1 (4.17%)

8

6 (14.63%)

…

9

6 (14.63%)

3 (12.50%)

10

2 (4.88%)

2 (8.33%)

11

3 (7.32%)

1 (4.17%)

12

0

7 (29.17%)

13

…

1 (4.17%)

Total

41

24

Under FIFRA, individuals won five cases across multiple circuits, but were
the least successful in the Eighth (n=5) and Ninth (n=5) Circuits. Nonprofit
organizations also struggled the most in the same circuits, losing six and five cases,
respectively. Businesses were the most successful litigant type, prevailing most often
in the Fifth (n=5), Eighth (n=6), and Ninth (n=5) Circuits. State and local
governments only won two cases and lost most often in the Fifth (n=5), Eighth (n=6)
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and Ninth (n=5) Circuits. Finally, the federal government won two cases in the Ninth
Circuit and lost six cases in the Eighth Circuit and five cases in the Fifth Circuit.
Tables 13 and 14 demonstrate how businesses were the most successful
litigant type under FIFRA, winning 65.85% (n=27) of the cases. They appeared as the
respondent in twenty-five cases (60.98%) and as the petitioner in eight cases
(19.51%). Environmental groups were the most unsuccessful litigant type under
FIFRA, winning only two cases (4.88%). They never appeared as the respondent and
only six times as the petitioner. This largely reflects the statute’s emphasis on
conflicts involving businesses and chemical manufacturers.
Table 13: Underdog Success by Litigant Type (FIFRA-Only)
(n=Number of Times in Which Each Type Faced in a Case)
Respondent
Petitioner

Individual

Nonprofit

Business

Individual

Nonprofit

Business

…

…

…

33.33%

…

…

(n=1)
State and
Local
Government

…

Federal
Government

…

…

Federal
Government

14.29%

State and
Local
Government
33.33%

(n=3)

(n=1)

(n=1)

…

66.67%

0%

(n=2)

(n=3)

66.67%

100%

0%

(n=2)

(n=1)

(n=1)

100%

…

…

…

…

50%

(n=1)
…

...
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Table 14: Underdog Success by Litigant Type as Petitioner or Respondent (FIFRAOnly)
(Percentage of underdog success when a litigant appeared as petitioner or respondent)

Individual

Nonprofit

Petitioner

Respondent

19.23%

33.33%

(n=5)

(n=1)

33.33%

…

(n=2)
Business

50.00%

24.00%

(n=4)

(n=6)

State and Local

0%

57.14%

Government

(n=1)

(n=4)

Federal Government

16.67%

…

(n=1)

An interesting descriptive result from FIFRA is that businesses were the most
successful litigant type, prevailing in 26 of 41 cases (63.41%). This is the only statute
of the dataset where this occurs and reflects the unique nature of this legal
environmental issue. Businesses were also the most frequent respondent in 25
(60.98%) of FIFRA cases for a statute where respondents won 70.73% of the time.
Compared to other statutes, the federal government played a lesser role in FIFRA
cases at the circuit level and this may explain the higher success rates observed for
businesses.
146

In the final dataset for TSCA, only twenty-four cases met the coding rules
described in Chapter 2 with the most decided in 2002 (n=5 or 20.83%). (See Table
12.) Of the twenty-four TSCA cases, 50% had at least one female judge. Sixty-seven
percent (n=16 of TSCA) of these opinions were published. Eight cases (33.33%) cited
Chevron and only one had an amicus brief. TSCA only had 34.78% (n=8) of cases
with at least one minority present on the panel. Lastly, the EPA was more involved in
TSCA as a party to fifteen cases and winning seven. The federal government did not
appear as a petitioner in a single case, but was the respondent in 95.83% of the cases
(n=23).
For TSCA, Table 15 illustrates how businesses appeared as petitioners 50%
(n=12) of the time and as a respondent 4.17% (n=1). After the federal government,
they were the most successful type of litigant (n=5 or 20.83% of all TSCA cases).
Businesses were most successful in the D.C. Circuit winning four cases and the least
successful in the same circuit, losing three cases. TSCA largely involved businesses
and the federal government, greatly limiting any meaningful information about
nonprofit or environmental groups. As shown in Table 16, individuals never appeared
as respondent and only listed first as the petitioner in three cases (12.50%). Nonprofit
litigant types won one case in the Ninth Circuit and lost twenty-three, with the
greatest number of losses in the D.C. Circuit.

147

Table 15: Underdog Success by Litigant Type (TSCA-Only)
(n=Number of Times in Which Each Type Faced in a Case)
Respondent
Petitioner

Individual

Individual

Nonprofit

Business

…

…

100%

State and
Local
Government
…

(n=1)
Nonprofit

…

…

…

Federal
Government
0%
(n=7)

…

66.67%
(n=2)

Business

…

…

…

…

50%
(n=6)

State and
Local
Government

…

Federal
Government

…

…

…

…

0%
(n=1)

…

…

0%

…

(n=1)
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Table 16: Underdog Success by Litigant Type as Petitioner or Respondent (TSCA-Only)

Individual

Petitioner

Respondent

12.50%

…

(n=1)
Nonprofit

66.67%

…

(n=2)
Business

50.00%

100.00%

(n=6)

(n=1)

State and Local

0%

…

Government

(n=1)

Federal Government

…

34.78%
(n=8)

Of the TSCA cases, three panels were 100% (n=3) Democrat-appointed
judges, eight panels (36.36%) were composed of two-thirds Democrat-appointed
judges, and seven panels (31.82%) had one Democrat-appointed judge. In
comparison, a majority of the FIFRA panels had 33% Democrat-appointed judges
(n=18 or 43.90%) and fifteen panels were 66% Democrat-appointed (n=15).
In terms of litigant success under TSCA, individuals only won a total of two
cases: one in the First Circuit and one in the Seventh. As with nonprofits, businesses,
and state and local governments, the D.C. Circuit was the least favorable circuit to
underdogs and the circuit in which these litigant types suffered the largest number of
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losses. The federal government was the least successful in this circuit, losing three
cases, but it was also the most successful circuit for this litigant type (n=4).
The only statistically significant variable in the combined FIFRA/TSCA
model is whether the respondent won (litigant). The federal government appeared as a
respondent in 29 cases and businesses were the second-largest type appearing as a
respondent in 26 cases. Table 10 illustrates the difference in models when this
variable is removed. With the log-ratio higher in the model including litigant, the
better-specified model is reported here. Each of the specific hypotheses for the
combined FIFRA/TSCA model will now be discussed.

Hypothesis 1. I expect upperdogs to remain the most successful litigants in
FIFRA/TSCA with the federal government remaining the most effective litigant type.
The data supports this hypothesis with underdogs being the most successful
litigants, but the federal government is not the most effective litigant type. Combined,
upperdogs won 67.69% (n=44) of the cases. Under FIFRA (Tables 13 and 14),
upperdogs were even more successful, winning 70.73% (n=29) as compared to
winning 62.50% (n=15) under TSCA (Tables 15 and 16). However, the federal
government is not the most successful litigant type. Businesses won 47.69% of the
cases (n=31) and the federal government won 30.77% (n=20). Neither petitioner nor
respondent type was statistically significant, but whether the respondent won was
statistically significant (p<0.002).
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Hypothesis 2. I expect litigant types to be negatively correlated with underdog
success. As the opposing litigant has more resources, using the litigant typology as a
proxy, the underdog will be less likely to win.
Neither respondent type nor petitioner type was statistically significant in the
final model in Table 10 with both statutes. Tables 13 and 15 provide additional
insight into this. Eighty-three percent (n=54) of petitioners were either individuals or
businesses and 84% (n=55) of respondents were either businesses or the federal
government. The lack of diversity among litigant types, as compared to the other
statues in this research, may explain these results.

Hypothesis 3. The presence of a female judge on the panel will be positively
correlated with the liberal outcome of underdog success.
Gender was not statistically significant in Table 10, meaning we cannot draw
any meaningful conclusions on the relationship between gender and underdog
success. Figure 4 below illustrates underdog success by litigant type when there was a
minority and/or a woman on the panel. The probability of an underdog winning with
both a minority and female judge on the panel was 0.03. This is very close to the
probability of underdog success if neither a minority nor female justice was on the
panel (0.02). If there was only a minority on the panel, an underdog’s probability of
success was 0.08. Underdogs had the lowest probability of success (0.006) if there
was only a woman on the panel.
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Figure 4: Probability of Underdog Success for FIFRA/TSCA

Hypothesis 4. FIFRA and TSCA are unique in that they are the only statutes in this
dataset without citizen suit provisions.

Hypothesis 5. I expect underdogs to be less likely to win when Chevron is cited in the
majority opinion.
Chevron was not statistically significant in the final model. It was only cited
in nine of the 65 cases (13.85% of the case population). This may be due to the highly
technical and process-oriented nature of these statutes and the chemicals regulated.
For this area of law, there may be a more applicable precedent to guide the courts,
requiring a detailed content analysis of opinions in the future. It may also be the case
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where judges cite the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) instead of Chevron as
discussed in Chapter 1.

Hypothesis 6. I expect amicus briefs to be statistically significant in favor of
underdogs.
Amicus briefs were not statistically significant in this model. This could be
due to several possibilities. First, this concept is measured as a dichotomous variable,
which may be a less precise measurement than what is necessary to get at a true
relationship between briefs and underdog success. Second, data limitations prevented
looking at who submitted the briefs and for which litigant they supported. It may be
the situation where underdogs do not have amicus briefs advocating their position.
Third, the judicial literature suggests amicus briefs can be a measure of case salience
and in light of the small number of cases at the Court of Appeals, this may not be a
high salience issue area despite the civil penalties possible. Fourth, the highly
technical nature and trade secret challenge of chemicals regulated by these statutes
may limit or discourage amicus participation.

Hypothesis 7. I expect underdogs to be unsuccessful when the respondent wins.
The lone variable of significance in this model was respondent success. When
the respondent won, underdogs were at a tremendous disadvantage. Upperdogs won
as respondents in 42 of 44 cases, compared to underdogs only winning three cases as
respondents. This is consistent with expectations that respondents will continue to be
153

successful in the area of environmental law as they are more broadly at the Court of
Appeals. Table 10 shows the difference in models when this variable is excluded.

As the analysis of FIFRA and TSCA demonstrates, these statutes are different
in several ways from others in the dataset. The smaller sample size is one way.
Compared to RCRA, the CWA, and CAA, there were far fewer cases reaching the
circuit courts even before the coding rules were applied. The smaller dataset could be
a result of more statutory issues being resolved at the district court level or possibly
through the EPA regulatory process of registering the substances. Collins (2010)
noted the lax enforcement of the EPA and the agency’s decision to perhaps not seek
an appeal or even a trial at the district court could also explain the low case numbers.
Although not given as often as they could be, the large civil penalties possible under
TSCA may be a strong incentive for businesses to comply with the registration and
licensing process and avoid additional sanctions or wait until an amnesty program is
made available. Additionally, both statutes place responsibility for enforcement with
the states. This is not unique to these statutes, but may explain the lower case
numbers at this level of the federal judiciary.
Looking at the types of litigants involved in these cases, the litigant pool was
less diverse and focused largely on businesses and the federal government. Nonprofit
organizations did not participate as extensively as either petitioner or respondent,
compared to their involvement in the CWA, CAA, or RCRA. Despite their role in
enforcement, state and local governments did not play as prominent a role as
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expected. Tables 13 and 15 illustrate underdog success depending on which litigants
types were opposing each other and notes the frequencies of each match-up. For
TSCA, the most common case pairings (n=7) were individuals as petitioners vs. the
federal government. The most common matches in FIFRA were individuals as
petitioners (n=3) and nonprofits vs. the federal government (n=3).
This litigant composition can have implications for certain types of
underdogs. Winning only 6.15% (n=4) cases, nonprofit litigants were not successful
in this area of law. TSCA and FIFRA do not have citizen suit provisions and this may
be a deterrent to pursuing cases. The low success rate for this litigant type may have
added importance considering the limited resources many of the nonprofits must
work with. One of the organizations, No Spray Coalition, is a volunteer organization
that opposes spraying of pyrethroid pesticides in New York. They petitioned the State
of New York in two cases and won once. With a geographic focus and limited
resources as a small volunteer group, this type of litigant has to be selective in the
cases it pursues. Similarly, the Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides is an
Oregon-based organization focused on sustainable agriculture, pesticide-free places
such as school playgrounds, and effects of pesticides on local salmon runs. For the
one case the Coalition petitioned, they faced the EPA and were unsuccessful.
In contrast to the smaller organizations, the other groups in this category were
as follows: Headwaters, Inc., a lobbying organization for energy distribution and
production, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), one of the largest
environmental lobbying organizations, and the Sierra Club, the largest organization in
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this category for FIFRA and TSCA. While these organizations all have the resources
to engage in litigation, pesticides and chemical substances are low on their published
financial contributions scale (Open Secrets 2013). Headwater petitioned the Talent
Irrigation District in Oregon in one case and prevailed over the state government.
With nearly a quarter-million dollars in lobbying revenue alone and 10 of its 11
lobbyists having previously served as government employees, Headwater has the
financial and personnel resources to pursue more cases, but focuses on Superfund
lobbying instead.
The NRDC is one of the most well known environmental organizations with
litigation at the core of its agency mission followed by lobbying and supporting
Democrat politicians. Their issue areas of emphasis shift depending on political issues
of the time, which may explain why they did not pursue many cases during the period
of data included for this analysis. There were no major policy initiatives during the
W. Bush and Clinton administrations, likely not prompting the NRDC to pursue legal
claims. Similarly, the Sierra Club has a wide range of environmental issues it
advocates through litigation, a Super PAC, a 527 group, and education/outreach
efforts. During the time period of study for this statute, the Sierra Club was only
involved in two cases and won both against the government. Both the NRDC and
Sierra Club have the resources to be more involved in litigating pesticides and
chemicals, but additional research is necessary to understand how and why they
choose to file so few petitions.
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Policy involvement of environmental organizations has changed recently with
the proposal of the bipartisan Chemical Safety Improvement Act (CSIA) by Senator
Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Senator David Witter (R-LA) on May 22, 2013. The
CSIA is the first significant reform to TSCA since the statute’s passage and is
designed to require the EPA to test high-risk chemicals prior to their introduction to
the market. Whereas under TSCA, the EPA can only request safety testing on a
chemical if there is evidence it will put people at risk, the CSIA would require all
chemicals to be tested and increase the EPA’s regulatory authority to do so.
Additionally, it streamlines introduction of new chemicals and adds protections for
trade secrets (AAAS 2013). This proposed bill has bipartisan support of over 20
senators from states throughout the country (U.S. Congress 2013). The
Environmental Defense Fund, Chamber of Commerce, and the American Chemical
Council have also endorsed the Senate-introduced bill.
The environmental community has not unified behind the CSIA, however, and
as this bill moves through Congress, the voices of opposition will likely increase. One
objection is that the CSIA would preempt state laws such as California’s “Global
Warming Solutions Act” (AB 32) plus additional bills in the state regulating ozone
pollution, drinking water, and consumer product safety. The California EPA has
argued its laws go beyond the federal standards and provide a good example for
effective legislation and these would all be damaged by CSIA in its current form
(Sharp 2013).
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Earthjustice, Greenpeace, the Environmental Working Group, and Breast
Cancer Fund are four of approximately 15 groups welcoming efforts at improving
regulation of chemicals, but opposing CSIA in its current form. Earthjustice argues
the bill does not give the EPA authority to demand data critical to making a decision
on whether a chemical is safe and echoes concerns of the California EPA about CSIA
limiting the actions of states (Putrich, 2013). The Safer Chemicals, Happier Families
coalition also notes that CSIA continues problems inherent in TSCA such as not
establishing deadlines or timetables and fails to protect vulnerable populations from
chemical exposure (Safer Chemicals 2013). These organizations and state agencies
will continue lobbying Congress as CSIA moves from the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, knowing that if eventually passed, the next
battleground will be in the court system.
Conclusion
Overall, neither the legal model nor litigant resources helped understand underdog
success in chemical substance cases. The only significant variable in the final model
was success of the respondent and how this disadvantaged underdog litigants. The
findings in this chapter speak to the need for additional research into this unique area
of environmental law and a wider search that looks closely at cases beginning at the
district court level. A content analysis of the opinions to determine if judges use the
APA as an alternate guiding precedent to Chevron might also be helpful in
understanding the applicability of the legal model. For underdogs looking at how to
be most successful in this area, the data provides little guidance.
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Future research is needed to better understand why litigant types such as
nonprofits or state and local governments are less involved in this statute, whether
there are alternate administrative processes used in this environmental area outside of
the courts, and monitoring whether this changes with the potential reform of TSCA
by the CSIA. Until this statute is passed, lobbying for favorable language and
processes offers the most promise for litigants seeking policy, and ultimately legal,
reform. This dataset marks the first quantitative analysis of this environmental law
issue area, though, and provides a snapshot of the types of cases heard by the Court of
Appeals.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This research marks an original quantitative analysis of environmental laws during
this time period at the Court of Appeals. Including 566 cases in the final models for
five major environmental statutes, I provide a meaningful contribution to both the
judicial politics and environmental literatures. By testing the legal models and litigant
resources with data from a largely ignored area of law, I was able to discover the
extent to which the models help explain judicial outcomes and what litigants are able
to learn about litigation in this field of law.
My initial research design as discussed in Chapter 1 was to look at the
relationship between judicial behavior and litigant resources using the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act
(CWA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). For each statute, I coded every statutory
provision cited in the opinions to understand if and how specific case characteristics
explain underdog success. By definition, underdogs have fewer resources than their
opponents in court and I wanted to see if they were able to prevail on the merits of the
statute, as the legal model would suggest. I also tested for the influence of ideology
and strategic behavior by including ideological scores for every judge on the deciding
panel and then an overall ideological distance measure. We know that judicial
ideology is a strong predictor of outcomes at the Supreme Court, but the influence is
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less clear at the Court of Appeals and with environmental cases generally. Using both
a descriptive approach to understand the types of cases being litigated and a
quantitative analysis, I am able to present an original analysis of litigation in
environmental law at the appellate courts.
Across all five statutes, upperdogs won a majority of the time. RCRA was the
most favorable statute, with upperdogs winning 77.07% (n=121) and TSCA was the
least favorable statute for upperdogs (n=15 or 62.50%). Looking specifically at
litigant types, the federal government was the most successful type under RCRA
(n=77, 49.04%), CWA (n=193 or 72.56%), and the CAA (n=63 or 63%). Businesses
were the most successful under TSCA (n=31 or 47.69%) and FIFRA (n=148 or
55.64%). These findings support prior research on litigant resources and how they
contribute to upperdog success.
For the statutes in this dataset, the EPA was the most frequent party for the
federal government typology and the most common respondent. It was also the
agency delegated enforcement responsibilities. This puts the agency in an
advantageous position, particularly when you add legal precedents such as Chevron
or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) further instructing the court to defer to
the agency’s decisions.4 For RCRA, the EPA won 43 of the 51 cases to which it was a
party. Under the combined TSCA/FIFRA model, the EPA won 11 of its 19 cases.
Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA won 58 of its 74 cases. And finally, the EPA
4	
  Chevron

was not statistically significant in any of the five statutes, but is an
important indicator variable for this area of law because it calls for judicial deference
to the decisions made by federal agencies. It was also a CAA case, which makes it
particularly critical to include for this analysis. 	
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won 60 of its 100 CAA cases. These cases demonstrate that successfully challenging
the EPA is going to be very difficult with a small likelihood of success.

Statutory Review
In large part, there is more support for the litigant resources model and less support
for the legal model. The amount of resources a litigant had was consistently the
strongest predictor of case outcomes, with case characteristics explaining outcomes
for some statutes. Returning first to RCRA (Chapter 3), we find three of the
hypotheses supported by the data and several predictor variables for the legal model
significant. The most cited case provisions were those found in Subchapter III on
Hazardous Waste Management (§6928) and Subchapter 1 (6902, 6903) on
congressional findings, policy, and definitions. RCRA was the second largest statute
of the research with 157 cases and 115 variables in the final model.5 It was also the
only statute in this dataset for which gender was a significant predictor of underdog
success. Previous scholars have looked at the role of gender in sexual harassment or
gender discrimination cases where it was less surprising to find presence of a woman
to be significant, but it is interesting to find it matters for environmental law and
specifically underdog success. I hypothesized that presence of a woman would be
correlated with underdog success and the data supported this hypothesis.
One of the most interesting findings of RCRA was the near significance of
cases citing the statute’s citizen suit provision (p<0.057). As discussed in Chapters 1
5

There were 288 observations total, but due to incomplete data, a number of cases
were not included in the final model. 	
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and Chapter 4 (RCRA), citizen suits are an important provision allowing litigants to
challenge EPA actions given certain restrictions and legal hurdles they must first
overcome. I hypothesized that underdogs would be more successful when bringing
their case under this statute and the data showed the opposite result. Underdogs were
less likely to win when pursuing a case on the citizen suit grounds. More in-depth
research is needed to determine if courts are conducting in-depth reviews of the
citizen suits or if judges are only allowing the claim to be made and not giving it
much attention in the final opinion. Underdogs may also struggle to meet the standard
of review necessary for citizen suits and at the appellate level judges might be willing
to reverse the opinion of the lower court. Ultimately, this is not a strong legal
provision for underdogs to use and one that should be carefully considered in future
litigation. With limited resources, other provisions may be more worth the investment
for toxic waste cases.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the CAA dataset was a random sample of 100
cases with 549 variables. While it shares some similarities with other statutes, data for
this statute also behaved differently in a few instances. Respondent type was
significant only for the CAA and in the direction anticipated. As litigant petitioners
had more resources, underdogs were less likely to win. Nonprofits were the most
frequent petitioner type for the CAA just as they had been in the CWA, but petitioner
type was only significant in the CAA. It is not possible to determine which case
characteristics are more likely to help or hurt underdog litigants since none of them
were statistically significant in this sample.
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The CWA (Chapter 5) was the largest statute, with 244 cases in the final
model and 230 variables. I coded every case characteristic cited and though only
those appearing ten or more times were put in the final model the dataset provides a
snapshot of the litigation before the appellate courts in water pollution law. Citizen
suits under the CWA closely approached statistical significance in favor of
underdogs, which may reflect the greater involvement of water body-specific
nonprofits or a greater investment in this legal area by environmental organizations,
and contrasts with RCRA’s finding of citizen suits helping upperdogs. It also suggests
that underdogs may still find citizen suits to be a worthwhile investment, but that a
successful argument should be supported by other legal claims the data found to
improve underdogs odds of winning.
Finally, looking at TSCA (Chapter 6), one challenge this statute presented was
the small sample size. Only 24 cases met the coding rules and it was therefore
combined with FIFRA (n=41) for the quantitative analysis. The only two hypotheses
supported by the data were the ones that argued upperdogs would be the most
successful litigants and that underdogs would lose when the respondent prevailed.
A distinctive feature of FIFRA and TSCA is that this was the only chapter in
which businesses were the most successful litigant type in contrast to the federal
government winning in the other three statutes. Under TSCA, businesses were the
most frequent petitioner whereas individuals were the most frequent type under
FIFRA. By the nature of substances covered by these statutes, businesses are heavily
involved in the litigation and the current research demonstrates this and their ultimate
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success. Businesses are cast as underdogs using the typology in this dissertation, but
for these statutes, they have the most resources and are comparable to the federal
government in other statutes when looking at litigant experience and expertise in this
area of law. As debate on the Chemical Safety Improvement Act (CSIA) continues,
this will be an important area to monitor. Final language of the CSIA could have
significant implications on EPA authority to implement its regulations under TSCA.
The common themes across these statutes were upperdog success, significance
of the respondent winning and positive correlation with underdog success, and none
of the ideology measures being statistically significant. Each statute had distinctive
variables of significance, indicating varying degrees of support for the legal model,
but indicating more support for the litigant resources model.

Implications
Prior to this research, we did not know to what extent the legal model or litigant
resources applied to environmental law and to what extent this area of law was
different or similar to previously analyzed areas such as search and seizure.
Additionally, basic descriptive information about environmental cases appealed
through the legal system during this time period did not exist before. My dissertation
helps start filling in both of these knowledge gaps.
One of the questions initially propelling this research is how less-advantaged
litigants succeed in the court when they are outmatched in many ways. Prior research
at the Court of Appeals offers mixed reviews with case characteristics (under the
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legal model) mattering in some issue areas and ideology (under the attitudinal model)
explaining other areas. I wanted to not only fill in this gap, but also to understand how
underdogs can win when these factors are controlled for. Nonprofits have fewer
resources than three categories of litigants, so how and when do they prevail in court?
In the CWA, for example, nonprofit litigants were the most successful underdog. At
this stage of evaluation, the findings invite more questions as to why underdog
litigants such as nonprofits do prevail in limited situations when litigant resource
theory argues they are less likely to win. A more in-depth content analysis of the
opinions in cases nonprofits won is necessary to understand the legal strategies and if
those explained success or if there was an interaction between judicial ideology and
nonprofit success.
Less interesting than why the EPA wins, is how the EPA loses. Courts are
instructed to defer to the agency, but do they? Chevron was neither statistically
significant nor cited often in any statute. The federal government, often represented
by the EPA, was the most successful litigant in three of the five statutes. FIFRA and
TSCA were the two exceptions and these statutes primarily involved businesses. The
outcomes of cases in this data suggest that whether or not an opinion explicitly cites
Chevron, judges do defer to the agency’s position in a case. This supports the litigant
resources theory, but provides little backing for the legal model. One explanation
needing additional research and coding is the Administrative Procedures Act and if
judges use this statute instead of the Chevron decision. Future research looking at the
ideology of the judges along with the direction of the opinion either for or against the
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agency may help explain possible interaction effects of Chevron under the legal
model and ideology from the attitudinal model.
As described above, upperdogs win a majority of the time. The federal
government was the most successful litigant in three of the five statutes with
businesses winning in the remaining two. This has implications for individuals and
nonprofits pursuing cases in this area. If an individual or organization has very
limited resources, their odds of prevailing in court as a party to a case are very small
in most situations. For three of the five statutes, specific case provisions were helpful
for underdogs, suggesting that targeted litigation may be a good strategy. It may also
be beneficial for some underdogs to submit amicus briefs in support of a party with
more resources. Additional research is needed to determine the effectiveness of briefs
in this area, but the briefs require less of a resource investment than litigating a case
and still allow the litigant type to express its perspective.
A second implication is the additional questions it raises about gender and
race at the appellate level. Gender was significant in one statute: RCRA. Presence of
a woman increased the likelihood of an underdog winning under RCRA, but this
finding was not repeated in any other statute. Prior to this research, we did not have
much data on what role, if any, gender played in environmental law cases. Now, we
have data that invites additional research and a more in-depth analysis into distinctive
features of cases in which underdogs won and there was a woman on the panel. There
could be qualitative differences in the types of issues these statutes regulate and how
the court interprets them or maybe the types of agency actions or provisions litigated
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changed from one statute to another. A closer evaluation of the opinions authored by
female judges and of the panels with at least one woman is needed to understand how
this indicator variable explains outcomes in this area of law and if the finding can be
generalized to other environmental laws.
Presence of a minority justice was never a significant predictor variable and
did not help explain underdog success. As the court has become more diverse since
President Carter, expanding the dataset to more years and statutes may yield results in
these statutes. Data limitations at this time restrict the conclusions that can be made
based on the lack of significance.
For the legal model, the data in this dissertation supports the theory that case
characteristics do matter. Excluding FIFRA and TSCA, statutory provisions were
statistically significant in explaining underdog success in the statutes. While it could
be argued that litigants with more resources can make stronger arguments for specific
provisions and challenge more laws in one suit, the finding of case characteristics
mattering suggests the letter of the law is important at the appellate level in
environmental law in these cases and possibly other environmental laws as well.
When examining the control variables for ideology, neither panel ideology nor
ideological distance was significant in any of the five statutes. The explanatory value
of a judge’s ideology may also be more complex than the JCS scores used to measure
it in this dataset. Other scholars have looked at interactions between ideology and a
pro-environment or pro-business decision and this may better illustrate potential
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influences of ideology in these environmental statues than using political ideology on
a conservative-liberal scale as measured by the JCS scores.
Finally, this data provides the most support for litigant resource theory and is
consistent with previous scholars who argued litigant resources could explain legal
successes. Although underdogs prevailed in some instances, upperdogs won a
majority of the cases. Having more resources correlated with winning more cases.
Success of upperdogs varied depending on the statute, with some upperdogs such as
businesses prevailing more often in FIFRA and TSCA cases, but in no statute did
underdogs win more cases than more advantaged legal opponents. This could be a
discouraging result for underdogs, but the few areas of underdog success offer some
promise of prevailing in the courts.

Future Research
Moving forward, there are several areas I plan to expand. First, it would be valuable
to code each statute for the entire time period it has existed and see if litigant success
has changed over time. The CAA, for example, had two waves of significant
amendments in 1977 and 1990 and these likely changed the legal landscape. Were
underdogs more or less successful immediately after initial passage of the statute or
after these reforms? With most of the statutes passed during the Environmental
Decade of the 1970s, issue salience may have helped underdogs in the early years of
the statutes and of the EPA. An in-depth analysis of EPA success over time could also

169

provide valuable insight into the agency’s legal strategies and involvement in the
courts through cases and amicus briefs.
A more longitudinal approach would also help capture changes occurring on
the circuit courts. Presidents Carter and Clinton appointed record number of minority
and female judges to the bench and the current dataset only covers one of those
notable presidencies. Gender was only significant for RCRA, inviting the questions of
why only for this statute and why did it help underdogs to have a female judge on the
panel? Race was never significant. Little research has examined judicial behavior of
minority justices in environmental law, illustrating the need for more analysis.
A second planned expansion is looking more closely at amicus briefs. In this
research, I measure whether a brief was submitted for either the petitioner or
respondent. This was due to data limitations at the time, but restricted conclusions
that could be made. The first step would be looking at which parties submitted briefs
and who they supported. For underdogs facing limited resources, it is less of a
commitment to submit a brief than party to a case. Are certain organizations or
litigants more likely to submit a brief or join a case? Building on work by Collins
(2007), the second step is looking at whether there is a point at which amicus briefs
no longer help underdogs in environmental law. This could also be considered in a
time-bound context and whether amicus briefs were more important in the beginning
of a statute’s life or later after more precedents had been established. A third step is
looking at the content of the briefs and specifically at the issues they raise. A
comparison between the briefs and final majority opinions would be interesting. Do
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judges use the language or content from the amicus briefs? Does this change over
time as judges become more experienced in environmental law cases?
A third area to expand is forum shopping and if/how litigants do this.
Anecdotally, practicing attorneys in this area of law discuss how they feel certain
clerks, judges, or circuits are more likely to decide in their favor. When possible, they
will file cases in multiple circuits to increase the lottery odds of having the case heard
in a friendly one. Testing this claim empirically could help understand success of
some litigants in particular circuits and whether this strategy actually works.
Qualitative interviews with practicing attorneys and clerks would be the first step in
this expansion followed by looking at specific case opinions. Does choosing a
particular circuit or judge actually increase the odds of success?
A fourth area I would like to broaden the dataset to include is unpublished
opinions. Until the access afforded by Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER), obtaining an unpublished opinion was logistically challenging and required
trips to the courthouses. PACER has made unpublished opinions available, but
remains cost-prohibitive without significant financial resources. Research by
Ringquist and Emmert (1991) found differences in penalty severity between
unpublished and published opinions and this could be one of many differences
between the two opinion types. Westlaw and Lexis Nexis include some unpublished
opinions, which were in the dataset for this research, but I was limited to only those
included by the sites. A more comprehensive data collection would provide scholars
with resources to better evaluate unpublished opinions.
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Fifth, I would like to expand my research to include other statutes, specifically
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA). The ESA is one of the few major environmental statutes whose jurisdiction
is not under the EPA; the Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
the Department of Commerce, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency
(NOAA) are responsible for enforcement. With the EPA as the most successful
federal litigant in the current data, it would be interesting to see what happens with
litigant success when that agency is not directly involved. CERCLA’s liability regime
and connection to RCRA make it an intriguing statute to analyze and the SDWA
covers water challenges similar to the CWA. When added to the existing five statutes
coded, a very comprehensive dataset on an understudied area of law would exist and
be valuable for future scholars in the field.
Sixth, and finally, I plan to expand the administrative law portion of my
research including coding for whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was
cited in the majority opinion and the type of action challenged in the case. Chevron
was not cited to the extent I would have expected and specific attention to the APA
and appealed actions may help explain this result.

Overview
This research provides a meaningful contribution to the both judicial politics and
environmental policy and law. It is an original dataset bridging the two fields and
172

examining litigant success at the circuit court level. While not an exhaustive dataset,
566 cases from 16 years across five environmental laws is a solid foundation of
research enabling unique analysis. Judicial scholars now have data on a previously
ignored area of law and a better understanding of similarities and differences of
behavior in this area as compared to others. Environmental scholars have information
on how policies are interpreted within the legal system, but also a sense of the
effectiveness of pursuing court cases. The dissertation bridges these two fields that
traditionally do not speak to one another, hopefully informing both and making a
meaningful contribution to the disciplines.
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Appendix A: Variables, Measurement, and Hypotheses for the Dataset
Variables
Chevron

Measurement
1=Chevron cited in the majority
opinion
0=Chevron is not cited

Case
characteristics

1=case characteristic is present
0=case characteristic is not
present
This will vary by statute
Circuits 1–11 coded by the
circuit number. D.C. Circuit
coded as 12.

Circuit
location

Litigant type
(for petitioner
and
respondent)

1=individual
2=nonprofit
3=business
4=state and local government
5=federal government

Panel ideology

The JCS score of the median
justice is used for each panel
(Epstein, Martin, Segal,
Westerland 2007).

Circuit
ideology

Using data from Keele (2010),
this is the median ideology of
judges in the deciding circuit.
The median JCS score of the
panel is subtracted from the
median JCS score of the circuit.
0=no women on the panel
1=at least one woman on the
panel
0=no minorities on the panel
1=at least one minority on the
panel
Coded as 0=no amicus briefs
submitted or 1=one or more
amicus briefs submitted.
0=no citation to CERCLA
1=citation to CERCLA

Distance

Panel gender

Panel race

Amicus brief

CERCLA
(for RCRA
only)
Litigant

0=petitioner wins
1=respondent wins

Hypotheses
Chevron requires deference to agency decisions. Since
underdogs are more likely to be challenging an agency
action, this variable is expected to be negatively
correlated with underdog success.
Every statutory provision is coded and sections litigated
ten or more times are included. These are control
variables.
Wenner and Dutter 1988 note litigants at the district court
level are more successful than others depending on the
circuit. This variable will test those findings at the
appellate level.
This variable is a typology of litigants and a proxy for
resources. Starting with individuals (coded as 1) and
moving up through nonprofits, businesses, state/local
governments, and ending with the federal
government/agency (coded as 5), this variable is expected
to be negatively related to underdog success. As litigants
have more resources, the underdog is less likely to win.
Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer (1992) and Songer and
Sheehan (1992) argue panel ideology affects litigant
success with some litigant types more likely to succeed
than others depending on the panel’s composition. A
liberal panel, using the judicial Common Space scores,
will be more likely to rule in favor of the underdog.
Liberal circuits, as measured by Keele (2010) using the
JCS scores, will be positively related to underdog success
as found in Songer and Sheehan (1992).
This is a control variable for circuit ideology and strategic
behavior.
With women more likely to rule liberally, this variable
will be positively related with the liberal outcome of
underdog success.
This is a control variable for the effect of race on a panel.

Viewing amicus briefs as additional resources for
resource-challenged litigants (Collins 2007) this variable
will be positively related to underdog success.
This is a control variable for RCRA cases.

This is a control variable used for the greater frequency of
respondents winning appeals. In this dataset, it also
controls for the federal government appearing most often
as the respondent and winning a large number of its cases.
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Appendix B: Case Characteristics by Statute
Statute
Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act

Clean Air Act

Clean Water Act

Case Characteristics
6901—Congressional findings
6902—Objectives and national policy
6903—Definitions
6921—Identification and listing of hazardous waste
6922—Standards applicable to generators of hazardous waste
6924—Standards applicable to owners and operators of hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
6925—Permits for treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous
waste
6926—Authorized State hazardous waste programs
6928—Federal enforcement
6941—Objectives of subchapter
6972—Citizen suits
6976—Judicial review
7401–7671—Provisions of statute
7401—Congressional findings and declaration of purpose
7409—National primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards
7410—State implementation plans for national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards
7607b—Administrative proceedings and judicial review
7607b1—Administrative proceedings and judicial review
7607d9a—Administrative proceedings and judicial review
(rulemaking)
7661c—Permit requirements and conditions
7661d—Notification to Administrator and contiguous states
1251—Congressional declaration of goals and policy
1251a—Congressional declaration of goals and policy: Restoration
and maintenance of chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
Nation’s waters; national goals for achievement of objective
1311—Effluent limitations
1312—Water quality related effluent limitations
1313—Water quality standards and implementation plans
1314—Information and guidelines
1316—National standards of performance
1317—Toxic and pretreatment effluent standards
1319—Enforcement
1319a—Enforcement: state enforcement; compliance orders
1319b—Enforcement: civil actions
1319c—Enforcement: criminal penalties
1319d—Enforcement: civil penalties; factors considered in
determining amount
1319g—Enforcement: administrative penalties
1328—Aquaculture
1341—Certification
1342—National pollutant discharge elimination system
1342a—National pollutant discharge elimination system: permits
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Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
Rodenticide, and Toxic
Substances Control Act

for discharge of pollutants
1342b—National pollutant discharge elimination system: state
permit program
1342c—National pollutant discharge elimination system:
suspension of federal program upon submission of state program;
withdrawal of approval of state program; return of state program to
administrator
1342p—National pollutant discharge elimination system: municipal
and industrial stormwater discharges
1344—Permits for dredged or fill material
1344a—Permits for dredged or fill material: discharge into
navigable waters at specified disposal sites
1344f—Permits for dredged or fill material: non-prohibited
discharge of dredged or fill material
1345—Disposal or use of sewage sludge
1362—Definitions
1365—Citizen suits
1365a—Citizen suits: authorization: jurisdiction
1365b—Citizen suits: notice
136—Definitions
136aa—Registration of pesticides: requirement of registration
136vab—Authority of states: in general, uniformity
2601—Findings, policy, and intent
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Appendix C: Map of Federal Circuits

U.S. Courts. www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf. Accessed June 3,
2013.
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